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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is concerned with two critical and interrelated questions in
American public law. The first question is how the law should regulate
politics. Specifically, how can legal doctrine be brought to bear on
processes of politics and political decisionmaking in order to produce
superior outcomes and to improve the operations of political process? This
question has been central to the agenda of public law scholars in modem
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times.' During the 1960s and 70s, when the Legal Process movement
commanded the attention of public law scholars, the question whether and
to what extent law could perfect politics was the core question of the
field.2 What was fundamentally at stake in the question of how best to
construct a system of public law-constitutional law, administrative law,
federal jurisdiction, regulatory law-was the efficacy and competence of
American political and legal institutions under alternative doctrinal regimes
and rules of law. Throughout the era in which the courts continually
revisited questions concerning the desirability of judicial intervention to
reign in the pernicious offspring of flawed political processes,3 was the
driving Legal Process theme that courts could perform the task of
improving politics and political decisionmaking. The notion of courts as
capable of credible interventions into process failures survived the decline
of Legal Process as the dominant organizing principle in public law
doctrine and theory.4
The second question is how the law should deal with the modem
regulatory process. We live, as we are constantly reminded, in an
administrative state.' Regulation and administration are an ever-present
1. See, e.g., Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES (1988); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW
AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROACHES TO POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1964); Paul
S. Edwards & Nelson W. Polsby, Introduction: The Judicial Regulation of Political Processes-In
Praise of Multiple Criteria, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 190 (1991); Jon G. Deutsch, Neutrality,
Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN.
L. REV. 169 (1968).
2. See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Laws (tent. ed. 1958) (on file with author). There have been a number
of pathbreaking scholarly analyses of the Legal Process movement published in the past five years. See,
e.g., Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV%. 601 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement:
Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707 (1991); Gary Peller, Neutral
Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 56 (1988). See also EDWARD PURCELL, THE CRISIS
OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973); Jan Vetter, Postwar Legal Scholarship on Judicial Decisionmaking,
33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 412 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See generally Hans A. Linde, Due
Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA.
L. REV. 747 (1991).
5. See THEODORE J. LOWi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1980); Edward L. Rubin, Law and
Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 369 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987).
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source of policies and programs.6 There was a time, certainly, when this
question was approached with a studied skepticism. The bulk of the
Progressive era and New Deal architects thought that law was inconsistent
with sound administration of the regulatory state.7 The thrust of American
public law should, in the thinking of an earlier generation of public law
scholars, be concerned with, as the song says, "get[ting] out of the way if
you can't lend a hand."' It is well known that American public law made
a sharp turn in the late 60s and 70s and, in caselaw and commentary, the
energies of American administrative law were directed toward constructing
rubrics and regimes of legal control.9 The question of how law should
deal with the regulatory state remains central to the agenda of American
public law scholarship.
Each of these questions is fundamentally about the relationship between
law and government. Yet, legal scholars have been frequently ambivalent
in absorbing the thoughts and insights of those political scientists whose job
it is to think carefully about precisely this relationship. The separation of
functions, with legal scholars thinking about law and political scientists
thinking about politics, cannot be easily maintained where the very
underpinnings of the subject call for simultaneous attention to both
elements and to the intersections between the two.") The most fruitful
efforts to understand the contours of American public law-its possibilities,
its limits, its normative foundations-have grown out of the collaborative
efforts of lawyers and social scientists to understand the phenomena that
underlies their respective disciplines. For lawyers, this has generally meant
critically examining the dimensions of politics and political
6. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 74-110 (1990); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986).
7. For a classic statement, see JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). See also
Sunstein, supra note 5, at 422-25.
8. BOB DYLAN, THE TImES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN (Columbia Records 1964). Dylan scholars
will note that the precise quotation is the following: "Your old road is rapidly aging/Get out of the new
one if you can't lend a hand..."
9. See, e.g., LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965); Richard
B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). For a
discussion of this era, see generally WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS 475-503 (8th ed. 1987).
10. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline ofLaw as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-87, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 761 (1987).
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decisionmaking;" for political scientists, this has meant examining the
nature and qualities of law, legal rules, and legal institutions.12 Mutually
reinforcing attention to law and government is crucial to tackling the two
interrelated questions.
One of the more interesting and important set of perspectives on politics
and regulation over the past thirty years has been the use of rational choice
theory to study regulatory decisionmaking and political processes. 3
Although styled as an analytical paradigm, rational choice theory has
moved off in many different directions. Some scholars have concentrated
on the use of interest group theory to study the demand for and the supply
of regulatory policy by administrative agencies and the legislature.
14
Others have considered whether "democratic" decisionmaking in multi-
member, collective institutions is possible within certain conditions."
Still others have considered the economic organizations of bureaucratic
institutions from the perspective of the "new economics of organization."16
This disparate body of work is held together by the underlying rational
choice heuristic, the assumption that political decisionmakers act rationally
with an eye toward accomplishing certain aims and that there exist certain
conditions and constraints on politicians' ability to pursue these aims within
their institutions. 7 Rational choice theories of politics are centrally
concerned with the same fundamental issue as are public law scholars: the
relationship between law and government.
In recent years, a growing number of political economists have brought
together a number of these strands of rational choice theories and, in
particular, the technologies of collective choice theory, principal-agent
theory and game theory, in order to develop a comprehensive positive
11. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990);
SUNSTEIN, supra note 6.
12. See, e.g., GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL ON
ADMINISTRATION (1988); R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS (1983); Robert Kagan,
Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369 (1991).
13. For a valuable survey of some important currents of theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP
P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). See generally infra part
III.B.
14. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 13, at ch. 2. See generally infra part III.B.
15. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 13, at ch. 3. See generally infra part IV.B.2.
16. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739 (1984).
See generally infra part III.C.
17. See Roger G. Noll, Introduction to Symposium, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
June 1994).
1994]
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theory of politics.1 8 Among the various dimensions to this ambition, two
are especially relevant to the purposes of this Article. One is the concern
with understanding systematically, and with the aid of formal theory, the
nature of the political institutions that are involved in regulatory
decisionmaking.'9 Too often, public law scholars have accepted descrip-
tions of Congress, the President, the judiciary, and the administrative
agencies as monolithic entities, essentially categorizable by how much they
are, and properly should be, concerned with politics or law. Moreover,
they have described the essential differences among the branches mainly at
the level of power-that is, what sort of powers Congress, the President,
the agencies, and the courts can exercise-as though the lines are severe
and the distribution of power immutable. Positive political theories of
legislation and regulation question the premises of these assumptions and
principles. By contrast to traditional public law scholarship, attention in
positive political theory is drawn to questions of how institutions are
constructed and how they function; they are treated as neither monolithic
nor immutable. Instead, they both reflect and shape the course of
regulatory decisionmaking as instruments of politicians' rational strategies
and as constraints on the exercise of such strategies. A second dimension
that is especially relevant is the consideration of the dynamic qualities of
the regulatory process.2" Regulatory policymaking is considered, in the
positive political theory framework, as a series of processes in which
institutions compete with one another for regulatory influence and control.
Regulation and administration are merely the outputs of political processes.
The creation of a regulatory program represents the setting in motion of a
process which presents to politicians sources of opportunities, as well as
risks. Understanding how regulatory policy is shaped requires understand-
ing how politicians take advantage of these opportunities and deal with
these risks. Positive political theory provides frameworks for thinking
about the dynamics of regulatory policymaking in a system comprised of
competing institutions and loci of power.
The prospect that we can incorporate the insights from positive political
theory into our thinking about the questions of how law should regulate
18. For a breezy, but useful, discussion of the phrase "positive political theory," see Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457
(1992) (defining positive political theory as "non-normative, rational-choice theories of political
institutions").
19. See discussion infra part IV.B-D.
20. See discussion infra part IV.E.
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politics and deal with the administrative state depends upon premises that
are ultimately more normative than positive. Rational choice theory has no
recommendations for legal reform. Positive theory cannot replace
normative theory. Recommendations for regulatory reform, whatever their
content, must be built on a construction of normative principles and
positive analysis in which the basic question to which we always return is:
How does this positive analysis or description help us to think about the
potential or limits of this strategy of legal reform?
Still yet, positive political theory can help us rethink our premises. One
critical premise that underlies this Article is that law and the institutions
that make law are embedded within politics. This is not meant to sound
like a variation on the critical theme that "law is politics." Rather, the
thrust of the premise is conservative; law should not be thought of as an
exogenous set of principles that can be shaped to rescue important
normative principles from legislative and administrative politics. The
farther we try and move from the realities of American government and
administration in establishing our normative principles of law, the less
likely we are to improve (or, if you prefer, "perfect") the legislative and
administrative processes that supply public policy.2' Law does not merely
reflect politics; but it does fundamentally and inescapably grow out of
politics and the structure of political decisionmaking. Accordingly,
sustained empirical and theoretical attention to the American political
system-whether from the perspective of positive political theory-is
necessary to undergird normative public law.
The object of this extended consideration of positive political theory as
a source of frameworks for thinking about legislative politics and regulation
is to examine why efforts at reforming political processes and regulation
frequently run up against the realities of politics and the limits of public
law. Politics constrain regulatory reform; at the same time, a key part of
the agenda of regulatory reform is to reconstruct politics. This Article
brings positive political theory to bear in appraising this dilemma.
Part I sets out some of the basic elements of the problem. The
objectives of regulatory reform are to improve the product of regulation and
administration. The increasing urgency with which scholars speak of the
regulatory predicament and of regulatory paradoxes suggests that contempo-
rary regulation has failed in important ways. These failures are, as is
suggested in Part I, significantly the product of the institutional dimensions
21. See discussion infra part V.B.
1994]
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of regulatory politics.
In Part II, I examine the efforts to understand institutions and the
dimensions of institutional decisionmaking from the perspective of rational
choice theory. Part II claims that the two principal efforts to understand
the role of institutions in regulation-interest group theory and the new
economics of organization-are seriously flawed. Specifically, neither
effort directly confronts the pivotal roles of politics and law in enabling and
constraining rational political actors and in framing regulatory choices.
Part III represents an extended examination of the strands of positive
political theory. Following a discussion of the basic themes and technolo-
gies of positive political theory, I consider a number of different positive
theories of legislative, presidential, and judicial institutions. The message
of these eclectic theories is that political institutions represent the product
of rational, strategic choices made by political actors within an environment
made up of competing institutions, of uncertainty concerning the nature and
effect of politicians' choices, and of limits imposed by law. At the end of
Part III, I consider the dynamics of regulatory policymaking from the
perspective of positive political theories of inter-institutional competition
for regulatory influence and control.
In Part IV, I consider the applications of positive political theory to some
normative issues in statutory interpretation and administrative law. The
basic theme is that positive political theories of legislation and regulation
can shed important light on the prospects and limits of regulatory reform;
to appreciate this, I focus attention on two particular aspects of public law:
statutory interpretation and administrative law.
This Article strikes a tone that reflects attention to the trees, often at the
expense of the forest. The object, however, is more ambitious than merely
surveying a part of the rational choice terrain. While I am concerned with
understanding many of the debates that rage within a particular part of a
particular paradigm-positive political theory as a branch of rational choice
theory-and how they help us in understanding politics and regulation, I
have in mind, at the same time, the larger questions with which I began
this introduction. The issue is not primarily whether we should venerate
positive political theory as a method for understanding the politics of
regulation and for grounding normative public law scholarship. Instead, the
issue is broader: How can public law scholars make use of the contribu-
tions of positive theory and social science in order to develop more
sophisticated and analytically rich normative theories of public law? The
state of the two fields that are considered in Part IV-statutory interpreta-
tion and administrative law-suggest that public law scholars have not
[VOL. 72:1
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always made the most use of contemporary social science, much less
rational choice theory. Let us put it this way: If positive political theory
could do for public law what, say, finance theory has done for corporate
law, we would have made progress indeed. The interpenetration of finance
theory into the legal literature on corporate law has not replaced prescrip-
tive theory with positive analysis and data. Rather, it has provided another
window for the fundamental questions that have defined the theory.
Positive political theory likewise furnishes a fresh view at the same
essential cathedral.'
II. THE OBJECTIVES OF REGULATORY REFORM
A. Perspectives on Regulatory Failure
By nearly all accounts, we are in the grips of a regulatory predica-
ment.23 We want governmental regulation designed to fulfill a number of
critical social needs, such as making consumer products, the workplace, and
the roads safer; cleaning the environment; and improving the conditions of
the socially and economically disadvantaged.24 We have had a taste of
success; regulation over the course of the past two decades has yielded
significant benefits.' Yet, modem regulation has fallen far short of
accomplishing its objectives. While measuring regulatory success or failure
is notoriously difficult,26 resort to a familiar cadre of evaluative criteria
has helped scholars construct a critical picture of contemporary regulation.
This picture suggests that, by a number of different measures, regulation
has fallen short of its intended goals and, in some important respects, has
actually left us worse off.
There are different dimensions to this critique. Perhaps the most
common basis for criticizing contemporary regulatory policy has been that
regulation, taken as a whole, imposes significant costs on the economy that
22. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327
(1983).
23. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993); SUNSTEIN, supra note 6; AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY (1988).
24. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at ch. 2.
25. See id. at 77-8 1.
26. See id. at 75-77. See also Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of
Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233 (1991). On cost/benefit analysis generally,
see R. Shep Melnick, The Politics of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in VALUING HEALTH RISKS, COSTS, AND
BENEFITS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING: REPORT OF A CONFERENCE (P. Hammond & R.
Coppock eds., 1990).
1994]
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are not justified by its corresponding benefits.27 These costs include the
decline in productivity of American enterprise as a result of complying with
federal and state regulations. Often this decline is styled, albeit with some
hyperbole, as a threat to America's "competitiveness."2 Every critic has
his or her favorite parade of horribles. John Mendeloff, for example, has
described the tremendous investment the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) made to eradicate vinyl chloride in the workplace,
a project that expended around $40 million for each life saved.29 The
regulation of asbestos is another common scapegoat. 0 OSHA's 1986
exposure limit on asbestos in the workplace cost an estimated $71 million
per statistical life saved.31 Perhaps the all-time champion for the greatest
mismatch between costs and benefits in the health and safety area is,
according to the federal government's 1992 regulatory report, the EPA's
hazardous waste listing for wood-preserving chemicals, a regulation with
an estimate $5.5 billion price tag per life saved.32
Beyond the objection that regulation's costs exceed its benefits, critics
argue that the techniques constructed by politicians are unsuited to the
regulatory goals established via the program.3 The problem is one of
regulatory "mismatch," described as the use of inapt regulatory methods
and strategies in the pursuit of regulatory goals.34 Sometimes the problem
is with the particular regulatory device that the politicians have chosen.
Reliance on rent control, for instance, as a means of ensuring greater
distributional equity among the population of renters or rentees has been
criticized as a counterproductive method of accomplishing its intended
goals.35 A standard economic objection is that limiting the owners' profits
limits the supply of available rental units, thus driving up the rents of the
remaining units. Moreover, limiting the owner's profit limits the incentives
27. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1080,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 17passim (1981) (collecting and describing
studies). See also LESTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION FRAMEWORKS
FOR POLICY (1981); Hahn & Hird, supra note 26, at 261-78.
28. See MARK PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 507-41 (1990).
29. JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION: How OVERREGULA-
TION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 22 (1988).
30. See BREYER, supra note 23, at 12-15, 26-27 (citing Regulatory Program of the United States
Government, April 1, 1991-March 31, 1992, at 12).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 26-27.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 59-64 (describing the flaws with this argument).
34. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
35. See, e.g., Edgar Olson, Is Rent Control Good Social Policy?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 931
(1991).
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of owners to invest in upkeep and improvement, thus reducing the quality
of the units. In a similar vein is the economic objection to the minimum
wage, that it reduces employment by making it more expensive for an
employer to hire marginal workers. 6 Additionally, consider the argument
that the use of particular price control strategies to regulate air travel before
deregulation in the late 1970s preserved inefficiencies in the industry and
hanned consumers.37
More generally, the use of command-and-control strategies of regulation
has come under fire.3" In the past two decades, government prohibitions
and restrictions, often imposed through administrative regulation and,
occasionally, through judicial decree have been the favored strategy of
regulation. In any case, these "regulation by directive" approaches have
constricted the ability of regulated industries to adapt creatively and more
efficiently to the social and economic goals underlying regulation's
imperatives. As with the critique of modem regulation generally, the
concern is that command-and-control regulation is neither cost effective nor
cost beneficial when weighed against alternative regulatory techniques.39
Specifically, command-and-control strategies perform poorly when called
upon to regulate imperfectly perceived, polycentric risks.4" When
regulators are fairly low down on the technological learning curve, reliance
on direct and particular techniques of regulation risks significant error.
Recent calls for a more sophisticated approach to risk regulation4! or,
36. See, e.g., FINIs WELCH, MINIMUM WAGES: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE (1978).
37. See, e.g., ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
209-20 (1988). For a lively discussion of Professor Kahn's role in deregulating the airlines, see
THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION ch. 7 (1984).
38. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION (1992); MASHAW &
HARFST, supra note 11, at 233-47; Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); Richard B.
Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV.
1256 (1981).
39. The conspicuous debate over the use oftransferable emission permits as a substitute for classic
command-and-control regulation illustrates the nature of the disagreement. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn
& Roger G. Noll, Environmental Markets in the Year 2000, 3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 351 (1990);
Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions
Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989); Roger G. Noll, Implementing Marketable Emissions
Permits, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 120 (1982).
40. See, e.g., Donald T. Homstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms
and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369 (1993); John S. Applegate, The
Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM.
L. REv. 261 (1991).
41. BREYER, supra note 23, at ch. 3; Clayton P. Gillete & James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and
Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027 (1990).
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more ambitiously, for a "reconstitutive law" for the modem regulatory
state,42 have been grounded on the view that modem command-and-
control strategies frequently fail to accomplish their purported aims.43
In addition, we are plagued, argues Cass Sunstein, by a series of
regulatory paradoxes." One paradox is that regulating new risks
aggressively leaves in place old, and more threatening, risks. 45  For
instance, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulations
requiring installation of anti-smog devices in cars built after a certain year
means that older, more polluting cars stay on the road longer.46 Relatedly,
the requirement in air pollution statutes that polluters use the "best
available technology" in controlling pollution retards the development of
newer, more effective technologies for pollution control.47  Moreover,
requiring stringent regulation may, paradoxically, result in
underregulation. 48 The idea here is that regulators will be reluctant to act
when their only options are no regulation or extremely strict regulation.
Consider the example of toxic substances regulation.49 The Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (1970 Act) is a classic command-and-
control regulatory statute;5" it creates an agency and charges it with the
responsibility of regulating with precision and energy substances that create
a "material impairment of health."'" In its early years, OSHA moved
slowly to regulate toxic substances in the workplace. When it acted,
however, the standards were quite strict on the theory that the 1970 Act
obliged the agency to regulate risks up to the point at which the regulated
industry would collapse. This was its understanding of the "all regulation
that is feasible" command of the 1970 Act.52 Ten years after its enact-
42. See Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86 (1986). Cf. SUSAN ROSE-
ACKERMAN, REFORMING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1991).
43. This concept of "regulatory aims" is quite slippery as we will consider in more detail below.
See infra text accompanying notes 59-64.
44. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407 (1990).
45. See id. at 417-19; Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025
(1983).
46. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 27 (1981).
47. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 420-21; Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985).
48. See, e.g., MENDELOFF, supra note 29; Sunstein, supra note 44, at 413-16.
49. On OSHA and toxic substances, see generally GRAHAM WILSON, THE POLITICS OF SAFETY
AND HEALTH (1985); BENJAMIN W. MINTz, OSHA: HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY (1984).
50. For a good account of the political origins of the 1970 Act, see Mark Kelman, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 236 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
52. See MENDELOFF, supra note 29.
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ment, however, the Supreme Court created a limitation to the apparently
limitless scope of the regulatory charge to the agency, holding that OSHA
was responsible for regulating only "significant" risksi 3  OSHA's
statutory responsibilities after this decision, however, remained very
stringent; OSHA took on the responsibility to construct a web of command-
and-control regulation in order to eradicate workplace risks.: The result
of this concerted strategy-a strategy formulated through the agency's
interpretation of the language and history of the 1970 Act-was an
underregulation of the most severe risks and an overregulation of those
risks which, on balance, posed less substantial threats to worker health."
Hence a regulatory paradox: Heavy-handed regulation resulted in
underregulation and therefore seemed to undermine the very purposes for
which this strict statute was created.
Beyond the paradoxical quality of contemporary regulatory strategy,
some commentators insist that the main problem is underenforcement and
underregulation or, even more simply, the failure of agencies to regulate
adequately the risks and harms that come within their programmatic
mandates. The classic whipping-boy of this category has been the
Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC) and its statutory charge
under the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 to regulate risks to
consumers. Created with fanfare in the midst of the burst of new social
regulation in the early 1970s, the CPSC has remained in virtual desue-
tude . 6 Few consumer risks have been regulated; the CPSC has concen-
trated its rare efforts on rather obscure risks, such as lawn darts and
disposable lighters, while eschewing regulation of those risks that are
53. Industrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (The Benzene Case).
54. Prior to the Benzene decision, OSHA was reluctant to attempt to quantify the risk presented
by substances, and generally devoted little attention to the significance of the risks presented by these
various substances. Since the Supreme Court has compelled the agency to change these policies,
however, OSHA's determinations of significant risk have been among the most coherent of all such
federal regulatory decisions. Frank B. Cross, Beyond Benzene: Establishing Principles for a Signifi-
cance Threshold on Regulatable Risks of Cancer, 25 EMORY L.J. 1, 12-13 (1986).
55. See MENDELOFF, supra note 29, at 119-21. John Dwyer disagrees with Mendeloff's
assessment that the Benzene decision exacerbated underregulation. John P. Dwyer, Overregulation, 15
ECOL. L.Q. 719, 730-32 (1988) (book review). He notes that OSHA was quite slow to adopt regulatory
standards before the Court's decision. Id. at 730. Moreover, the case, in proffering the opaque
"significant risk" standard accorded significant latitude to agencies to regulate at their own pace. Id.
at 730-31. In recent years, however, the (increasingly conservative) D.C. Circuit has strengthened the
"significance" criterion. See, e.g., United Auto Workers v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
56. See, e.g., Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product
of the Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 32 (1982).
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widely regarded as more significant.17  As a result, the CPSC has been
perceived as something of a laughing-stock, an agency that reacts slowly
and ineptly to public outcry but generally remains in the shadows. Another
prominent target has been the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the agency
assigned to regulate unfair trade practices and to implement important parts
of the federal antitrust laws. 8 During the 1970s, the FTC was mostly
dormant, declining to pursue regulatory initiatives such as restrictions on
certain forms of children's advertising and regulation of the funeral
industry. The FTC was, for all practical purposes, fair game to critics
writing in the 1980s that the agency had eschewed its statutory responsibili-
ties to regulate aggressively. The FTC was seen as a rogue agency,
shielded from punishment by its legislative and executive benefactors and
irresponsible in its unwillingness to tackle head-on the significant
regulatory issues under its ken. 9
Underlying many of the critiques described above is the notion that the
goals of the regulatory program are not being met.6" This is seen as a
principal element of the so-called regulatory predicament. Agencies and
administrators as creatures of Congress and the President are falling short
of their missions and disappointing their makers by their incompetence and
opportunistic behavior. The consequence is not merely poor regulation in
some sort of objective terms, but an incommensurability between the
structure and purpose of the regulatory program and its implementation.
However, the notion that Congress establishes regulatory goals and aims
that the agency struggles to meet is problematic. To begin with, there is
no monolithic "Congress" to which we can ascribe overarching inten-
tions;6 1 Congress conducts its business through a combination of institu-
57. Examples might include cigarettes and firearms.
58. See KENNETH W. CLARKSON & TIMOTHY J. Mulus, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE
1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR (1981); Ernest Gellhorn, Regulatory
Reform and the Federal Trade Commission's Antitrust Jurisdiction, 49 TENN. L. REV. 471 (1982);
Robert A. Katzmann, Federal Trade Commission, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 152 (James Q.
Wilson ed., 1980).
59. A revisionist interpretation of the FTC's behavior during this era, an interpretation illustrative
of some of the positive political theory themes discussed in this Article, is provided in Barry P.
Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory
Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
60. See sources cited in supra notes 56-58.
61. Kenneth A. Shepsle aptly titled his contribution to a recent positive political theory
symposium, Congress Is a "They" Not an "It. " See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They" Not
an "It". Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). See also discussion
infra note 195 and accompanying text.
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tions and coalitions.6 z Insofar as regulatory statutes are the product of this
complex web of lawmaking interactions, these statutes will have multiple
purposes.63 They will set regulatory goals, but may have different
understandings and predictions concerning how (and if) these regulatory
goals should be met.' We should be wary of these critiques. We should
not declare that an agency is eschewing its statutory responsibilities by
simply identifying an agency and claiming that it has not engaged in what
we deem sufficiently aggressive regulation as measured by, say, the number
of rules issued or the agency's vigor in pursuing enforcement actions.6"
Rather, we must attempt to understand the dimensions of these responsibili-
ties. Is the regulatory program constructed with an eye toward setting a
minimal level of enforcement? Has Congress left to the agency-and to
future legislative coalitions-the responsibility to hammer out the proper
level and techniques of regulation in the future? To assess the degree to
which the agency has "complied" with its regulatory goals, we must
understand, and not merely speculate about, the nature and conditions of
the regulatory program as constructed by legislators and the President.
The hypothesis at the core of the positive political theory of legislation
and regulation is that this process of construction represents exercises in
rational, strategic political action. Positive political theory stresses the role
of politics and political action in the construction of the regulatory
program's construction, implementation, and interpretation.66 From the
perspective of regulatory reform, understanding the role of strategic,
political action within the structure of institutions and legal rules helps us
understand both what is possible in terms of reforming regulation. Judging
what is desirable is, of course, a normative enterprise; all that positive
62. See infra text accompanying notes 278-84 (describing Congress as collection of institutions
and coalitions).
63. Recall the example of toxic substances and OSHA. The lesson of the Benzene decision was
that the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, containing both the section which defined
"occupational safety and health standard" as that standard which is "reasonably necessary or
appropriate," 29 U.S.C. § 3(8) (1988) and the section which required the agency to "set the standard
which most adequately assures ... that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or
functional capacity ... ," 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988), embodied multiple purposes. This threatens
the sort of sweeping delegation that was held in the Benzene decision to be constitutionally problematic.
See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 640-46 (1980).
64. On the dilemmas faced by agencies and courts in connection with a statute with multiple
purposes, see John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOL. L.Q. 233 (1990).
65. This is also the case in the various critiques of the CPSC and the FTC. See discussion infra
part V.A.
66. See discussion infra part IV.D.
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theory can provide is the tools, the perspectives, and the frameworks. For
prescription, we need to examine the nature and scope of the system's
ailments to determine what sort of investments we want to make in
regulatory reform.
If we cannot leap to the conclusion that contemporary regulation fails to
fulfill its statutory promises, is there any basis to criticize regulation and to
call for reform? Yes, but the perspective is more objective and, for that
reason, more certain. The real predicament is that regulation seems to yield
a declining set of benefits for its costs. Regulation is not clearly making
us better off. Regulatory administration is used as a means of expanding
the political influence and opportunities of rational politicians rather than
as a means of improving the state of the economy and society. It is against
the standard of an improved quality of life that contemporary regulation
fails, and not against some politically bounded standard of political
infidelity and undemocratic conduct.67
No one could tackle the overarching question begged by general critiques
of regulation: Is contemporary regulation on balance a good or a bad thing?
The question is too general and abstract to yield a studied answer. There
are, however, real. questions that lie at the heart of most critiques of
regulation in modem America." These questions concern why the
67. The normative focus here is admittedly on the measurable cost/benefits elements of regulatory
performance. What is elided are the issues concerning whether there are other values associated with
regulatory policymaking that modem regulation subserves or subverts. For example, a perspective on
regulation that stresses the "democratic values" dimension of regulation and administration would
presumably evaluate the questions of regulatory failure and regulatory reform much differently. See,
eg., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L. REV.
1512 (1992); Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991
DUKE L.J. 561, 588-98; Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An
Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.L 1617 (1985). Cf. Gerald C. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy In
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984). In another light, the objectives of regulatory reform
would be tied to a different set of philosophies. It is not the task of this Article to set out a
comprehensive defense of the use of an economic value conception of regulation. Instead, it is to
consider seriously the positive political dimensions of regulation and regulatory reform in connection
with the practical, economic concerns that are, at least in part, implicated by regulatory policymaking
in modem government
68. I appreciate the extent to which this discussion is focused exclusively on the United States.
Of course, there are a wealth of critiques directed at regulation in other industrialized countries and at
regulation across a range of countries including the United States. See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL
STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1986).
Studying regulation comparatively is, I would readily concede, quite useful in understanding both the
nature of regulatory failure in the United States and also what sort of reforms are possible and desirable.
On the other hand, I would insist-for reasons that will hopefully become clearer later in this
Article-that the structure of regulation in the United States is, in significant measure, the product of
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contemporary structure of regulation seems unable to respond systematical-
ly to the problems that call for government response. Beyond the "horror"
stories-the Savings and Loan crisis, the scandal in HUD, and so
forth-are the vexing dilemmas arising within those programs that seem
unable to match appropriate regulatory means to ends. They are unable to
accomplish regulatory tasks without expending resources and energies of
government agencies and officials for little product and payoff.
B. Institutions, Environment, and Regulatory Reform
As critiques of regulation and the performance of regulatory agencies
have burgeoned, legal scholars have tackled questions concerning the
appropriate strategies for regulatory reform. A tacit assumption of this
normative enterprise is that changes in legal rules and the structures of
legal institutions matter; that legal reform can have salutary impacts on the
process and substance of regulation. To see whether and how this is so, we
must understand the dimensions of the regulatory predicament of which we
are so repeatedly reminded by scholars.
There are, as one would expect, nearly as many different explanations for
the causes of regulatory failure as regulatory programs themselves.69 The
half century since the New Deal's regulatory experiments were put in place
has failed to yield a consensus theory of how and why regulation fails; nor
has agreement been reached in light of the attention paid to regulatory
problems plaguing the social regulation of the 1960s and 70s. Nonetheless,
there are competing perspectives on the nature of regulatory failures.
Marver Bernstein's famous theory of the "lifecycle" of regulatory policy
and the "capture" theories fashionable among political economists over the
past couple of decades are two conspicuous examples of general theories
that purport to explain the nature of systematic regulatory failures.7"
a set of political institutions and political choices that are distinctly American. Indeed, it is one of the
core theses of this Article that the nature and function of American political institutions, as constructed
over the course of 200 years, and as functioning in modem America, represent the driving engine(s)
of regulatory performance. Put another way, in considering regulatory reform we should look, first, to
the characteristics of American political institutions-how they are constructed and what are their
important traits. I do not mean to suggest that we turn away from comparative examinations of
regulatory policy across a range of different states and societies but, rather, that we appreciate the extent
to which American regulation is so much the product of American government and its institutions.
69. For a thorough survey, see Roger G. Noll, Government Regulatory Behavior: A
Multidisciplinary Survey and Synthesis, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 9 (Roger
G. Noll ed., 1985).
70. MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); ANTHONY
DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967).
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Moreover, organizational theory of the past half-century, beginning with the
work of Chester Barnard, 7 Herbert Simon,72 Philip Selznick 7 and
others,74 while not expressly concerned with crafting a theory of regulato-
ry failure, has contributed to the development of theories concerned with
exploring how and why regulation succeeds or fails.
Much of this eclectic body of scholarship, which includes Marxist
accounts of regulation's origins, 75 theories of organizational learning and
behavior,76 rational choice accounts of agencies as cartels or as hostages,
and organized interest groups,77 understands the principal determinants of
agency performance, good or bad, as the product of the "internal"
dimensions of agency performance. Attention may be focused on the
individual components of the agency and its policymaking scheme, that is,
on the humans involved in running the program. Or, as is more common,
the focus is on the complex interrelationships among individuals, groups,
roles, rules, and organizational structure, where the task is to understand
how these elements of organizational function work (or do not work)
together.78 The task of these explanations is to assess regulatory perfor-
mance within a framework that concentrates on the structure, incentives,
and functions of the organization and its members.79 Insofar as the
71. CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1938). For descriptions of
Barnard's contributions to the "science" of administration, see, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Chester
Barnard and the Incipient Science of Organization, in ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER
BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 173-78 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990) [hereinafter
ORGANIZATION THEORY].
72. HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1957). On Simon's contributions,
see Williamson, supra note 71, at 178-81.
73. See PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); Philip Selznick, An
Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy, 8 AM. SOC. REV. 47 (1943).
74. See, e.g., HAROLD SEIDMAN & ROBERT GILMOUR, POLITICS, POSITION AND POWER (4th ed.
1986); W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS (1981);
AARON WLDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1964). For a thumbnail sketch of
the role of organization theory in understanding bureaucratic processes, see the discussion in Terry M.
Moe, Politics and the Theory of Organization, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 106, 107-15 (1991).
75. See, e.g., GABRIEL KoLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965). See also Noll,
supra note 69, at 25-26.
76. See, for example, the collection of essays in JAMES G. MARCH, DECISIONS AND ORGANIZA-
TIONS (1988).
77. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971); WLDAVSKY, supra note 74.
78. JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSON, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS (1989).
79. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on
Management, Games, and Legal and Political Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming June 1994).
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relevant organization in most regulatory policymaking is the administrative
agency (or agencies) obliged to create and implement the regulatory
programs, it is the agency and its members that is the principal subject of
study"0
Exclusive focus on the internal aspects of organizational decisionmaking
as a basis for assessing regulatory performance is too narrow, however.
There are important "external" components to the regulatory process as
well. Regulatory policy takes place within a political environment, an
environment that has substantial effects on the functions of the agency and
the performance of the program."' This external environment consists of
a variety of elements. Most central is the legislature, an institution which
shapes the world in which regulatory decisions are made in many different
ways. 8
2
Legislative coalitions fashion statutes and establish the regulatory
program, along with the implementation mechanisms with which the
program is carried out. 3 Drafted in fairly specific terms, the statute
creates the framework within which the regulatory process is set. It is the
regulatory program's core. 4 Accordingly, issues concerning the nature
and scope of a given program grow out of the choices made by legislative
coalitions in the course of designing and shaping the agency's "organic"
statute. The external environment is also made up of various nonstatutory
forms of legislative decisionmakingY Oversight and budgetary control
are two of the most obvious examples.86 Beyond the legislature, the
80. Examples of studies by legal scholars that focus on the internal dynamics of regulatory
decisionmaking within agencies include JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA
Rulemaking, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1991); Peter L. Strauss, Rules, Adjudications and Other
Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on the Interior Department's Administration
of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1231 (1974).
81. For recent studies that stress the external environment as the principal determinant of
regulatory performance, see MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 11; Mashaw, supra note 79. For a
detailed discussion of the positive political theory studies see infra part IV.
82. See infra part IV.B.
83. See Rubin, supra note 5, at 418-23 (describing the significance of implementation
mechanisms).
84. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
549 (1985).
85. Understanding the dimensions of the external environment of agency decisionmaking requires
that we carefully examine the interaction of statutory and non-statutory decisionmaking. See discussion
infra part V.B.
86. See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT (1990); CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL
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President and his preferences shape regulatory decisionmaking.8 7 The
President participates in the enactment of the regulatory statute.88
Moreover, he wields a fairly substantial role in superintending regulatory
policymaking through personnel, budgetary, and oversight controls.8 9
Courts and judicial doctrine also make up substantial elements of
regulation's external environment.9"
The choice between the internal and external environment as the
principal locus of regulatory policymaking and its successes and failures is,
of course, not either/or. The internal structure of the agency and the
external environment in which the program is carried out are both critical
to the program's performance.9 They will, in combination, determine
whether regulation succeeds or fails. Moreover, the internal and external
(organizational and environmental) aspects of regulatory policymaking are
intertwined. The structure of agency decisionmaking will affect how its
decisions are considered by political institutions. Correspondingly, the
shape of the external environment will have effects on the internal aspects
of agency decisionmaking. As Jerry Mashaw puts it: "The signals that an
agency receives from its external, legal and institutional environment will
ultimately cause the internal procedural and managerial environment of the
agency to adapt in order for the agency to survive or to prosper."'92 For
example, if the court evinces a will to review command-and-control-type
rules issued by an agency more stringently than other forms of agency
action, such as recalls or issuance of non-binding policy guidelines, then we
could expect the agency to adapt their internal procedures accordingly. Or
suppose an agency operates in a shadow of an intrusive and bellicose
legislative committee. In such an environment, an agency may react by
performing more of their tasks in secret. Greater stealth removes, to some
OVERSIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION (1989); Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlook: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, in CONGRESS:
STRUCTURE AND POLICY 426 (Matthew D. MeCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987).
87. See, e.g., THoMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991); Terry M. Moe, Presidents, Institutions, and Theory,
in RESEARCHING THE PRESIDENCY 337 (George C. Edwards et al. eds., 1993). See also sources cited
infra notes 356-60.
88. See Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming June 1994).
89. See sources cited infra notes 90-91.
90. See, e.g., MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 11; MELNICK, supra note 12. See also infra part
IV.D.
91. See Mashaw, supra note 79, at 61-66.
92. Id.
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extent, the agency from the constant surveillance of legislators. A legion
of examples could be marshalled to illustrate the straightforward point:
External influences will affect the agency's decisions regarding its
institutional structure and procedures. Hence, in juxtaposing the external
environment with internal agency organization, we should keep firmly in
mind the intersection between these two dimensions. Structure affects
environment and environment affects structure, in ways that any complete
theory of regulatory decisionmaking must take into account.
The linchpin of both dimensions, internal and external, organizational
and environmental, is institutional theory. To begin with, we must come
to regulatory reform armed with a theoretical understanding of how
regulatory organizations are formed. What choices are made by those
responsible for constructing and operating regulatory institutions? Are
there limits built into the structure of the institutions that cripple their
capacity to realize their programmatic goals? Next, we must understand
how they function within an external environment made up of other
organizations, each with their own form, function, and legal controls. How
do the interactions among these institutions affect agency decisionmaking?
How does competition among organizations facilitate or thwart regulatory
change? In short, we need a theory of each institution and its behavior; we
also need a theory of institutional competition that folds in and revisits the
theories of each institution taken separately.
The core premise of positive political theory is that regulatory decisions
are a product, in substantial part, of the strategic decisions made by
politicians acting within the structure of political institutions.93 It is
important to understand that the regulatory system is just that-a system.
Decisions (threatened and real) made by one institution will have an impact
on decisions made by others; regulatory agencies will respond to the
signals, influences, pressures, rewards, and sanctions of a variety of
politicians and political institutions; no one institution is the master of all
regulatory policymaking. The American governmental structure, in design
and in practice, ensures that power is dispersed and that political influence
and control over regulatory policymaking is complicated and unstable.9"
93. See infra part IV, especially part W.E.
94. The complexities of modem regulatory policy have generated a number of different analytical
approaches. Positive political theory aims toward a comprehensive and theoretical explanation; other
strands of rational choice theory, as described in more detail infra part I.B-C, aim for general theory
as well. Other political scientists, most notably James Q. Wilson, have pioneered a more eclectic,
empirically grounded, and less sanguine, approach to analyzing the dimensions of regulatory policy.
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III. INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND RATIONAL CHOICE
A. Rational Choice Theory and the "Discovery" of Institutions
Recent scholarship on the nature and causes of regulatory failure has
been characterized by a greater attention to the role of institutions."
Institutional theories have come into fashion as social scientists construct
explanations for regulatory failure and as public law scholars develop
strategies for regulatory reform. This growing focus on institutions is a
general characteristic of contemporary social science; the call for institu-
tional theory has come from a variety of different directions, including
sociology, political science, economics, and public law.96
The most ambitious of these trends is the so-called "new institutional-
ism,"" a phrase sociologists James March and Johan Olson coined to
describe a multi-layered perspective on studying political institutions.
Earlier political science theories tended to reduce political behavior to the
summation of individual behaviors and to see politics as a rather indistinct
element of society generally,98 instead of as a unique, peculiar process.
See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT
(1989). Consider Professor Wilson's comments on the ambition for a comprehensive theory of
organizations:
After all these decades of wrestling with the subject, I have come to have grave doubts that
anything worth calling 'organization theory' will ever exist. Theories will exist, but they will
usually be so abstract or general as to explain rather little. Interesting explanations will exist,
some even supported with facts, but these will be partial, place- and time-bound insights.
Id. at xi.
95. See generally MARCH & OLSON, supra note 78.
96. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALiSM: FiRMs,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985) (economics); JOHN W. MEYER & W. RICHARD SCOTr,
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND RATIONALITY (1.983) (sociology); STEPHEN
SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEw AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE
CAPACITIES (1982) (political science/history); Rogers Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the "New
Institutionalism, " and the Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 89 (1988) (political
science/public law).
97. James G. March & Johan P. Olson, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors In
Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 734 (1984). See also MARCH & OLSON, supra note 78.
98. March and Olson explain these reductionist tendencies:
[S]ubstantial elements of modem theoretical work in political science assume that political
phenomena are best understood as the aggregate consequences of behavior comprehensible
at the individual or group level.... Such theories depend on two presumptions. The first
presumption is that a political system consists of a number (often a large number) of
elementary actors. Human behavior at the level of these elementary actors may be seen as
conscious, calculated, and flexible, or as unconscious, habitual, and rigid. In either case, the
preferences and powers of the actors are exogenous to the political system, depending on their
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In contrast, new institutionalist perspectives stress the importance of
examining institutions as the principal arenas in which critical decisions of
politics (including not only strategic decisions, but also symbolic,
expressive activities) are made."9 Political institutions are considered, in
the new institutionalist frameworks as autonomous, yet interdependent,
entities which are worthy of studying systematically and theoretically.
This new institutionalism illustrates one take on the revival of institution-
al analysis in the social sciences. Overall, there is a heightened attention
paid to institutional theory in a dual sense: First, more often than before,
social scientists consider the nature and functions of institutions and the
role of individuals acting within institutions; accordingly, perspectives on
institutions are incorporated into theories of regulation and normative
scholarship on regulatory reform. Second, social scientists frequently set
out to develop institutional theories that are distinct from the tendencies to
view political behavior in terms of the specific behavior of the individual
politicians making up the institution that is the subject of study."° While
it is really in this second sense that March and Olson write of the "new
institutionalism" and its role in reshaping political science, the growing
attention paid to institutions in a variety of disciplines and theoretical
contexts is itself significant, regardless of whether or not it is described as
a disciplinary movement or paradigm shift."' 1
positions in the social and economic system. The second presumption is that collective
behavior is best understood as stemming from the (possibly intricate) interweaving of
behavior understandable at a lower level of aggregation. Discovering, or deducing, the
collective consequences may be difficult, even impossible; but the central faith is that
outcomes at the collective level depend only on the intricacies of the interactions among the
individual actors, that concepts suggesting autonomous behavior at the aggregate level are
certainly superfluous and probably deleterious.
March & Olson, supra note 97, at 735-36. The interest group theories of regulation, described at infra
part Ill.B, are reductionist in just the way March and Olson describe.
99. See MARCH & OLSON, supra note 78, at 39-52. Cf. PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMON-
WEALTH 231-64 (1992) (describing non-strategic functions of institutions within a sociological
framework); WILSON, supra note 94, at 31-110 (describing heterogenous circumstances, beliefs,
interests, and culture of bureaucratic institutions).
100. Moe, supra note 74 (discussing the interpenetration of organizational theory into political
theory).
101. The label of "new" has been attached to a variety of recent institutionalist scholarship. See,
e.g., A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM: DESIGNING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FOR A GOOD SOCIETY (S. Ellein
& K. Soltan eds., 1993); John A. Ferejohn, Law, Legislation, and Positive Political Theory 32 (1993)
(on file with author) ("institutional neo-realism"); Symposium on the New Institutional Economics, 146
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 1 (1990); Symposium on the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L.
REV. (1991); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REV. 919
(1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988)); Moe, supra note 16.
1994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
24 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The turn toward institutions in contemporary social science has also
included political economists. 2  The focus on institutions among
political economists is distinct, however, from other new institutionalist
scholarship in important respects. Sociology and mainstream political
science always had at their cores an appreciation for the role of groups and
a skepticism about the potential of the atomistic "rational actor" heuristic
to explain the sum and substance of political behavior. Political economy
on the other hand, was traditionally less patient with explanations that
looked past the individual and his rational, strategic, and perfectly informed
decisions. In its most extreme Chicago School form, politics was
seemingly a black box, a forum in which self-interest and organized interest
groups fought for advantage. 3
This myopia characterized much of the political economy literature on
regulation. One would think, reading the political economy scholarship of
the past three decades on, regulation and bureaucracies, that political
institutions such as Congress, the President, and courts hardly mattered
except for such responsibilities as creating and perhaps dissolving the
agency and its program.' The concern was with administrative discre-
tion. The image of the "rogue agency" animated discussions of regulation's
discontents. And administrative discretion was viewed as the product of a
political process in which self-interested politicians were supplicants for
demanding interest groups. We could, in this light, no more expect the
political process to reign in the rogue agency than we could expect interest
groups to look out for the public interest. The linchpin of the political
economy of regulation was rational action by utility-maximizing individuals
played out on a field made-up of political organizations. Among the
consequences of disregarding the autonomous aspects of institutions and
institutional decisionmaking was the constricted ability of political
economists to speak to the issues of concern to political scientists who
struggled to understand the institutional dimensions of American govern-
ment, including Congress, the Presidency, the bureaucracy, and the
judiciary.
102. For a useful survey of recent economic analyses of institutions, see Terry M. Moe, Political
Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 213 (1990); Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS
51 (Herbert F. Weisberg ed., 1986).
103. See, for example, the various contributions in CHICAGO STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (G.
Stigler ed., 1988).
104. See generally infra part III.B (discussing interest group theories).
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Also myopic was the tendency in rational choice theory to disregard the
role of legal rules and doctrines as determinants of, and constraints on,
institutional decisionmaking. The role of law was rather opaque in the
political economy literature. Law was considered as immutable, something
"out there," which politicians and interest groups had to deal with, work
around, and try to manipulate.'0 5 Or else law was a "good" that interest
groups and politicians would haggle over and construct in the normal
strategic way.
By contrast, legal scholars understood that neither legal rules nor the
institutions which framed and implemented these rules could be character-
ized in either of these extreme ways. Rules represented both the product
of political choice and the constraints on that choice. What was perennially
at issue for normative public law scholarship was what function legal rules
could serve as forms of constraints on political behavior and policymaking;
but this did not presuppose that law was completely separate from politics.
It did presuppose, though, that law could usefully serve as a source of
constraints on political decisionmaking within institutions. However, in the
worldview of classic political economy, it is difficult to see exactly how
law could play this function. It was as if political economists and legal
scholars were talking entirely past one another, with the former concentrat-
ing on the client-broker relationships among interest groups and legislators,
and the latter emphasizing the ways in which the regulatory process is
circumscribed by a web of legal constraints.
To the extent that the role of institutions and of law were two massive
concepts that were nearly entirely absent from rational choice accounts of
regulation and its administration, a substantial gap existed between the
concerns at the core of rational choice theory and the concerns of lawyers
doing normative scholarship. However, recent years have witnessed a
wealth of rational choice theory that attempts to examine and explain the
significance of institutions and institutional structure for regulatory
decisionmaking. At least one of the valuable lessons of this renewed
interest among political economists in institutions and law is that there is
nothing inherently inconsistent about rational choice theory and perspec-
tives on institutions and on law.
Much of the dissonance between contemporary rational choice theory and
public law scholarship comes from the erroneous equation of rational
105. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. ECON. 875, 885-87 (1975).
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choice theories of politics with the economic theory of legislation that
frequently travels under the banner "public choice."' 6 Similarly, rational
theories of regulatory politics are often viewed as merely an extension of
the Chicago School theories of interest group formation and influence that
dominated the economics scholarship on regulation in the 1970s and early
80S.107 Yet, rational choice theories of legislation are not necessarily
synonymous with public choice or with interest group theories of
regulation. Rational choice theories of politics are not monolithic. Such
theories include several different perspectives on legislation and regulation
in the modem administrative state. Microeconomics and the rational choice
heuristic provide a set of tools for use in understanding politics and
regulation. However, scholars can adapt these tools in different ways;
some tools are more serviceable than others.
To understand the distinct contributions of positive political theory to the
political economy literature on legislation and regulation, I will examine
two important rational choice perspectives on legislation and regulation:
interest group theories and the new economics of organization. In
reviewing these theories, the reader should keep in mind the two critical
dimensions of regulatory policymaking that have been so often inscrutable
to rational choice theory: the role of institutions and institutional
decisionmaking and the role of legal rules.
B. Interest Group Theories
Interest-group theories of legislation grow out of a political economy
literature in which it is hypothesized that individuals will organize into
pressure groups in order to achieve benefits through the production of
regulatory policy and that politicians will facilitate this self-interested
behavior through the legislative and administrative processes.' The crux
of interest group theories has concerned how and why such groups form
and organize to pursue their self-interested aims.0 9 At the core of
interest group theories of regulation is the idea that interest groups form out
106. For usefil surveys of these latter two theories, see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (4th ed. 1992); FARBER & FRIcKEY, supra note 13.
107. See discussion infra part III.B.
108. See Gary Becker, A Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J.
ECON. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211
(1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MOMT. Sa. 3
(1971). Good descriptions of this literature include FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 13, POSNER, supra
note 106; Noll, supra note 69.
109. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcrION (1965).
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of individuals' rational decisions to come together in order to influence
public policy.' The benefits at stake are ubiquitous; they range from
direct cash subsidies to restrictions on entry by firms into existing markets.
Naturally, these benefits accrue to different individuals and firms in
different amounts. The organization of interest groups-and, critically, the
size of the group and political muscle of the group-will be a function of
the value of the benefits at stake in regulation. Sam Peltzman summarizes
the crux of the "demand" side of the interest group theory of regulation:
To summarize the argument briefly, the size of the dominant group is limited
in the first instance by the absence of something like ordinary-market-dollar
voting in politics. Voting is infrequent and concerned with a package of
issues. In the case of a particular issue, the voter must spend resources to
inform himself about its implications for his wealth and which politician is
likely to stand on which side of the issue. That information cost will have
to offset prospective gains, and a voter with a small per capita stake will not,
therefore, incur it. In consequence the numerically large, diffuse interest
group is unlikely to be an effective bidder, and a policy inimical to the
interest of a numerical majority will not be automatically rejected. A second
major limit on effective group size arises from costs of organization. It is not
enough for the successful group to recognize its interests; it must organize to
translate this interest into support for the politician who will implement it.
This means not only mobilizing its own vote, but contributing resources to
the support of the appropriate political party or policy: to finance campaigns,
to persuade other voters to support or at least not oppose the policy or
candidate, perhaps occasionally to bribe those in office. While there may be
some diseconomies of scale in this organization of support and neutralization
of opposition, these must be limited. The larger the group that seeks the
transfer, the narrower the base of the opposition and the greater the per capita
stakes that determine the strength of opposition, so lobbying and campaigning
costs will rise faster than group size. The cost of overcoming "free riders"
will also rise faster than group size. This diseconomy of scale in providing
resources then acts as another limit to the size of the group that will
ultimately dominate the political process."'
The consequence of this "law of diminishing returns to group size in
politics" is that optimally sized groups will form and wield substantial
control over the political process."2 The essential idea is that groups will
110. For the classic, early statement of interest group theory, see James Madison's discussion in
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966).
111. Peltzman, supra note 108, at 236.
112. Id.
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form only where they predict that they will successfully be able to provide
the sort of benefits that justify the costs of organizing and influencing." 13
The empirical part of the theory is devoted to showing that politicians
accede to the demands of the most effectively organized and, therefore, the
most powerful, groups. After all, "there are many bidders, but only one is
successful.""' 4 The political process that yields regulatory decisions is
described, in the interest group account, as essentially a political auction,
in which politicians transact with organized groups for benefits in the form
of "votes" and "resources" and, in return, reward groups with various goods
such as cash benefits and restrictions on entry. 15 The basic connection
between the consumers and the producers of these regulatory goods is a
reciprocity of interests: Interest groups secure economic rents through
manipulation of the political process while legislators secure reelection
through careful attention to interest group demands." 6
Interest groups manipulate the political process in a variety of ways."
17
The more powerful groups may capture the administrative agency that is
responsible for implementing the regulatory program." 8 The result is that
the agency becomes a mouthpiece for the goals of the interest groups,
responding to pressures and demands through the administrative process.
Regulatory capture may be manifested in several different ways. An
interest group may infiltrate the processes the agency follows in formulat-
ing a rule or order. Administrative staff may be made up of members of
the targeted regulatory industries or members of organizations representing
regulatory beneficiaries. Additionally, interest groups may wield influence
through supplying carrots or applying sticks to administrators during the
decisionmaking process. For instance, interest groups often possess a
virtual monopoly of information that is vital to the formulation of an
113. See OLSON, supra note 109, at 11-16. See also RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1982).
114. Peltzman, supra note 108.
115. See Stigler, supra note 108.
116. See, e.g., MORIs P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
(2d ed. 1989); MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS
(1981); DAVID R. MAYHEw, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
117. See, e.g., Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VIA. L. REV. 339, 351-63
(1988).
118. In addition to the sources cited in supra note 7, see Gordon Tullock, Concluding Thoughts on
the Politics of Regulation, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND REGULATION 334 (Robert J. Mackay et al. eds.,
1987).
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agency decision." 9 Groups may supply to administrators benefits of a
more traditional sort, say, valuable perquisites such as jobs after the
administrator's tour of duty is completed.'
In addition to agency capture, interest groups may influence the
regulatory process at the threshold, by influencing legislators' decisions
concerning the structure of the agency's organic statute in order to ensure
that the regulatory program and agency structures are designed to aid the
groups' regulatory agenda.' The language of the statute, as well as its
legislative history, may reflect the imprint of the winning interest group
acting through a legislative coalition. Once the program is in place, interest
groups can wield ongoing influence by monitoring agency action and
influencing legislators to intervene or to refrain from intervening in the
decisionmaking process over time.' Legislative oversight of the
activities of the agency may facilitate these aims."
Interest groups have available a large collection of strategies and tactics
they can use to influence the course of regulatory policy. They may deliver
votes, campaign contributions, or outright bribes. 4 They may extract
rents from legislators who would receive value from having information
which the groups exclusively possess." Additionally, they may threaten
to support a legislator's opponent in the next election.
While the interest group theory, often called the "Chicago School" theory
of regulation,'26 purports to account for both the demand and supply sides
of regulatory decisionmaking, fundamentally, the theory speaks to the
demand side. To be sure, the theory, taken on its own terms, explains why
political decisionmakers would trade with interest groups and why we
observe a range of regulatory decisions that benefit a class of individuals
and firms (hence the interest group theory is also labeled the "producer
119. See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug
Amendments, 81 J. POL. EcoN. 1049 (1973).
120. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 70.
121. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The
Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 83 (1989).
122. See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
123. It may also defeat these aims, though, for the reasons spelled out in infra text accompanying
notes 506-12.
124. See, e.g., Pablo T. Spiller, Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals
Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed," 33 J.L. & ECON. 65 (1990).
125. See, e.g., McChesney, supra note 122.
126. See CHICAGO STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 103.
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protection" view). 2 7 However, the political machinery that is implement-
ed to set the structure and rules for this political auction is opaque in the
Chicago School account. In interest group theories, public policy is an
output in a process that is driven by the mechanism of interest group
control and influence. There is no internal logic to the function of certain
political institutions; politicians will simply do what is necessary to
facilitate the aims of their benefactors. What, then, explains why the
political process is structured as it is? Is the legislature, for instance,
designed in the manner that facilitates regulatory transactions? Does the
constitutional structure of government aid or inhibit strategic bargaining?
The interest group account carefully examines the structure of interest
group organization, considering such questions as what is the optimal size
of a powerful group and what sort of groups benefit from certain regulatory
decisions; no such attention is paid to the structure of the political
organizations that furnish benefits and extract rents from these interest
groups.
Interest group theories of regulation flatten out political and legal
institutions. Legislative and administrative institutions are regarded as
transmission belts, performing the rather mechanical function of translating
interest group demands into public policy.'28 The origins and functions
of political institutions are explained, in interest group theories, as instru-
ments of interest group control. The explanation of the "supply" side in
interest group theory, therefore, has a distinctly axiomatic quality; the
notion is that interest groups will demand, and politicians will provide,
whatever institutions are necessary to facilitate efficient transactions among
the producers and consumers of these regulatory goods. Institutions such
as the committee system, the structure of legislative voting, and critically,
the administrative agency, are seen as designed to respond efficiently to the
rent-seeking demands of powerful interest groups.'29 Rational legislators,
127. See Peltzman, supra note 108, at 235. See also William A. Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior
Market Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J.L. & EcON. 151 (1972).
128. The description of the legislature-agency relationship as a transmission belt comes from
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1675
(1975). Richard Stewart's seminal article on administrative law incorporates much of the important
interest group scholarship of the 1960s and early 1970s and is interesting in, among other respects, the
anthropological sense in which it reflects the influence of these then-fashionable positive theories of
regulation on public law scholarship. See id. at 1681-88 (discussing interest group theories of regulation
in relation to the "problem of discretion").
129. See Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market
Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 43 (1988).
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argue interest group theorists, will construct institutions to enable them to
respond effectively to the demands of organized groups and also to mediate
the competing demands of such groups.13 ° The classic interest group
theories of regulation, while representing a critical step in understanding
why certain regulatory decisions are made and why and how regulation
fails, have expended most of their explanatory energies in crafting
sophisticated explanations for the demand side of public policy. Institu-
tional theory has played a rather peripheral role. As a result, much of the
supply side of regulation-the institutional matrices of decisions represent-
ing the regulatory environment-has remained inscrutable to interest groups
theories.
Consider, as an example of a theoretical insight culled from interest
group theories of regulation, the two different perspectives on the
legislative delegation of regulatory power to administrative agencies. One
perspective explains delegation as a response to the competing demands of
interest groups.' Delegation, in this account, represents the passing of
the buck to the agency; legislators can thereby claim the credit that goes
along with the enactment of a regulatory program while eschewing the
blame that goes along with deleterious (from the interest group's stand-
point) policies made by the agency in the future.'32 Legislators will be
anxious to delegate power when the costs and benefits of a program are
both relatively concentrated so that vigorous interest group competition on
both sides of the issue is likely. Delegating, in this account, creates a
"policy lottery" in which the substantive outcome of regulatory policy is
unclear ex ante.'33 Another perspective emphasizes the role that the
legislature plays in manipulating administrative processes in the service of
interest group demands.' In this account, agencies are interest group
supplicants once removed. Regulation through administrative decision is
a means by which legislators can tailor their responses more effectively and
more economically to interest group demands. Even where the delegation
130. See, e.g., HAYES, supra note 116; MAYHEW, supra note 116.
131. See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv.
1 (1982).
132. See Morris P. Fiorina, Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority, in
REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 69; Aranson et al., supra note 131.
133. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions,
1 YALE J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 90 (1985).
134. See, e.g., Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or
Administrative Process?, 39 PuB. CHOICE 33 (1982); McChesney, supra note 122; Richard A. Posner,
The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, I J. LEGAL STUD. 305 (1972).
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to the agency is ambiguous and thus the final regulation uncertain, the
device of administrative regulation enables interest groups to converge on
the administrative process and fight for their agenda with the blessing-and
the help-of self-interested legislators.
The essential dynamics of the relationship between legislators and the
agencies they have created are largely left out of this interest group picture.
What explains the design of particular regulatory structures and the choice
by legislators and administrators to pursue one strategy rather than another
in response to demands from outside constituents and groups? Again,
legislative institutions are regarded as devices by which interest group
demands are transformed into public policy. The past decade has brought
an enormous quantity and range of critiques against this approach to
understanding regulation and regulatory politics. 135
Consider a key problem upon which positive political theory has shed
light. Interest group theories suppose that the history of legislation is
essentially the winner's history; the most powerful interest group will
prevail upon a majority of the legislature and will establish its preferred
regulatory policy; or else the legislature will react to competing interest
group pressures by delegating regulatory responsibilities to another
institution, such as an agency or the court.'36 What interest group theory
does not seem to contemplate is that the regulatory policy created by statute
will reflect a bargain among legislators who collect themselves into
coalitions and hammer out a deal amongst one another. The regulatory
policy, including both the substantive decisions made in the statute and the
process for implementing these policies, reflects this deal. It may provide
a suitable set of benefits to one or more interest groups; it may give little
more than half a loaf to all concerned. However, the important point is
that the final outcome-the regulatory statute and administrative pro-
gram-will reflect a combination of forces and influences; groups may win
135. Empirical critiques of interest group theories include KAY L. SCItLOZMAN & JOHN T., TIRNEY,
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986); Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture
and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 279 (1984); James B. Kau & Paul
H. Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology and Logrolling in Congressional Voting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1979);
Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice
of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199 (1988); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and
Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139
U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1990). Normative critiques include STEVEN KELMAN, MAING PUBLIC POLICY: A
HOPEFUL VIEW OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987); ARTHUR MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON
GOOD (1980).
136. See Aranson et al., supra note 131.
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and lose.'37 These groups may eschew the legislative process altogether,
if they lose confidence in their ability to put their exclusive stamp on the
regulatory statute.'38 In other words, groups may decide, in light of the
significant costs of playing the regulatory game in the legislature, to decline
to play. But what interest group theories of legislation suppose is the
norm-a victorious interest group capturing the statute and the regulatory
program created under the statute's rubric-is more likely the exception,
rather than the rule. One searches in vain for many instances in which we
can confidently describe a regulatory statute as the creation of a particular
interest group. 139  Much more common are those statutes that represent
a combination of interest group pressures filtered through legislative
processes and ameliorated through the struggle within the legislature and
with legislators and their constituents, all of which results in a statute with
multiple winners and losers." The role of these so-called "losers" in
constructing the regulatory program is nearly entirely missing in interest
group theories of legislation. 4'
Another problem with interest group theories is that they do not clearly
explain the origins and maintenance of the political arrangements that
currently exist. Difficult to explain are those institutional structures and
rules that, rather than facilitating interest group demands for policy in the
way that the theories predict, actually hinder these demands. The system
of institutional checks and balances, for example, and for that matter, much
of the constitutional structure of government, is hard to reconcile with the
view that the structure of government is designed to ensure the low cost
supply of goods to aggressive interest groups."
One response to this seeming anomaly, however, has been to flip this
137. See Terry M. Moe, Toward a Theory ofPublic Bureaucracy, in ORGANIZATION THEORY, supra
note 71, at 116, 125-27.
138. They may, for instance, concentrate their efforts on influencing the administrative agency
charged with implementing the statutory program.
139. For episodes of legislative compromises in connection with regulatory statutes, see the essays
in THE PoLmcs OF REGULATION, supra note 58.
140. For example, Gabriel Kolko has described the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 as an instance
of decisive interest group influence. KOLKO, supra note 75. Thomas Gilligan, William Marshall, and
Barry Weingast persuasively show, however, that the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was not a
railroad "relief" bill but, instead, reflected a combination of cross-cutting factors. The final product
reflected compromises and bargains made among critical players in the legislative process. See Thomas
W. Gilligan et al., Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of
1887, 32 J.L. & ECON. 35, 54-59 (1989).
141. See discussion infra part V.A.3.b.
142. See DAvID F. EplrTm, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 126-46 (1988).
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argument around and to view the structure of political institutions,
enshrined in the Constitution and implemented through two centuries ofjudicial decisions, as the machinery by which the regulatory auction
described by interest group theories is controlled and regulated.'43 This
is where legal rules and institutions come into the interest group picture.
Part of the project of public law scholars steeped in interest group theories
of legislation has been to explain how the framers wisely designed the
Constitution to control what would otherwise be the norm-competition
among interest groups for political influence and the provision of
disproportionate benefits to powerful groups-and to counsel courts to
construct rules and doctrines to implement the framers' vision of a purer
and fairer political process. The basic normative idea is that courts act as
a last resort against a dysfunctional regulatory process. Courts can perform
this function in a variety of different ways: steering statutes, through
instrumental interpretations, towards more public-regarding aims;' 4
maintenance of institutional devices, especially the separation of powers,
in order to fragment governmental power and interest group influence; 4 '
and more stringent constitutional review of legislation.'46 While I will
say more about this vision later in the Article,'47 for now it is enough to
notice that this represents a normative project that is situated within interest
group theories. These theories remain rather agnostic concerning the nature
and function of political institutions and the role of legal rules in framing
regulatory decisions.'48
C. The New Economics of Organization
A competing model of regulatory behavior is emerging from the
literature on the new economics of organization and, in particular, the
143. For starters, see James Madison's discussion in THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)
(Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981).
144. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
223 (1986).
145. See Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471 (1988).
146. See, e.g., William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative
Choice: The Political Consequences ofJudicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REv. 373 (1988).
147. See infra part IV.A.
148. For a multi-layered argument against the expansion of judicial review to combat the evils
described in interest group theory, see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J 31 (1991).
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developing applications of transaction cost economics to the study of
organizational design and functions. 149  This account takes off from
positive theories of the organization of business firms. The question asked
is the same one asked by Ronald Coase in writing The Nature of the Firm
in 1937:150 Why would rational competitors choose the business firm as
a method of economic organization rather than entrusting their business
decisions solely to the market? The answer given by the new economics
of organization is that rational decisionmakers will construct the organiza-
tion of the firm in order to solve various contracting problems that
arise. 5' However, once the organization is in place, how will rational
decisionmakers structure it in order to facilitate their interests and the ends
of the organization? In general, the new economics of organization sets out
to explain, first, when and why firms (hierarchies) replace markets as a
form of economic organization and, second, the structural choices made by
the firm's decisionmakers to ensure the efficient carrying out of the tasks
for which the organization is formed under conditions of opportunism and
given ubiquitous transaction costs.'52
The central hypothesis is that rational decisionmakers will choose the
firm as their mechanism of economic organization instead of entrusting
transactions and business decisions to the market in order to reduce the
transaction costs associated with making business transactions in the market
and with enforcing these transactions once made.'53 Once decisionmakers
have chosen firms as their organizational form, they face critical problems
that they must overcome in order to fulfill the purposes for which the
organization was created.
The key problem faced by rational decisionmakers who must decide
whether and how to form an economic organization is opportunism.'
54
149. See generally Moe, supra note 74.
150. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
151. See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory, 2 J.
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 107 (1993); Williamson, The Evolving Science of Organization, 149 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 36 (1993); Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics,
142 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 230 (1986); Mayer Zald, Review Essay: The New
Institutional Economics, 93 AMER. J. SOC. 701 (1987); Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic
Organization 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 65 (1988) [hereinafter Williamson, Logic of Economic
Organization]; WILLIAMSON, supra note 96; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1985).
152. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 96.
153. Williamson, Logic of Economic Organization, supra note 151.
154. See Arman A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
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Individuals within the firm who have incentives to shirk and in various
ways depart from the purposes underlying the firm and its structure.'55
An advantage of the firm as a method of organizing business decisions and
transactions is that the firm's supervisor has an incentive to monitor the
performance of subordinates who have incentives to shirk. The incentives
may be financial: Perhaps he can capture the residual profits left after he
has compensated the employees of the firm for their efforts.'56 To the
extent that shirking reduces the size of the pie that can be distributed
among the firm's members, rational managers have an incentive to
construct economic organizations in which they may maintain their
marketable title to the output of the organization and in which they can
effectively increase the output in order to assure a larger profit in the form
of the difference between the compensation paid to employees and the total
output.'57 Beyond this economic incentive, the firm's managers may well
owe obedience to another set of goals; in the vernacular of principal-agent
theory, the managers may be principals with respect to the agents working
below them, but agents with respect to others higher up the chain of
command. Facing opportunistic subordinates, rational managers must
construct strategies to cabin disobedience in order to facilitate their ability
to meet their obligations. Under either scenario, the managers of the firm
must guard against opportunistic behavior and shirking.
Rational decisionmakers will design their firm with an eye toward
addressing these risks of opportunism and with an eye toward facilitating
their economic aims.'58 With the theory of the firm as a conceptual
building block, the new economics of organization has set out to explain
why decisionmakers would construct particular types of firms and particular
types of rules and strategies within these firms. In considering how
individuals will make decisions to create certain organizational forms, the
new economics of organization borrows the concept of bounded rationality
from an earlier generation of organizational theorists, led by Herbert
Simon.'59 "Bounded rationality refers to behavior that is 'intendedly
155. See infra notes 214-19 (describing principal-agent theory).
156. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 154, at 781-83. See also JOE B. STEVENS, THE
ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE 280-81 (1993).
157. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 154, at 780-81.
158. See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 96.
159. See generally SIMON, supra note 72; Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Bounded Rationality, its
DECISION AND ORGANIZATION 161 (C.B. MeGuire & Roy Radner eds., 1972). For discussions of
"bounded rationality" in the new economics of organization, see Williamson, supra note 71, at 178.
[VOL. 72:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss1/2
REGULATORY REFORM
rational, but only limitedly so.""'  Decisionmakers in institutions,
including those who are designing these institutions, have limited foresight
and skill. Reliance on organizations can be a means of satisficing, if not
maximizing, certain goals and ambitions. 61 Organizational structures, it
is suggested, will be designed to "adapt to disturbances ... in ways that
economize on bounded rationality 62 while safeguarding the transactions
in question against the hazards of opportunism." '63 Governance struc-
tures arise in order to facilitate contracting and to reduce the incentives and
opportunities to act opportunistically.1"
Administrative agencies are treated, in this account, like business firms.
They are distinct types of firms, to be sure, but firms nonetheless.1 65 The
organization of a bureaucratic agency will trace the organization of a
business firm in that they both face similar problems in regulating the
actions of "employees" within the firm. The contracting problems that
arise are distinct because bureaucratic firms are not really competitors in
a market for their products or services. Fundamentally, they do not have
the choice of eschewing a hierarchy and choosing a market form. 66
Nonetheless, the new economics of organization stresses the analogies
between bureaucratic and business firms. Contracting problems arise in
connection with the relationship between the agency and the legisla-
ture. 67 The legislature designs the agency/firm in order to economize the
costs of ensuring that the agency acts in accordance with the legislature's
goals; in other words, that it adheres to the contract between the legislature
and the agency. The contract, however, is incomplete.1 68  Legislators
cannot foresee future exigencies and circumstances; it is in their interest to
160. See Williamson, supra note 71, at 178 (quoting SIMON, supra note 72, at xxiv).
161. See id. at 178-79.
162. See, e.g., James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice,
in RATIONAL CHOICE 142 (J. Elster ed., 1986).
163. Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance, 7 J.L.
ECON & ORG. 159, 176 (Special Issue 1991).
164. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 96.
165. See Oliver E. Williamson, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story-Comment,
6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263 (Special Issue 1990).
166. See Moe, supra note 74; Moe, supra note 137.
167. See infra part IV.B.
168. On incomplete contracting, see, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Commentary: Incomplete Contracts
and Statutes, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 257 (1992); David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic
Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90 (James Alt & Kenneth Shepsle eds.,
1990); Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119
(1988).
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enter into agreements with other legislators and with the agency, but it is
not in their interest to entrust all regulatory decisions to a nexus of
contracts. 69 Like business firms, bureaucratic hierarchies face contract-
ing problems. These problems can be redressed by a scheme of organiza-
tion and a regime of contract law that is tailored to the purposes of the
bureau and the problems that it faces in its external environment. As
Oliver Williamson explained: "[S]tudies of economic organization and of
political organizations are both similar and different. They are similar in
that both work out of an 'incomplete contracting in its entirety' orientation.
They are both different in that each generic mode of governance, bureaus
included, requires its own distinctive contract law."' 70 The "contract law"
of bureaus consists of civil service law, which regulates the conduct of
employees within the organization as well as the relationship between
managers and employees;' it also includes administrative law, which
regulates the decisionmaking processes of the agency.
To the extent that the theory emerging from the new economics of
organization is not a theory of public bureaucracy as much as it is an
application of a general theory of economic organization to public
agencies, the application elides important differences between public
agencies and private business firms. The two most fundamental differences
are the distinct role of politics and the role of law. In the new institutional
economics, firms are established by actors in order to carry out transac-
tions; by contrast, the organizations which form the structure of regulatory
policymaldng have a complex set of goals. Administrative agencies are the
products of political choices. 74 An agency may be designed to facilitate
efficient transactions, but this is not necessarily so. Moreover, regulatory
programs are the products of political compromises; a program may be
constructed in order to produce a limited regulatory output.75 Politicians,
constrained by the demands of interest groups and constituents, may be
willing to trade off efficiency and efficacious regulation for other political
169. On the firm as a nexus of contracts, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
This approach is criticized in Oliver D. Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm,
in ORGANIZATION THEORY, supra note 71, at 159-60.
170. Williamson, supra note 165, at 265-66.
171. Id. at 266. Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaus (1993) (on file with author).
172. Williamson, supra note 165, at 265-66.
173. See Moe, supra note 74; Moe, supra note 137.
174. See Moe, supra note 74; Moe, supra note 137.
175. See generally infra part V.A.3.
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goals and interests. 7' The result is a regulatory program that is not
necessarily designed to economize on transaction costs through a nexus of
intra-agency and inter-institutional (Congress-agency) agreements, but a
program that is purposefully limited in its scope and objectives. In sum,
economic organizations are, by hypothesis, designed by their makers to
succeed; public organizations may be designed to fail.
177
In addition, the new economics of organization largely ignores the role
of persistent political competition for control. Political competition makes
the predicament facing regulatory agencies far different from that
confronting private economic organizations.178 The application of the
economic theory of the business firm to public bureaucracies supposes that
the main structural relationship is among the managers and the employees
of the firm. It is a hierarchical relationship to which principal-agent theory
176. See Moe, supra note 74; Moe, supra note 137.
177. Terry Moe suggests a number of other respects in which public agencies and regulatory
programs are importantly distinct from business firms. See Moe, supra note 137. One concerns the
role of political uncertainty. Central to the economic explanation of the origins and functions of the
private firm is the notion that the firm's managers possess property rights in the ownership of the firm's
assets; relatedly, firm members will make important investments in assets specific to the purposes of
the firm. For instance, an employer will design a retirement plan to create incentives for the employees
to stay on the job. These features-stable property rights and asset specificity-provide, respectively,
the bases upon which the economic organization can be formed and the economic reasons for its
creation and maintenance. By contrast, in regulatory programs involving public agencies, both sources
of stability and certainty are missing. The relevant "property rights" are the elements of authority in
regulatory decisions. These elements of authority are complex and only partially within the control of
the agency-organization. For instance, an agency may be required, per a statutory instruction, to carry
out a task. The governing law, then, is public law; it is not the sort of private law represented by
contract law in which the law provides a source of guidance for firm managers to follow in making
bargains with one another. The property right, in the instance of the public agency, is held by the
maker of the laws, not by the members of the agency-organization. With respect to asset specificity,
the decisions involving what sort of investments the agency will make may well be within the purview
of political decisionmakers and only within the discretion of the agency at the sufferance of those
decisionmakers.
So how will administrative agencies exercise this authority? While we cannot confidently predict,
we can be reasonably sure that they will not necessarily regard their decisions as driven by the need
to facilitate efficient transactions. The governance structures put in place by rational political
decisionmakers will be designed to carry out certain political goals; efficient economic organization will
become, unless part of the regulatory goal of the program, an incidental factor.
This is not to say, though, that the analogy of political institutions and business firms is not
appropriate in other contexts. For example, efficient transacting may still be a goal for certain political
institutions, such as legislatures. See Barry R. Weingast & William Marshall, The Industrial
Organization of Congress; or Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL.
ECON. 132 (1988).
178. See infra text accompanying notes 315-51 (providing a positive political theory analysis of
political control).
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is applied. The aim is to understand how decisionmakers structure this
relationship and, specifically, how they reduce the agency costs associated
with managing opportunistic subordinates and increasing the productive
capacity of the organization.'79 By contrast, decisionmakers in public
agencies are involved in a myriad of different relationships. In addition to
the hierarchy of administration within the agency, there are relationships
among the agency and its regulatory constituents. For example, the
administrator of the EPA must pay attention not only to opportunistic
assistant administrators, but also to environmental interest groups, important
members of Congress, and to the President and his agents. To understand
the environment in which public organizations operate, we must understand
the dimensions of political competition among those who are battling for
influence over the agency. 8 To the extent that we view these relation-
ships in principal-agent terms, there are multiple principals and agents. 8'
However, there are relationships among political actors that are not clearly
amenable to analysis within the standard principal-agent frameworks. For
instance, in competing for control over the regulatory process, Congress
and the President are concerned partially with controlling opportunistic
behavior by the agency and its members. 82 But this is only part of the
dilemma that Congress and the President face; they are also concerned with
the agency's obedience to their competitor. Hence, it may be precisely in
that situation in which an agency is perfectly obsequious to Congress, that
the President will assert his powers and therefore threaten to upset the
balance.
The new economics of organization's underappreciation of the interrela-
tionship between the agency and its "clients" is part of a larger tendency
in this theory to disregard important elements of the external environment
within which the organization functions. Certainly, the new economics of
organization has acknowledged the critical role of law in providing a matrix
in which the functions of the agency are carried out.'83 The law that is
germane to the theory as it is applied to private organizations is contract
law; the notion is that decisionmakers made organizational decisions in the
179. See generally John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview,
in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STmucruR OF BUSINESS I (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauscr
eds., 1992) [hereinafter PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS].
180. See discussion infra part IV.D.
181. On multiple principals, see Kenneth Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND
AGENTS, supra note 179, at 37.
182. See infra Part IV.E.
183. See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 96.
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shadow of the legal rules governing how their agreements will be
interpreted and enforced. From the perspective of transaction cost
economics and the new economics of organization, the external environ-
ment represented by legal rules remains opaque. At times, it appears
almost as an independent variable, existing as a ubiquitous set of con-
straints on the organizational choices of boundedly rational actors. This
suggests a dichotomy between decisions that are within the domain of the
organization and its members (i.e., which governance structures it can
create) and decisions that are out of their hands (i.e., the law that governs
certain arrangements and transactions). At other times, law is described as
the product of rational decisionmakers who aim to facilitate efficient
transactions. Contract law, for instance, functions as a set of useful
instructions to finr managers to use in making and enforcing agree-
ments." In this sense, legal rules enforced by courts represent the rules
that rational actors would construct and implement themselves if it were
efficient for them to do so.
The view of law as exogenous and constraining and the view of law as
a set of rules that merely map the preferences of the rational
decisionmakers are irreconcilable. At bottom, the problem is that the new
economics of organization lacks a sophisticated theory of the law and the
nature and function of legal rules. Oliver Williamson candidly conceded
this point when he wrote that the incipient science of organization "puts
emphasis on governance structures (which mainly implicates economics and
organization) rather than on the institutional environment (where the law
is more salient)." '  With such an emphasis, the new economics of
organization cannot satisfactorily explain how the "institutional environ-
ment" in which regulatory decisions are made affects the performance of
agencies and the decisions made by rational actors to design the institution
in a certain way. For example, how would the new economics of
organization explain the performance of the EPA, an agency constantly
pulled and tugged in different directions by a web of legal restrictions,
constructed by Congress and applied (and occasionally created) by
courts?'86 We could not, surely, evaluate the EPA's performance without
incorporating these environmental factors and, especially, the role of law
184. See id.
185. Williamson, supra note 71, at 200 n.3.
186. See, e.g., ROBERT G. HARRIS & SIDNEY MILKIS, THE POLrTlcs OF REGULATORY CHANGE: A
TALE OF Two AGENCIES (1989); MELNICK, supra note 12. Cf. JERRY L. MESHAW & DAVID L.
HARTFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990).
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and legal rules. Governance structures, while important, would capture
only part of the regulatory story.
Although the new economics of organization is limited in its ability to
explain the political dimensions of regulatory politics, it does illuminate
important aspects of organizational structure and function. Accordingly, it
sheds useful light on how institutional form affects regulatory performance.
At best, the new economics of organization can help to develop theories of
each political organization standing alone;"87 what it cannot do-and, in
fairness, has no pretense to do-is explain the interactions of each
rationally constructed organization in an environment made up of political
factors and legal commands.'88
Neither one of these rational choice theories has thus far considered
adequately the interdependence among institutions and the dynamics of
inter-institutional competition for regulatory control. Myopic is the view
that, with regard to regulatory policymaking, the legislature and adminis-
trative agencies act either as passive translators of interest group demands
or as autonomous organizations. The regulatory environment is made up
of elements that we must understand separately as well as interactively.
What has been missing from rational choice theories until now is suitable
appreciation of the role of institutions outside the agency, namely,
Congress, the President, and the courts. These institutions are outside the
agency but are very much inside the regulatory process. They have their
own agendas, incentive structures, and methods of regulatory intervention
and influence. What is needed is a complex theory of institutions which
would help make sense of the dynamics of the regulatory process by
closely examining the functions and activities of each institution that
participates in this process.'89 What is also needed is an examination of
the role of law and legal rules in the regulatory policy process. It is to the
role that positive political theory plays in elucidating these issues that we
now turn.
IV. TOWARD A POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY OF POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS
The previous Parts have framed, respectively, the regulatory predicament
and the ambitions of contemporary rational choice theory. The general aim
187. See Weingast & Marshall, supra note 177.
188. See generally Williamson, supra note 171.
189. See Terry Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story. 6 J.L. ECON. & ORO.
213 (Special Issue 1990).
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is to enable legal scholars to consider more rigorously public law questions
that concern the prospects and limits of regulatory reform. In Part I, I
surveyed some of the elements of the general regulatory predicament. To
the extent that effective regulation is thwarted by improper political and
legal interventions, as I discussed in Part II, scholarship within the tradition
of rational choice theory has helped us understand the nature and
consequences of these interventions. Yet the principal efforts by econo-
mists to develop institutional theory--or, in the case of interest group
theory, theory about institutions-have thus far failed to develop a
sufficiently rich analysis of the interrelationships among various political
institutions and the role of law in both enabling and constraining regulatory
decisionmaking within institutions.
The objective of this Part is to evaluate the contributions of positive
political theory with regard to these issues. The description of positive
political theory in this Part is selective. Without question, the discussion
of positive theory herein is filtered through the author's interpretations of
the scholarly literature. The objective of the positive political theory
literature is to explain political-institutional phenomena; my objective in
this Article is to examine the potential intersections between positive
political theory and prescriptions for regulatory reform. Consequently, the
project in this Part is not to report comprehensively a line of research. It
is to draw out of a burgeoning positive literature on governmental
decisionmaking within political institutions a series of complementary
perspectives on regulatory policy in order to consider whether and to what
extent we can better understand the prospects for real regulatory reform.
A. The Elements of Positive Political Theory
1. Themes
The signal contribution of positive political theory is its attention to the
dynamics of political behavior within institutions. Positive political theory
describes regulatory policymaking as a part of a world in which political
actors function within institutions rationally and strategically in order to
accomplish certain goals. 9 ' These rational actors compete for power and
influence within these institutions; moreover, these institutions compete
190. See generally Farber & Frickey, supra note 18 (defining positive political theory as "non-
normative, rational choice theories of political institutions"). An early use of the phrase was in
WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY
(1973).
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against one another, on behalf of their members, for control. The
contribution of this body of work is to consider more rigorously and
theoretically, and with the use of the technologies of microeconomic theory,
the notion that much of regulation and public policy can be understood as
products of strategic action.
Nearly twenty years ago, two prominent political economists described
the basic underpinnings of what would become the principal project of
positive theorists of politics and its processes.' 9' The notion was that
legislators act purposively and will structure their institutions and
procedures to facilitate their goals. These goals are heterogenous.
Legislators may covet job security; if so, they will act to maximize their
chances of becoming reelected." 2 They may covet greater influence
within the legislature, in which case they will orient their behavior to
maximize intra-legislative influence. 93 Or they may simply aim to
implement their vision of proper public policy through the lawmaking and
regulatory processes.!94 Whatever their goals, legislators would act
purposively in order to improve the conditions for the accomplishment of
their aims. 95 The most significant of these conditions are the institutions
in which the legislature carried out its activities and the rules and
procedures that govern legislative decisionmaking. These institutions and
rules range from the committee system to political parties to amendment
rules. They also include, significantly, the institutions with which
legislators interact in the course of regulatory decisionmaking, such as the
President, administrative agencies, and the courts.
Purposive models of legislative behavior do not suppose that legislators
would have some sort of collective intent or purpose. Legislatures, after
all, are made up of individuals and groups.'96 They did suppose, howev-
er, that legislators would share an interest in acting rationally and
strategically to pursue their ambitions in the legislative system. As a result
of this shared purposivism, legislative institutions and rules would become
things to fight over, just as legislators fight over substantive policies.
191. John A. Ferejohn & Morris P. Fiorina, Purposive Models of Legislative Behavior, 65 AM.
ECON. REv. 407 (1975).
192. See MAYHEW, supra note 116.
193. For an excellent examination of the various goals that legislators may pursue, see Richard
Fenno's pathbreaking CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973). See also R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE
LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACION 3-36 (1990).
194. See, e.g., ARTHUR MAAS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1983).
195. See, e.g., WILLAM H. RiKER, THE ART OF POLITCAL MANIPULATION (1976).
196. See, e.g., Shepsle, supra note 61.
[VOL. 72:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss1/2
REGULATORY REFORM
Structure is not something immutable; it is subject to manipulation and to
strategic behavior. Most structural features of political institutions are, in
the vernacular of political economy, endogenous to politics. They are not
the remnants of some deterministic political history or some precise
constitutional rulebook. Instead, they represent the creation of rational
decisionmakers determined to facilitate their political goals. Purposive
models help to explain the past and present, that is, why we observe the
creation and maintenance (or, in some cases, the destruction and recreation)
of certain forms of decisionmaking within legislatures. Purposive models
resist treating the legislative process as a deus ex machina, inherited by
legislators and basically impervious to change. For that reason, purposive
models help us predict the future: How will legislators adapt their
institutions and rules in light of changing circumstances?
Positive political theory represents the modem incarnation of Ferejohn
and Fiorina's early survey of purposive models of legislative behavior. It
has, as its general ambition, the construction of a comprehensive theory of
politics. To that end, positive political theory employs theories of all the
institutions that make up the political process. It is especially concerned
with the politics of regulation.'97 The regulatory process incorporates the
decisions and behavior of each part of government: the legislature that
enacts the regulatory statute and the legislature over time as it confronts
changing regulatory policies; the President who appoints regulatory officials
and supervises aspects of administrative decisionmaking; the courts who
review agency decisions; and the agencies themselves.
Regulation presents a set of opportunities and risks for rational
politicians acting within political institutions. Regulation presents, as the
political economy of regulation has stressed, a set of goods to be fought
over.' Decisions to regulate, to not regulate, or to deregulate, implicate
politicians' preferences. Moreover, once the structure of regulatory policy
is set, the administrative process can function as an arena in which
politicians compete with one another for political advantage. 9 However,
pursuing these opportunities through aggressive strategic action presents
risks. For example, legislators may pass a statute that creates a regulatory
program, an agency to implement it, and a general delegation which
197. See Noll, supra note 17.
198. See KEITH KREHBIEL, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 23-60 (1991) (describing
"distributive" theories of legislative organization). See generally infra text accompanying notes 299-
303.
199. See infra part IV.E.
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enables them to exercise flexible control over regulatory decisions as they
arise. Such a decision, while presenting opportunities for legislators who
are parties to the original bargain, is subject to manipulation by others who
not only share different goals but may confound the expectations and hopes
of the program's creators in order to suit their own purposes. Broad
delegations leave agencies some discretion; politicians may limit this
discretion by intervening in agency decisions, but they will not necessarily
do so in order to ensure that the agency is acting in accordance with the
will of the regulation's creators.2" Delegations designed to ensure
flexibility may empower political competitors and therefore risk defeating
the purposes of the program's original creators.
Positive political theories have had two different agendas. The first is
to construct positive theories of political institutions.2"' Not all of these
theories resemble all others. Positive political theory is methodologically
eclectic. There are different positive perspectives on studying institutional
phenomena. For example, controversies over the purpose of committees
and committee power rage among political economists who remain
committed to the basic rational choice underpinnings and methodologies of
positive political theory. The second agenda is to put the pieces of these
institutional theories together into a general theory of inter-institutional
decisionmaking. The question is: How do rational politicians construct
their institutions and regulatory processes to facilitate their individual goals
and, at the same time, expand the domain of influence of the institutions
to which politicians' own fates are tied?
Both of these agendas are relevant to normative public law scholarship
and efforts to reform regulation. To understand the potential and limits of
various prescriptions, we must build on a positive understanding of the
nature of the institutions to which these prescriptions are directed. In
addition, we must understand the relationship between reform suggestions
200. See discussion infra part IV.B.2.
201. By far the richest positive analyses of political processes have been the studies of
decisionmaking within Congress. Until very recently, positive political theory was formal studies of
the legislature and legislative institutions. See Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of
Congressional Dominance, 12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475 (1987) (criticizing political economists' singular
focus on Congress and neglect of the Presidency). By now, there are positive analyses of presidential
and judicial decisionmaking; accordingly, positive political theory has a substantially more catholic
bent-and, for that reason, much more to offer to those interested in the sections between positive and
normative theory. See supra part IV.B-C. Nevertheless, there is simply much more ground covered
by positive political theories of legislative processes and, as a result, a considerably richer picture of
legislative decisionmaking with which to work.
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and the dynamics of regulatory processes.
Political economists and legal scholars working within the positive
political theory framework strive to understand and explain two components
of regulatory policymaking. The first, and more "internal" component, is
the structure of institutional design and organization. The question here is
the same one asked by organization theorists, including the new economists
of organization: Why are institutions designed the way they are? What
purposes are being subserved? And how might rational decisionmakers
construct institutional structures, rules, and procedures in order to facilitate
efficiently and efficaciously the purposes of the institution? To the extent
that one of the principal aims of each political institution is to increase its
power, positive political theory aims at explaining how political institutions
are designed to facilitate these goals.
However, the power of any institution is limited in crucial ways. These
limits implicate a second, and more "external," aspect of regulatory
decisionmaking: What are the constraints on the power wielded by self-
interested institutions? The first category of constraints involves political
checks, largely defined with reference to the strategic decisions made by
institutions who compete with one another for political influence and
control. In the positive political theory vision, politics becomes a sort of
marketplace in which institutions compete with one another for economic
rents. Where institutional power is unequal, the political marketplace
becomes a game in which the fittest survive and in which political actors
are sensitive to the appropriate design and structure of their institutions in
order to improve their ability to compete for control.
In addition to these ubiquitous checks, inter-institutional competition is
controlled by means of legal rules, enforced (and occasionally constructed)
by courts. Hence, positive political theories of regulatory policymaking
demand attention to the role of politics and the role of law.
2. Technologies
Positive political theory is squarely within the tradition of rational choice
theory, and builds on its standard assumptions." 2 It considers political
processes by examining the choices made by rational actors in institutions.
It supposes that politicians act rationally, possess perfect information about
202. For a useful introduction, see JOE B. STEVENS, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE
(1993). A more critical survey is provided in DAVID FARBER & PHILIP FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
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the preferences of other politicians in government, and will, accordingly,
attempt to carry out their own interests within the boundaries set by the
decisions made by their competitors and the rules of law. As previously
mentioned, positive political theory does not rest on a particularly strong
conception of what politicians maximize; 3 all that is assumed is that
politicians will strive to maximize their own interests through rational,
strategic decisions made within their institution and in competition with
other institutions in the political "marketplace."
Positive political theory is not synonymous, however, with what has been
described in the law and in economics literature as collective choice or
public choice. Collective theory concentrates on the difficulties posed for
democratic-majoritarian decisionmaking by the impossibility theorems
described by, among others, Kenneth Arrow and Duncan Black.214 Public
choice theory, although the basic definition is general,205 has become
associated with interest group theories of legislation in which, as described
above, regulation is viewed as the output of a process driven by interest
group pressures on reelection-maximizing legislators. Positive political
theory breaks from both the collective choice and public choice traditions.
It directly challenges the basic collective choice insight that decisionmaking
within multi-member institutions is unstable and that, broadly speaking,
anything can happen.0 6 Positive political theory examines the role of
institutions in ameliorating the problems described in collective choice
theory. It also challenges, albeit more ambivalently, the thrust of public
choice theory in its conclusion that regulatory outcomes are mere wealth
transfers from the public fisc to interest groups. 2 7  Positive political
theory draws attention away from the relationship between legislators and
constituents and toward the relationship among politicians, who have
heterogenous goals, within the matrices of strategically constructed
institutions and practices.
One of the ways in which positive political theory focuses attention on
inter-institutional relationships is through the application of game
theory.20 8 The game-theoretic models employed in positive political
203. See supra notes 191-95.
204. See infra part IV.B.2 (discussing collective choice).
205. See DENNis L. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989).
206. See, e.g., Richard McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some
Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976).
207. See supra part III.B (describing interest group theory of legislation).
208. For useful introductions to the assumptions and insights of game theory, see ERIC RASMUSSEN,
GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (1989); DAVID M. KtEps, GAME
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theory rest on the idea that political institutions will make regulatory
choices as moves in a game involving each institution as a player and in
which there is a payoff associated with particular regulatory outcomes. The
standard regulatory game is a perfect information game." 9 It proceeds
in sequence with each institution making its decision, that is, its "move,"
in light of the decisions that other institutions will make in response to this
move. A rational player will anticipate the future course of the game and,
planning accordingly, will make his decisions in light of the entire sequence
of the game. The notion of a subgame perfect equilibrium expresses the
idea that we can describe the outcome of the game by working backwards,
that is, by considering what would be the ex ante choices made by
institutions given the game's scenario."' In the simplest positive political
theory games, the game is modeled in a series of decisions made by actors
on a set of policies within a one-dimensional space where the actors are
supposed to have "single-peaked" preferences.2 '
Game theory provides an interesting, yet highly stylized, perspective on
inter-institutional decisionmaking in the regulatory process. 2 Although
the game theory apparatus is not always easily accessible to the average
consumer of legal scholarship, or at least, is not the common fare of law
reviews, the game-theoretic models used in most contemporary positive
political theory scholarship are rather simple. Indeed, part of the problem
is that they may be too simple to account for the complexities of the
regulatory process. For example, prominent positive political theorists have
THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING (1990); Ann E. Cudd, Game Theory and the History of Ideas
About Rationality: An Introductory Survey, 9 ECON. & PHIL. 101 (1993).
209. See RASMUSSEN, supra note 208, at 50-51.
210. See id. at 85. Equilibrium is short-hand for "Nash equilibrium." A Nash equilibrium "is an
array of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has an incentive (in terms of improving his
own payoff) to deviate from his part of the strategy array." KREPs, supra note 208, at 28.
211. See generally Amartya Sen, Social Choice and Justice: A Review Article, 23 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1764, 1770-74 (1985).
212. Although the positive political theory literature I will describe herein follows the standard
tenets of non-cooperative game theory, and the assumptions about rationality that underlie it,
contemporary game theory is a field very much in flux. See generally Cudd, supra note 208. For
example, through the work of Amartya Sen and others, there are developing theories that suggest
modifications in rational choice economists' assumptions about rational behavior. See, e.g., AMARTYA
SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT (1982); Amitai Etzioni, The Case for a Multiple-Utility
Conception, 2 ECON. & PHIL. 159 (1986). Moreover, there are new models developing under the
banner "information theory" that may lead to important reconstructions of game theory and its
methodologies. These issues are well beyond the scope of my Article. Suffice it to say here that
positive political theory, in its reliance on game theory, borrows from a tradition that is in serious
methodological ferment.
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recently used imperfect information, or "signalling" models, to construct
pictures of regulatory policymaking. The idea in this literature is that
information is held in different amounts by different institutions. I will
examine these signalling models in more detail later as we discuss
congressional efforts to control administrative agencies through procedural
and structural devices." 3
Principal-agent theory is another analytic technology employed by
positive political theory. 4 The basic idea is that political institutions are
principals, trying through various means to control the actions of their
agents." 5 The most literal iteration of this principal-agent relationship is
between a majority legislative coalition and an administrative agency.2"6
There may, though, be a myriad of other principal-agent relationships
critical to the positive political analysis of the regulatory process, including,
for example, the relationship between legislative coalitions and political
parties or committees, and the relationship between the legislature and the
courts.
21 7
The use of a principal-agent framework to describe the relationship
among political institutions, and specifically, the relationship among
Congress, the President, and the courts, in the process of regulatory
decisionmaking is problematic. It is difficult, as an initial matter, to define
who are the principals and who are the agents. The relationship between
Congress and an administrative agency might be accurately characterized
213. See infra part IV.B.3.
214. See generally Pratt & Zeckhauser, supra note 179; Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980). See also sources cited in supra note 169.
215. See, e.g., BARRY M. MINIcK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION (1980) [hereinafter
MITNICK, ECONOMY OF REGULATION]; Barry M. Mitnick, Regulation and the Theory of Agency, I
POL'Y STUD. REV. 442 (1981-82).
216. See infra part IV.B.3.
217. Terry Moe offers a lucid account of the basic elements of the principal-agent framework:
The principal-agent model is an analytic expression of the agency relationship in which one
party, the principal, considers entering into a contractual agreement with another, the agent,
in the expectation that the agent will subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes
desired by the principal.... [A] principal may seek out an agent for various reasons. Often
he may lack specialized knowledge or legal certification that the agent possesses, and
sometimes the size or complexity of the task simply requires coordinated action by persons
other than himself. But ... the principal's decision problem is far more involved than simply
locating a qualified person-for there is no guarantee that the agent, once hired will ...
choose to pursue the principal's best interests.... The agent has his own interests at heart,
and is induced to pursue the principal's objectives only to the extent that the incentive
structure imposed in their contract renders such behavior advantageous.
Moe, supra note 16, at 756. See also D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEw D. MCCUBBINS, THE LoaIc
OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 22-38 (1991).
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in hierarchical terms: Congress acts, as a principal, to control the actions
of its agency-agent. However, when we introduce the President into this
mix, the relationship becomes more complicated. Perhaps the President is
a competing principal; in this scheme, two principal-agent relationships
exist, each with a separate incentive structure and, therefore, with its own
basis for predicting patterns of regulatory decisions. Moreover, one could
think about the President as an agent of Congress; after all, the President
is obliged to execute faithfully the laws enacted by Congress."' Accord-
ingly, Congress acts, through its laws, as a principal in a hierarchical
relationship in which the President is, at least with respect to his obligations
under legislative commands, an agent of Congress. Thus, in the same
regulatory scenario, the President can act as both (competing) principal and
agent.21
9
The relationship among Congress, an agency, and the judiciary has a
similarly complicated character. On one theory of legislative supremacy
and judicial restraint, the court is clearly the agent of Congress; it is
obliged to obey Congress' will and, insofar as the court faces the same
incentives as does any other agent to shirk, Congress must structure its
principal-agent relationship with the same attention to proper incentives and
controls. However, even in this scenario, the courts wield substantial
control over the actions of agencies. Are they a principal, acting to control
the behavior of "their" regulatory agents? Can a court simultaneously be
a principal and an agent? Perhaps there is a different way to think about
the judiciary and its role in regulatory administration altogether. To the
extent that the judiciary has its own distinct economic organization and
incentives, it may behave like a principal competing with Congress for
control over their agents.
Positive political theory brings an eclectic set of methodologies to the
study of political phenomena. Its catholic approach is, in an important
sense, a welcome relief from the tendencies in other rational choice theories
to rest their entire analyses on a particular framework or analytic technolo-
gy. However, there are potential tensions among the frameworks and
technologies upon which positive political theory relies. The detailed
examination of positive political theory in the remainder of this Part
illustrates some of these tensions.
218. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
219. Cf. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics ofAgency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS, supra note 179,
at 42-43 (discussing principal-agent problems associated with multiple principals).
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B. Legislatures
1. Constitutional Structure and the Possibilities for Rational Choice
In the American lawmaking system, there is little in the way of a
constitutional template for proper legislative decisionmaking. Legislators'
strategic decisions fill a vacuum left by the absence of explicit constitution-
al arrangements regarding the structure, rules, and practices of the federal
legislature. Perhaps this vacuum was intentional;"0  or perhaps the
Constitution's framers underestimated both the capacities of rational
legislators to construct institutions to facilitate their opportunistic aims and
the dangers posed by these strategic decisions.22' In any event, the
Constitution's structure sheds precious little light on the important decisions
made by legislators within institutions.
Where the Constitution provides the most guidance is with respect to
Congress'powers. However, the depiction of Congress' legislative powers
in Article I is inchoate. Congress' regulatory powers derive from its more
220. There are positive political theories explaining certain constitutional arrangements, The gist
of these explanations is that the framers were more prescient than is generally credited and that they
deliberately constructed mechanisms to regulate political advantage-taking. See, e.g., William H. Riker,
Rhetorical Interaction in the Ratification Campaigns, in AGENDA FORMATION 81 (William H. Riker ed.,
1993); John A. Ferejohn & William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Article , Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523
(1992) [hereinafter Ferejohn & Eskridge, Article 1]; John A. Ferejohn & William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern
Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 165 (1992) [hereinafter Ferejohn & Eskridge, Making the Deal
Stick]. Cf. Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 145 (1992); Robert Cooter, The Minimax Constitution as Democracy, 12 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 292 (1992).
221. Of course, this merely hints at a large subject of inquiry, namely, the framers' purposes in
choosing the constitutional structure reflected in the United States Constitution. While this subject is
mainly beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noticing that the observation in text-that the
framers provided little in the way of a precise template for legislative decisionmaking-could be
explained by a number of distinct theories. One perspective would stress the extent to which the
framers were concerned, in their constitutional architecture, with fostering deliberation and public-
spiritedness, and in that connection, fashioned a document that accomplishes these aims rather well.
See, e.g., HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL 137-62 (1991); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). Another perspective
would emphasize how the framers set out to construct a Constitution that would restrict lawmakers' self-
interest-a purpose described lucidly by James Madison, see THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)
(Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981), but failed. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 145. A third perspective, and
surely the one that is most interesting from the standpoint of positive political theory, would suggest
that the framers constructed exactly what they wanted, that is, a system that would leave most important
issues of the lawmaking process indeterminate. The Constitution would preserve, thusly, "an invitation
to struggle."
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specific powers to regulate and its general power to enact legislation
"necessary and proper" to carry out the powers enumerated elsewhere.' a
Legislators' strategic decisions are constrained by this ascription to the
legislature of certain powers in three ways: first, through the principle of
limitation embodied in the theory of American constitutionalism and
incorporated into the structure of Article I; second, through the
Constitution's separation of powers; and, finally, through the right
described in the first ten amendments of the Constitution.2z
Congress has only limited powers-those enumerated, and those
necessary and proper to implement the basic powers. The basic principle,
then, is that legislators cannot make choices that would expand the scope
of legislative powers beyond that permitted by Article I. If the operative
metaphor in positive political theory for legislators' institutional choices is
a competitive marketplace, it is a marketplace regulated by the
Constitution's core principle of limited government and enumerated
powers.224 Of course, the boundaries are imprecise; McCulloch v.
Maryland and its progeny ensure that what is "necessary and proper
within the meaning of Article I will receive a capacious interpretation. 22s
Positive political theory suggests that legislators will push the edges of
these boundaries. Yet, the delineation of legislative powers assures that
legislator strategizing will occur within some sort of constitutional
architecture.
Politicians' exercise of regulatory powers is also circumscribed through
the Constitution's separation of powers. The core idea is separation and
specialization of function; the reality is, however, much more complex.
The American lawmaking system is characterized more accurately by a
structure of checks and balances, with institutions exercising overlapping
powers and in which structure excesses are controlled through the checks
and balances provided by political controls. 6 Separation of powers has
222. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See MeCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
(construing "necessary and proper" clause).
223. For recent attempts to integrate these sources of limitation into a more comprehensive theory
of the American Constitution than the traditional rights/power distinction has permitted, see Geoffrey
P. Miller, Liberty and Constitutional Architecture: The Rights-Structure Paradigm, 16 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 87 (1993); Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991);
Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship
Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267 (1988).
224. See Cooter, supra note 220, at 292-94.
225. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 2 (2d ed. 1988).
226. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984).
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operated as a constitutional doctrine-as a rule of law-only sporadical-
ly. 7  This is because of the uncertain contours of each branch's respec-
tive powers and because of the courts' reticence to intervene in disputes
among the branches over regulatory issues. The exceptions, of which the
Supreme Court's decision striking down the legislative veto is perhaps most
notable," are striking in part because they are so rare. Thus, while the
Constitution's separation of powers might well have functioned as an
orderly constraint on the strategic behavior of rational politicians acting
within the institutions of government, the history of American constitutional
law gives little indication that the courts are prepared to enforce separation
of powers to such effect. As a result, there is little in the way of reliable
legal controls on the encroachments by legislators, the President, and the
agencies on the assigned powers of the other branches. 9
With respect to the procedural components of legislative and presidential
decisionmaking, the Constitution is mostly silent. The Constitution
delineates the specific procedures legislators must follow in order to pass
a statute.Y° Beyond this relatively brief set of rules, legislators are left
to their own devices. "Each House," the Constitution states, "may
determine the Rules of its Proceedings .... ."2 The courts have
persistently taken this injunction rather literally, seldom intervening to
restrict the discretion of legislators to develop their own institutions, rules,
and practices. 2 The President's discretion in structuring the executive
branch is, if anything, even more broad. The labrynthine executive branch
is a product of two centuries of political practice;233 so long as the
President has acted within the capacious scope of his constitutional powers
227. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513
(1991); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern," The Need for Pragmatic
Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 (1991).
228. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
229. Perhaps this statement would appear less controversial than it seems on its face if the reader
understood me to be making merely an empirical point about the state of separation of powers
jurisprudence, that is, the point that the courts rarely strike down an action of a governmental
decisionmaker on the grounds that such action violates the Constitution's separation of powers. It is
concededly another matter to make the more ambitious point that the Constitution, in its text and
history, could not provide any satisfactory legal controls on the exercise by politicians of lawmaking
powers.
230. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7.
231. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
232. But see Powell v. MeCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
233. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992).
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under Article II, decisions concerning proper executive structures are
reserved to the political process, that is, to decisions of the President and
Congress.1 4 In short, the Constitution delegates most important structural
decisions to politicians.
The remaining potential source of lawmaking instructions is the
Constitution's Bill of Rights. In principle, the Constitution's enumerated
rights could provide the same sort of structural constraints as the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments provide with respect to the criminal justice system.
The Bill of Rights is largely silent, however, with respect to the lawmaking
processes of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The most
ambitious attempt to construct a web of Constitutional rules for proper
lawmaking has been the proposal for, in Hans Linde's words, a "due
process of lawmaking." '235 The idea, broadly speaking, is to subject
legislation to a procedural test whereby "the central function of judicial
review [would be] to guarantee the democratic legitimacy of political
decisions by establishing essential rules of the political process." The
source of this test would be, as with judicial or administrative
decisionmaking, the Constitution's guarantees of procedural due pro-
cess. 6  While there have been occasional moves by the Supreme Court
in the direction of a right to due process in lawmaking, the proposal has
fallen on mostly deaf ears.237
We are back, then, to the basic theme of positive political theory:
structural choice is political choice; decisions about procedure are decisions
made within the political process and for the same sorts of instrumental
reasons as other, more substantive, decisions. The task of the next three
234. The principal constitutional restraint on presidential power is provided in Article II, which
obliges the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. See generally Calabresi & Rhodes,
supra note 233.
235. Hans Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976). See also Terrence
Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977); Laurence Tribe, Structural
Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975).
236. More recently, Cass Sunstein has suggested the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a source of regulation on the legislature's lawmaking functions. Cass R. Sunstein,
Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984); Cass P. Sunstein, Public
Values; Private Preferences, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 127. Sunstein's
proposal would, even if adopted, provide little in the way of a lawmaking template, for all that is
required is that the legislature indicate that they have deliberated over the proposed legislation; in other
words, they must demonstrate that the law has a rational justification and is not merely a manifestation
of the legislature's "naked preferences." Sunstein's procedural suggestions have largely concerned
matters formally outside the legislative process, for instance, greater restrictions on campaign spending.
237. But see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 549 & n.24 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
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sections is to examine how politicians make these structural-institutional
choices.
2. Bargaining, Information, and Legislative Design
At the core of rational choice theories of politics is the insight that the
structure of legislative institutions is the product of rational, informed
choices made by legislators acting within the domain of Congress and with
the tools and resources they possess as elected officials. While positive
political theories do not presume any particular legislative motivations, they
do insist-and explain with the aid of formal models-that legislators act
strategically to expand the scope of their own power and the power of the
institutions that they create and work within. There are two different
dimensions to these strategies. First, legislators must settle on the
appropriate institutional structure of Congress; that is, what sort of rules
and structures will best facilitate their interests. Majorities must agree to
legislative initiatives; hence, legislators must make decisions with an eye
toward convincing equally strategic legislators to go along. Second, these
legislative coalitions must make decisions regarding the appropriate scope
of delegated power to other institutions, outside the formal parameters of
Congress, to carry out their interests and aims.
The scholarly effort by political economists to craft positive theories of
legislative institutions was set in motion by a theoretical paradox.
Legislative decisionmaking should ensure that the final policy reflects the
will of a majority of legislators voting on the proposal. Whatever other
objections we may have to the policy on the merits, we can be confident
that it reflects the outcome of a process that is, broadly speaking,
democratic. However, a core tenet of collective choice theories of
legislative decisionmaking is that the policy outcomes voted upon by
legislators need not reflect majoritarian processes. On the contrary, there
is no guarantee that the process will yield coherent choices on any
decisionmaking process in which the majority rules. 8 The lawmaking
process is chaotic. 9 An 18th-century French mathematician, Marquis de
Condorcet, pointed out how in a situation in which a collection of
decisionmakers is choosing a policy from among three or more alternatives,
238. See KENNETH ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). For a useful
survey of the literature, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 13, at 38-62.
239. See the discussion in William H. Panning, Formal Models of Legislative Processes, In
HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 689 (Gerard Lewenberg et al., eds., 1985); and in MUELLER,
supra note 205, at 384-99.
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a majority-rule voting procedure can lead to arbitrary results.24  Two
centuries later, political economists such as Duncan Black and Kenneth
Arrow constructed theories that explained how, in the absence of certain
restrictive conditions, in all forms of decisionmaking in which votes are
aggregated, including legislatures, outcomes will be arbitrary and hence the
process chaotic."
This voters' paradox does not indicate, of course, that decisionmaking in
legislatures is impossible. It only supposes that legislators must choose
some method to reach decisions on policy outcomes with the understanding
that majority-rule voting is prone to cycling.24 2 Under certain conditions,
these decisionmaking choices need not be incoherent. There are two
primary categories of conditions in which coherent choices can prevail.
One is what we might label voter properties conditions, the substance of
which are more or less outside the scope of contemporary positive political
theory.243 The other set of conditions are institutional conditions. The
240. MARQUIS DE CONDORcET, EsSAI SUR L'APPLICATION DE L'ANALYSE A LA PROBABILITt DES
DECISIONS RENDUES A LA PLURALITt DES VOIX DE (1785).
241. See ARRoW, supra note 238; DUNCAN BLAcK, THE THEORY OF COMMITrEES AND ELECTIONS
(1958).
242. See McKelvey, supra note 206.
243. One condition for coherence is the existence of single-peaked preferences. Technically, the
notion of preferences that are single-peaked refers to a two-dimensional model of voter utility (vertical
axis) and policy choices (horizontal axis) in which there is only one "peak" in terms of utility, and
hence, one can consistently rank their preferences/utilities for each policy choice. See STEVENS, supra
note 156, at 146-47. Basically, where preferences of legislators are single-peaked, they can rank their
preferences from top to bottom in a way that, when aggregated, will reveal a coherent majority
outcome. See BLACK, supra note 241. However, the conditions for single-peakedness are quite
restrictive. First, all legislators must have single-peaked preferences; and, second, the issues that give
rise to the choice must be single-dimensional issues, that is, they must rest on a single underlying
evaluative dimension adhered to by all voters. STEVENS, supra note 156, at 147. For example, suppose
the issue is a choice for a health care proposal among several alternatives, including "managed care,"
"Canadian style," and "pay or play." In choosing from among the alternatives, each voter must adhere
to a single criterion, say, economic efficiency, in order to adhere to the single-peakedness condition.
Suppose I support "managed care" because of its cost-effectiveness, but also support, albeit less,
"Canadian Style health care" because of its equity and fairness qualities. If you value "Canadian Style"
over "managed care" based on an efficiency criterion, then, given additional policy choices and
additional voters, we are no longer adhering to the single-peaked preferences condition and are back
to incoherence.
Another voter properties condition is the role of ideology. Here the idea is that voters can align
their preferences from left to right on a single policy dimension based on their ideology. See ANTHONY
DOwNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 115-16 (1957). Suppose the criterion is the level of
government intervention in the economy. This ideological criterion can be mapped along a single-
dimensional spectrum so that we can plot all voters somewhere on this line. We can then align the
policy choices on this spectrum based on the degree to which it is interventionist. Again, this
conception runs into the problem of single-dimensionedness. Voters can rarely be plotted along a
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notion underlying these conditions is that some degree of coherence can be
obtained through legislator choices that carefully consider the consequences
of choices made under certain decision rules.2" One way a legislator can
adapt to potentially arbitrary outcomes is by voting strategically, that is,
calculating how the structure of his votes will play out given a particular
voting scheme. Suppose we observe the following preference ordering:
A prefers X > Y > Z
B prefers Y > Z > X
C prefers Z > X > Y
Assuming the first vote pits X versus Y and the second vote pairs the
winner versus Z, Z would win. For A to avoid getting Z, his last choice,
he can vote strategically for Y in the first round. The final outcome will
then become Y, his second-best choice, even though he preferred X to Y
in the first round. By voting strategically, legislators can ameliorate the
effects of voting intransitivities and can secure better, if not ideal,
outcomes.245 Of course, strategic voting (or "sophisticated voting") does
not make the process any more stable or democratic. It only adds another
layer to the already chaotic process; given strategic voting, we cannot tell
what legislators' true preferences are. Voting becomes a process of
legislators' calculating each others' preferences and strategies and taking
advantage of voting rules to implement the best results possible under the
circumstances.
Related to strategic voting as a means of limiting chaos is the manipula-
tion of legislative agendas in order to stack the deck in favor of preferred
outcomes.246 Legislators can limit the possibility of cycling by structur-
ing the agenda in order to ensure that the most desirable pairwise vote will
occur at the end. The agenda in the modem Congress, where the final
proposal is pitted against the status quo, is a simple example of how the
agenda can influence the final outcome.247 The collective choice litera-
ture is full of theoretical and empirical examinations of the manipulation
single-dimensional spectrum in the way that Downs supposed. Nor can issues be so clearly mapped.
244. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman et al., Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial
Context, 81 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 539 (1987).
245. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Veingast, Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting
Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions, 28 AM. J. POL. Scl. 49 (1984).
246. See RIKER, supra note 195; McKelvey, supra note 206; Charles Plott, A Notion of Equilibrium
and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 787 (1967).
247. 'we can say that the status quo is "privileged" in the voting sequence. Although legislators
can introduce various amendments to the proposal on the floor during deliberation, the final version of
the proposal must defeat the status quo to become enacted.
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by rational legislators of agendas in the service of political advantage-
taking.245
While each of these devices-strategic voting and agenda manipula-
tion-is a way of limiting voting cycles, these devices are not ideal, either
from the perspective of democratic theory 49 or, as is more relevant for
our purposes in this section, from the perspective of the legislators
themselves. Each legislator can vote strategically and participate in agenda
manipulation." Therefore, legislators will want to take full account of
the incentives and opportunities for such manipulations when they make
their choices concerning the rules and structures of decisionmaking in the
legislature. As a general matter, legislators can appreciate the extent to
which strategic behavior can promote chaos. Cycling is replaced by
strategic voting and agenda manipulation; the result, however, is still
undemocratic decisionmaking."I
Chaotic decisionmaking means that policy outcomes would be uncertain.
It is therefore in each legislator's interest to limit the extent of chaos.
There are several reasons for this. One reason concerns the relationship
between legislators and their constituents. Legislators survive to the extent
that they provide benefits to constituents. The inability of legislators to
ensure that their constituent demands will be fulfilled through their
legislative efforts decreases the value of the legislator's services. Thus
devalued, constituents will be inclined to turn their attention elsewhere,
either to a different legislator or to a different political institution, with the
informed hope that an alternative decisionmaking forum would provide a
more fruitful source of benefits. Another reason for legislators to prefer
stability to chaos involves the interest of legislators in the relative power
of their institution. The idea is the legislature's relative power-their
ability to compete against other political institutions for influence and
248. See generally FARBER & FRICKEY, supra, note 13; Panning, supra note 239.
249. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982); AMARTYA SEN,
COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970).
250. However, some legislators may be more equal than others. A legislator's position in the
institution may determine his relative ability to manipulate successfully legislative agendas with regard
to policy outcomes.
251. However, such decisionmaking need not be unstable. As Kenneth Shepsle notes:
[E]ven in voting processes victimized by the Arrow result, we are sometimes able to identify
equilibria. These equilibria, however, are strongly affected by the underlying incoherence of
majority preferences and, because of this, lack a compelling normative justification. Arrow's
theorem does not necessarily entail constant flux and indeterminacy; rather, it implies that the
manner in which majority cycling is resolved is arbitrary or otherwise morally indefensible.
Shepsle, supra note 61, at 242 n.6.
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control over the regulatory process-is a function of the structure of
legislative decisionmaking. If legislating is an inherently unpredictable
activity, then policymaking through other institutions, such as the
bureaucracy, the Presidency, and the courts, becomes much more attractive.
Persistently chaotic decisionmaking devalues the legislative function and,
therefore, decreases the relative power of the legislature vis-a-vis other
branches in government. Legislators would, therefore, share an institutional
interest in restricting the scope of chaotic decisionmaking in order to
preserve the overall power of Congress in the governmental system.252
Starting with the assumption that legislators will expend efforts to avoid
the chaos produced by voting intransitivities and agenda manipulation,
formal theorists have described how legislators could construct institutions
that would defeat cycling and, at the same time, facilitate the interests of
all legislators in reaping benefits through mutually beneficial exchanges
with one another concerning policies. Attention to these institutional efforts
was especially appropriate for an empirical reason: The modem legislature
was, despite the dire predictions of collective choice theory, observed to be
a rather stable institution. Gordon Tullock, one of the founding fathers of
Public Choice, asked at the beginning of the 1980s: Why do we observe so
much stability in the modem Congress?253 Theoretically, such stability
seemed implausible given the chaos theorems described in the collective
choice literature; empirically, though, legislative decisionmaking in the
modem Congress appeared fairly stable.
A seminal theoretical contribution is the concept of "structure-induced
equilibrium." '  The basic idea starts with a dichotomy between two
different dimensions of rational choice: the choice among policies and the
choice among institutions. Given that legislators will have heterogenous
preferences about policies, they avoid chaos by rationally choosing institu-
tions that manage uncertainty and secure stability. To the extent that
252. To be sure, a sophisticated legislator might well profit from a chaotic environment. For
instance, a legislator in the position to regularly manipulate the policymaking agenda in order to take
advantage of voting intransitivities would welcome a certain degree of chaos. However, it is unlikely,
given the interests of all other legislators in the chamber, that the scenario in which a legislator can act
as a de facto dictator would remain stable. It is far more likely that all rational legislators would seek
measures to restrict the extent of chaos and to manufacture rules, institutions, and procedures to limit
the scope of arbitrariness and uncertainty.
253. Gordon Tullock, Why So Much Stability?, 37 PUB. CHOICE 189 (1981).
254. Shepsle, supra note 102; Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced
Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PuB. CHOICE 509 (1981); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional
Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. Sc. 27 (1979)
[hereinafter Shepsle, Multidimensional Voting].
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legislators are concerned with reaping benefits, they will construct
institutions in order to capture their share of benefits. Stability is still
possible, though, to the extent that all legislators share the same interest in
manufacturing institutions that facilitate agreements over policy outcomes.
Agreement on institutional design and procedural detail will yield an
institutional equilibrium from which legislators would find it costly to
defect.
The most conspicuous example of such an institution is the standing
committee in the United States Congress. 5 The significance of the
committee and committee power in the modem Congress is attributable,
according to positive theorists, to the strategic decisions of legislators to
manufacture and maintain such power in place of entrusting all policy
decisionmaking to floor debate and voting. 6 Committees act as critical
"gatekeepers," ensuring that there is substantial and persistent support for
a legislative initiative before it can clear the committee hurdle. 7  The
antidemocratic qualities of committee decisionmaking described by critics
are, in this perspective, precisely the point: legislators place themselves on
those committees in which they have an extraordinary interest. So long as
other committees are also open to such self-selection, a reciprocity of
interests exists. This reciprocity is manifested through a structure which is
itself the product of rational, reflective choice.25  This structural
arrangement is reinforcing; legislators will gravitate to those committees
that coincide with their electoral needs and interests and will preserve the
system that enables this mutually advantageous specialization of function.
255. See generally STEVEN S. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS
(1984); Heine Eulau & Vera McCluggage, Standing Committees in Legislatures: Three Decades of
Research, 9 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 195 (1984). For an early analysis of the role of committee government,
see WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885).
256. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Why are Congressional Committees So
Powerful?, 81 AM. POL. Sc1. REV. 935 (1987); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The
Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 85 (1987) [hereinafter Shepsle
& Weingast, Institutional Foundations].
257. See Shepsle & Weingast, Institutional Foundations, supra note 256, at 87.
258. See KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE: DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE
ASSIGNMENTS IN THE MODERN HOUSE (1978) [hereinafter SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE];
Shepsle, Multidimensional Voting, supra note 254; David A. Rohde & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Democratic
Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process,
67 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 889 (1973). For different perspectives on committee selection and membership,
see Keith Krehbiel, Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?, 84 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 149 (1990); Richard L. Hall & Bernard Grofinan, The Committee Assignment Process and
the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias, 84 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 1149 (1990).
1994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
62 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Once on the committee,S9 legislators wield various powers to ensure
control over proposals. The most critical source of power flows from the
committee's role as gatekeeper, limiting the bills that come to the floor for
consideration. Committees are well known graveyards for a large
percentage of bills in any given legislative session.260 Committees enjoy
other critical powers as well. The so-called "ex post veto" device-the
power of the committee to have a second chance to review a proposal after
it works its way through both Chambers and the inter-Chamber conference
committee-enhances the power of committee members by insulating
committee proposals from destruction at the hands of the legislative body
as a whole.26'
The structure of rules governing floor debate once a bill emerges from
a committee also facilitates the legislators' distributive decisions.262 The
congressional literature describes a dichotomy between so-called "open"
and "closed" rules.263 Open rules leave legislators more or less unrestrict-
ed in their ability to introduce amendments to a bill brought to the floor of
the House or Senate for consideration. 2" Closed rules limit, to varying
degrees, legislator prerogatives. The decision to give a reported bill an
259. For the purpose of this discussion, "committee" includes "subcommittee" as well.
260. Two excellent descriptions of the role and significance of the standing committee in modem
congressional government are RICHARD FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITrES (1973) and Nelson W.
Polsby, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 144
(1968).
261. Shepsle & Weingast, Institutional Foundations, supra note 256, at 93-100. "The ex post veto
power of a committee follows from the fact that it represents the chamber in conference proceedings
and may refuse to agree to a conference settlement." Id. at 95.
262. See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast, Fighting Fire With Fire: Amending Activiy and Institutional
Change in the Postreform Congress, in THE POSTREFORM CONGRESS 142 (Roger H. Davidson ed.,
1992) [hereinafter Weingast, Fighting Fire with Fire]; Barry R. Weingast, Floor Behavior in the US.
Congress: Committee Power under the Open Rule, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795 (1989).
263. See, e.g., STEVEN S. SMITH, CALL TO ORDER: FLOOR POLITICS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE
(1989) [hereinafter SMITH, FLOOR POLITICS]; STANLEY BACH & STEVEN S. SMITH, MANAGING
UNCERTAINTY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1988); Steven S. Smith, New Patterns of
Decisionmaking in Congress, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (John E. Chubb & Paul
E. Peterson eds., 1985); Stanley Bach, The Structure of Choice in the House of Representatives: The
Impact of Complex Special Rules, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 553 (1981).
264. "Open" need not mean completely unrestricted, however. As Weingast points out:
The open rule is not a free-for-all that allows anything to happen; rather, it is a highly
managed process that provides important advantages to the proponents of legislation. The
open rule embodies a large number of constraints, including restrictions on the number of
motions in order on the floor at any one time and, critically, rules governing the order of
recognition.
Weingast, Fighting Fire With Fire, supra note 262, at 144. See also WALTER J. OLESZEK,
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS (3d ed. 1978).
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open or closed bill is, explains positive political theorists, a strategic
judgment.26 Indeed, the very structure by which legislation is consid-
ered, including the right of committee majorities to restrict the scope of
legislative debate through the use of more or less restrictive rules, is the
product of rational, self-interested choices. As with the committee system
generally, legislators share in common an interest in maintaining a structure
by which they can regulate the legislative process in particular policy
contexts.
Committee power and rules of debate often work in tandem. In recent
articles, Barry Weingast sets out to explain an apparent anomaly, namely,
the persistent power of subcommittees in an institutional environment in
which floor politics has taken an increasingly significant role.266 Increas-
ing floor behavior, facilitated through more frequent floor amendments,
need not be inconsistent with the maintenance of subcommittee power.
While it is true that permitting more opportunities to opponents of the
subcommittee's bill to introduce amendments on the floor threatens to
undermine subcommittee power, rational legislators are capable of adapting
to the new situation. One way they have adapted is to come to the floor
prepared to fight fire with fire, that is, to respond to threatening amend-
ments with counter-amendments.267 The evidence suggests that this
strategy is largely successful; bills emerging from committee prove
remarkably resilient in the face of reforms that decentralized the committee
structure and increased the power of legislators who opposed committee
proposals.26
One of the lessons of this story is that rational legislators will adapt to
institutional changes and reforms. The substantial reforms of the 1970s
were hailed as the dawn of a new "postreform" era in which legislative
power would be redistributed and legislative decisionmaking would be
substantially different.269 While the postreform Congress was not merely
business as usual, rational choice theories of Congress have stressed the
phenomenon of institutional adaptation, pointing out that rational legislators
will adapt their rules and institutions in order to maintain their power, and
265. See Weingast, supra note 262; David P. Baron & John A. Ferejohn, Bargaining in
Legislatures, 3 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 181 (1989).
266. See Weingast cites in supra note 262. On the increasing role of floor activity, see, e.g., SMITH,
FLOOR POLITICS, supra note 263.
267. Weingast, Fighting Fire With Fire, supra note 262, at 148-53.
268. See id.
269. See Roger H. Davidson, The Emergence of the Postreform Congress, in THE POSTREFORM
CONGRESS, supra note 262, at 3.
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the relative power of Congress generally.270 Structure-induced equilibria
will persist even in the face of attempted and real reforms. This is so
because legislators maintain a continuing interest in constructing means of
facilitating and preserving their power. So long as decisions concerning the
nature and scope of reform are within their hands, structural and procedural
choices will reflect these self-interested concerns.
The structure-induced equilibrium literature has provided a wealth of
insights regarding the structure of the modem federal legislature. However,
serious questions remain. First, what ensures that legislators will remain
committed to these institutional arrangements? It is surely not some
abstract interest in stability for its own sake. If the idea was that the
structure-induced equilibrium was the product of rational, self-interested
decisions by legislators, what would keep a legislator from abjuring his
commitment to rules and procedures when it served his interest to do so?
A second, and related, issue, concerns what we may label the inheritability
paradox. As William Riker pointed out, decisions by legislators to
construct and maintain institutions are presumably susceptible to the same
sort of instabilities that plague decisions over policy.27" ' Hence, institu-
tional choices "inherit" the problems that plague policy choices.272 The
third question is more general: Is it correct to think of legislators as acting,
through institutions, only to increase their share of legislative goodies?27
Is the driving engine behind institutional design and maintenance the
redistribution of resources and power? Or can we explain legislators'
rational decisions to construct certain political institutions as driven by
other, nondistributional, goals?274
The most recent spate of literature on the foundations of institutional
power in Congress has been directed toward answering these sets of
questions.27 The question of what mechanisms ensure legislator fidelity
to the institutional structure they have created has been considered from the
270. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Changing Textbook Congress, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT
GOWN? 238 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989).
271. William H. Riker, Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majoriy Rule for the Study of
Institutions, 74 AM. POL. So. REV. 432 (1980).
272. In addition to Riker, id., see KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGIsLATIVE OROANIZATION
32-33 n.12 (1991).
273. See KREHBIEHL, supra note 272, at 23-60.
274. See infra text accompanying notes 299-303.
275. See the discussion in Kenneth A. ShepsIe & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Theories of
Congressional Institutions (Nov. 1992) (on file with author).
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perspective of the new economics of organization.276 The basic thesis is
that legislators will construct their organization in order to facilitate the
making of bargains and legislative deals. The risks of defection from
institutional commitments are akin to the problems of moral hazard faced
in any organization.277 The task, then, is to maintain legislator commit-
ment in the face of incentives to renege. These issues were thoroughly
addressed in a 1988 article by Barry Weingast and William Marshall.27
The authors argued that legislators face severe contracting problems. The
structure of logrolling, for instance, involves persistent risks of reneging.
Except where legislators can trade with each other in one bill, legislator
performance of their respective bargains is nonsimultaneous; legislators
give benefits to colleagues in exchange for behavior that will occur in the
future.279  Without the ability to enforce their trades and fearing
legislators' incentives to renege after they have received their benefits,
legislators will discount the present value of the benefit to be received from
trade.2"' The upshot is fewer legislative bargains; only where the
discounted benefits exceed the costs of trading, including the significant
transaction costs entailed in reaching agreements episode by episode, will
legislation get enacted.2"
Weingast and Marshall point out, however, that legislators need not
accept the playing field as they find it. They will design institutions and
rules to facilitate trading, that is, to decrease the transaction costs and
ensure the durability of legislative bargains.28 2 "In the face of uncertainty
over the future status of today's bargain," they argue, "legislators will
devise institutions for long-term durability of agreements that ensure the
flow of benefits beyond this session of the legislature." '283 Requiring
proposals to cross through a number of institutional gates increases the
durability of the final bargain, thus raising the value of the legislative deal
to legislators. Most particularly, committees with exclusive jurisdiction
276. On the new economics of organization, see supra part III.C.
277. See Moe, supra note 16, at 754-55.
278. Weingast & Marshall, supra note 177.
279. See id. at 138-39. See also Macey, supra note 129, at 53.
280. Weingast and Marshall do not consider systematically the role of reputation as a means of
guarding against ex post reneging. See David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect
Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982).
281. Weingast & Marshall, supra note 177, at 139 ("Rational coalition partners, therefore, discount
the potential gains from a proposed trade by the probability that these benefit flows will be curtailed
by reneging.").
282. Id. at 136-37.
283. Id. at 139.
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over policy domains and agenda power create a mechanism for solidifying
legislative bargains. "Institutionalizing rights over agenda power-control
over the design and selection of proposals that arise for a vote-substitutes
for purchasing the votes of others in an explicit market."2" 4  This
mechanism facilitates coalition formation in two ways: First, in order to
form, coalitions must secure the support of the critical members of the
relevant committee; committee power is thus both necessary and sufficient
(along with the support of a large enough coalition of the committee to
meet the majority-rule criterion) to defeat the status quo; accordingly,
legislators will, in order to maintain their own bargaining power concerning
those issues that matter to them, self-select committees that correspond with
their policy preferences.85 Second, committee power rigidifies the
coalition formation process by making it more difficult to change policy.
Small changes in political circumstances are unlikely to generate changes
in policy; committees with exclusive jurisdiction and agenda power stand
as bulwarks against policy changes." 6
The industrial organization perspective represents a step forward from
earlier positive theories insofar as it begins to explain why legislators
would both construct and maintain institutional apparatuses in the face of
incentives to defect. In a similar vein is the theory of legislative bargaining
sketched out by David Baron and John Ferejohn in recent articles." 7
They use noncooperative game theory to illustrate how legislators construct
an institutional system to facilitate vote trading. They describe how the
result of this game is an equilibrium which satisfies the distributional
interests of all legislators in the chamber-or at least satisfies them enough
so that they will resist disrupting the equilibrium through defections or
institutional change or both.88 Baron and Ferejohn set out to explain
whether rational legislators would prefer to send proposals to the floor with
an open or closed rule. The key lies in the gains that can be captured by
the rule choice that increases the likelihood that: (1) a majority will agree
as soon as possible, thus reducing the transaction costs associated with
284. Id. at 145.
285. See, e.g., SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE, supra note 258. But see Krehbiel, supra note
258.
286. Weingast & Marshall, supra note 177, at 146-47. They notice how this second phenomenon,
policy durability through committee power, parallels some of the advantages of vertical integration in
business firms. Id. at 147 n.17.
287. Baron & Ferejohn, supra note 265; David P. Baron & John A. Ferejohn, The Power to
Propose, in MODELS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE IN POLITICS 343 (P. Ordeshook ed., 1989).
288. See Baron & Ferejohn, supra note 265, at 187-89.
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continuous bargaining; and (2) the proposer will capture a greater share of
benefits under one type of rule than another, in which case the proposer
would be more inclined to invest in bringing such a proposal forward."9
The conclusion is that legislators would, with complete information, choose
a closed rule for distributive legislation.290 Again, the effort of this
game-theoretic approach is to explain how and why legislators would tether
themselves to the institutional choices made ex ante. The basic answer is
the same as in the industrial organization perspective: Legislators will
strive to construct a system for efficient bargaining.
The collective interest in facilitating bargaining forms part of an answer
to the second issue of concern, the inheritability paradox. The paradox
concerns the risk that institutional choices will inherit the instabilities that
would, collective choice theory predicts, plague policy choices. Although
this paradox has thus far been largely ignored in positive theory literature,
the tacit assumption underlying many of these theories seems to be that
legislators share a collective interest in structural stability, regardless of
their heterogenous preferences over policies. The key, suggests Kenneth
Shepsle, lies in legislators' interests in hedging against policy uncertain-
ty.21' There are several dimensions to this uncertainty and the notion that
institutional stability responds to uncertainty is more plausible with respect
to some dimensions than to others.
One source of uncertainty concerns the risk that changes in institutional
structure will backfire; legislators risk leaving themselves worse off with
respect to implementing their policy goals when they tinker with existing
structure. "It is risky," argues Shepsle, "to try to change institutional
arrangements in a manner adverse to the interests of those currently in
control. Failure has its consequences so that anyone initiating such
attempts at change must weigh the expected benefits of success against the
certainty of sanctions if he fails."292  Risk-averse legislators may well
agree to keep their bird in the hand, even where they see on the horizon the
potential for institutional change that would facilitate their immediate policy
aims.
289. Id.
290. Legislators may still prefer open rules in instances in which less fettered floor debate restrains
the power of the committees that legislators distrust. See David P. Baron, Majoritarian Incentives, Pork
Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control, 35 AM. J. POL. Sci. 57 (1991). Baron explains that this will
be especially true when legislators have an incentive to facilitate pork barreling, but still wish to reduce
the inefficiencies associated with this inherently inefficient type of legislation.
291. See Shepsle, supra note 102, at 69-70.
292. Id. See also KREHBIEL, supra note 272, at 32-33.
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Another source of instability concerns the prospect that the other
legislators will begin to reflect different sets of policy preferences and
goals. To the extent that legislators build their institutional choices-and
hence their institutions-around assumptions and expectations concerning
their colleagues' agendas, the shift in legislator preferences may reveal
itself in the fracturing of existing legislative coalitions. As a result, the
commitment to existing institutional arrangements may waver. Still, the
benefits of eschewing commitments to the institutions of the status quo
must be weighed against the short-term and long-term costs-both the
immediate costs borne by legislators who take the first steps to renege on
the structural bargains and the long-term reputational effects associated with
demonstrating disloyalty to existing legislative arrangements.29' Both sets
of costs may be worth bearing in light of the reconstruction of legislative
preferences and coalitions. Indeed, even addressing the issue as one that
involves a cost-benefit tradeoff introduces an important element of
instability.
This phenomenon of shifting coalitions and resulting instabilities has
been described by the father of structure-induced equilibrium theory,
Kenneth Shepsle. He starts by noting the inherent instability in any given
policy decision made by a majority coalition of legislators. Legislators
cannot see into the future. Accordingly, the reasons that drive them to
support one or another policy may evaporate over time. This is true
regardless of whether their decision was based on what a majority of their
constituents wanted, the demands of especially powerful interest groups, or
their sense of what the public interest properly requires. This uncertainty
may be manifested, says Shepsle, in a coalitional drif.294 Legislative
coalitions that have succeeded in enacting their preferences into law may
become obsolete as a result of elections and the corresponding replacement
of old legislators and hence the replacement of a previous pattern of
legislator preferences. 95
With respect to the stability of structure, the risk of coalitional drift-a
293. See Kreps & Wilson, supra note 280 (discussing reputation as a constraint on reneging).
294. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drit, and Time Consistency: A Comment
on Macey, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. I I 1 (1992) [hereinafter Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift]; Murray J. Horn
& Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of
Agencies": Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs,
75 VA. L. REV. 499 (1989). See also John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 263 (1992) (discussing the difference between the
enacting and sitting legislature and the significance of the difference for statutory interpretation).
295. See Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, supra note 294, at 114.
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form of uncertainty-may cut in two different directions. On the one hand,
it may be precisely because of the risk that coalitions will drift away fron
one set of policy preferences that legislators will cherish institutional
rigidity. This, after all, is the main point of the structure-induced
equilibrium theory, as well as of the new economics of organization to
theories of legislative bargaining.296 From this perspective, coalitional
drift provides yet another reason to suppose that legislators will adhere to
durable, persistent institutional forms.297 Legislators will want to preserve
what they have; victorious coalitions will want to maintain this precarious
victory in the face of future uncertainties, which threaten to break apart the
coalition. On the other hand, coalitional drift may signal the danger that
legislators' preferences concerning institutions may drift over time. With
new information, new constituents, and changing patterns of interest group
influence, legislators who today support a particular policy may later
change their tune. Moreover, the makeup of the legislature may change in
ways that dissolve the original commitments to certain organizational
forms. Surely the legislative reforms of the 1970s, which ushered in the
modem "postreform" Congress, reflect the capacity of the legislature to
change its way of doing business."' Perhaps the impetus for much of
this change was the sort of coalitional drift Shepsle describes.
Legislators face a tradeoff between preserving structures that strengthen
the position of the coalition that has enacted the statute and creating
structures flexible enough to ensure that new bargains can be struck when
circumstances change in ways that make current structures anachronistic.
The problem, in short, may not be merely reneging, in the sense of failing
to hold up one's end of the bargain in a logroll, but that legislators may
modify or abandon their own policies when their preferences change. The
role of uncertainty in structural choice represents an important area of
future inquiry in the literature on positive theories of the legislature.
Keith Krehbiel, an important contributor to the theoretical and empirical
literature on legislative organization, has offered one perspective on
296. See Weingast & Marshall, supra note 177 and accompanying text.
297. This point about durability has an analogue in public choice. See, e.g., Landes & Posner,
supra note 105, at 877-79. The public choice argument is that policy durability generates a larger
amount of rents to legislators from interest groups. What interest groups are willing to pay is a function
of the value of the legislative product they will receive, which is naturally a function of its durability.
Id.
298. See THE POSTREFORM CONGRESS, supra note 262 (collecting various essays describing the
postreform Congress).
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uncertainty in legislative decisionmaking.299 Krehbiel criticizes the focus
in the positive political theory literature on the "distributive" or "demand
side." of institutional choice.3"e By doing so, the theories fail to capture
important elements of legislative decisionmaking that are not concerned
with the competition among legislators over a fixed sum of goods.3' t
Krehbiel argues that legislative decisionmaking can be understood as a
series of rational choices to facilitate the gathering and processing of
information that can be used to make better policy choices. Politics, in the
informational account, is not zero-sum; legislators can and do create institu-
tions that expand the set of opportunities available to them. 2 Indeed,
some of the very same institutions that are the subjects of study in the
distributive accounts are considered through the lens of informational
theories with very different results.30 3
Krehbiel describes the structure and function of standing committees in
299. See KREHBiEL, supra note 272, at 61-103.
300. See generally id. The critique is descriptively accurate in ascribing to the bulk of the positive
political theory literature on legislative institutions a distributive, legislative rent-seeking perspective.
See, e.g., SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE, supra note 258; John A. Ferejohn, Logrolling In an
Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation, in CONGRESS AND POLICY CHANGE
(Gerald C. Wright, et al., eds., 1986); Weingast & Marshall, supra note 177. The structure-induced
equilibrium literature focuses on the efforts made by legislators to reap certain electoral advantages
through institutional design and structural choice. The idea is that legislators are preoccupied with
distributive politics, that is, the capturing of benefits available through the policy process. The policy
game is, in this view, zero-sum, with legislators gaining benefits at the expense of others. The
conflictual nature of legislative politics drives legislator behavior in two senses. First, legislators will
act to maintain structures and procedures that will enable them to capture their share of benefits,
Although legislative structure may seem to reflect consensual decisionmaking within the legislature, in
distributive terms, it reflects a marriage of convenience in which legislators agree upon structures that
will preserve for each their ability to compete for influence and power. Second, legislators will try to
compete for control vis-a-vis other institutions; they therefore share a collective interest in structuring
their institution in order to increase its potential force.
301. Keith Krehbiel discusses a number of different perspectives on legislative policies which he
labels broadly as distributive, including James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS
OF REGULATION 357 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) and Theodore J. Lowi, American Business, Public,
Case-Studies, and Political Theory, in 16 WORLD POL. 676 (1964). What is ruled out of the broad
definition of distributive is the "prospect of passing policies that make everyone better off." KREHBIEL,
supra note 272, at 30-31 n.l1.
302. KREHBIEL, supra note 272, at 30-31.
303. While the focus in this discussion is on Krehbiel's perspectives as elaborated in his recent
book on legislative organization, the informational perspective draws on his earlier articles with Thomas
Gilligan. See Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a
Rational Legislature, 34 AM. J. POL. SCi. 531 (1990); Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel,
Asymmetric Information andLegislative Rules with a Heterogenous Committee, 33 AM. J. POL. SCl. 459
(1989); Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees:
An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 287 (1987).
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informational terms.3°4 A beginning assumption is that legislators have
incomplete information about the relationship between policies and' the
effects of policies upon their enactment and implementation. Legislators
are also incompletely informed about the preferences of other legisla-
tors."' Legislator information is not only incomplete, but is also
asymmetric, simply meaning that some legislators have better knowledge
than others concerning the connection between policies and the results of
these policies." 6  Committees perform the function of processing
information for the benefit of the Chamber as a whole. Members working
within the institutional structure of committees act as experts to help their
colleagues become informed regarding the relationship between policies and
outcomes. Therefore, they will be able to make better decisions.30 7
Krehbiel models the committee-Chamber relationship as a legislative
signalling game in which the object is to structure the process in order to
encourage legislators to convey to their colleagues any private information
that would be useful in making a decision."' One way to so encourage
legislators is to arrange the committee so that it reflects, in its membership,
a spectrum of viewpoints that more or less mirrors the body as a
whole.09 A representative committee provides more information, because
the interests of its members coincide with the interests of the Chamber as
a whole.310
304. See sources cited supra notes 272, 303.
305. See KREHBIEL, supra note 272, at 66-68. On the incomplete information assumption, see
Cudd, supra note 208, at 111.
306. See KiRHBIEL, supra note 272, at 68. See also Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins,
Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming June 1994); David
Austen-Smith & William H. Riker, Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation, 81 AM.
POL. Sc. REv. 897 (1987). See generally RASMUSSEN, supra note 208, at 53-54.
307. See KREHBIEL, supra note 272.
308. See generally JEFFREY BANKS, SIGNALLING GAMES IN POLrrICAL SCIENCE (1991). Cf. A.
MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALLING: INFORMATION TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING
PROCESSES (1974) (describing signalling games in economic markets).
309. See KREHBIEL, supra note 272, at 81-84, 95-96; see also Krehbiel, supra note 258.
310. In two separate commentaries to a 1987 article by Gilligan and Krehbiel, two political
scientists question the claim that committee members will have the incentives to provide reliable
information to the legislative body. Morris Fiorina argues that the informational rationale for restrictive
amendment procedures works only where there are unified, homogenous committees and a likewise
unified body. Morris P. Fiorina, Comment: Alternative Rationales for Restrictive Procedures, 3 J.L.
EcoN. & ORG. 337 (1987). During periods of great social, economic, and technological change, there
is unlikely to be the sort of common interest between committee members and the body that would lead
the body to trust the work of the committee and therefore to install restrictive amendment procedures.
Id. at 339-40.
Even more damaging to the assumptions underlying the informational rationale is Martin Shapiro's
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. Another crucial element of the committee's role as an efficient signaller
is the use of restrictive rules for the consideration of legislative proposals
on the floor. The notion is that committee members will "invest" in
accumulating expertise and in developing mechanisms with which to
provide information to the Chamber. Rules that restrict the scope of
amending on the floor will increase the value of the committee's proposal
and therefore the value of the committee as expert.31t Specialization of
function, crucial to the role of the committee in providing information to
legislators, requires the sort of enforced deference that restrictive rules
provide.
This informational, or "supply-side," theory of legislative
decisionmaking, is offered by Krehbiel as a direct competitor to distribu-
tive, "demand side" views.312 The conceptual conflict is apparent.
Distributive views see politics as a zero-sum game in which legislators
fight with one another for a share of the pie; informational views see the
goal of the legislative process as the production of net social benefits; the
legislators' task is to construct the legislative process to facilitate the
reaching of agreements on policies that will make everyone better off.
However, as two important contributors to the distributive view argue,
when we look deeper into this potential conflict, we see that demand side
and supply side views can be reconciled.31 3 The key is the dynamic,
multi-dimensional characteristics of policymaking in the modem Congress.
Legislators can and do make trades with one another across different bills,
different committee jurisdictions, and even across different titles within the
argument that committee members will have strategic incentives to offer to the chamber selective
information in order to increase the chances of the committee bill passing the "yes" threshold. Martin
Shapiro, The Concept of Information: A Comment on Gilligan and Krehbiel's "Collective
Decisionmaking and Standing Committees," 3 JL. ECON. & ORG. 345 (1987). In the Gilligan-Krchbiel
signalling model, the chamber benefits as its information increases. The model does not contemplate
that a committee may vary the quality of information to steer the final outcome in its preferred
direction; this committee members will do to the extent that their preferences diverge from the Chamber
as a whole. Shapiro states:
[Tihe floor ought to be as much concerned about the quality as about the quantity of the data
on consequences it receives. As it stands, the model provides no account of the quality
dimension and, therefore, an unsatisfactory account of a rationale for closed rules based on
the real-world transfer of knowledge.
Id. at 347-48.
311. See KREHBiEL, supra note 272, at 97-98.
312. See id.
313. See Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 275, at 24-27.
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same bill.3 14  One of the principal reasons they do this is because some
issues are more important, in electoral or ideological terms, to one
legislator than to another. Indeed, the essence of logrolling across different
issues and bills rests on a conception of legislation as a sequence of policy
choices made within a multi-dimensional framework. Such logrolling
requires a mechanism to facilitate the transfer of information within the
legislature concerning the nature and scope of members' preferences across
a range of issues. Legislative committees can play an important role in
supplying this information to legislators in order to facilitate trades. The
distributive approach to legislative decisionmaking suggests that these
trades often will not be Pareto optimal; and yet, even when policy is seen
as zero-sum, legislators may still construct committees with an eye toward
performing the informational functions described by Krehbiel.
This reconciliation is, in a sense, artificial. It explains how the
informational functions of committees may serve the purpose of facilitating
members' distributive goals. Theorists who insist, however, that the
distributive perspective is conceptually narrow and empirically inaccurate
will maintain that committees supply information to the legislature for
reasons other than the facilitating of efficient logrolling. As the current
controversy over distributive versus informational rationales for legislative
structure and rules indicates, fundamental disagreements remain among
positive theorists of congressional institutions over the nature of legislator
behavior and the function of institutional rules. It remains to be seen
whether these disagreements can be resolved at the level of institutional
theory.
314. Krehbiel's account, by contrast:
[R]elies explicitly and crucially on the assumption of a single policy dimension.... This
argument depends upon unidimensional reasoning in two respects. First, Krehbiel's reference
to the 'chamber's interest' only makes sense in a unidimensional world. Second, even if there
were some multidimensional meaning to 'chamber interest,' Krehbiel's argument presumes
that committees must persuade the chamber jurisdiction by jurisdiction, issue by issue, bill
by bill, even title by title in terms of this notion of chamber interest. This perspective ignores
the possibility of gains-from-exchange as a result of cross-jurisdictional, cross-issue, cross-bill,
or cross-title trades. It is as though one looked at separate items and concluded that each of
them must be defended in terms of the 'chamber interest' separately and independently. In
a multidimensional world, however, it is conceivable that, though none could be defended in
this manner, an omnibus of otherwise indefensible items might well be defensible in this
manner.
Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 275, at 24, 27. Krehbiel concedes that the assumption of
unidimensionality is a restrictive one: "The assumption of unidimensionality is variously regarded as
overly simple, as locking the Arrow problem in the closet, or as rigging the theory against the standard
multidimensional logrolling view." KREHBIEL, supra note 272, at 261.
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3. Delegation and Control
A central dilemma for rational legislators is how to control
decisionmakers who function outside the legislative process. The problem
is fundamentally a principal-agent one, but with significant wrinkles. The
most important of these wrinkles concerns the unique nature of the
relationship between legislators and the bureaucracy. As Terry Moe points
out, the relationship between these institutions is grounded in political
authority, not voluntary exchange."' The basis of the regulatory structure
is not primarily economic efficiency, with the creation of the agency
representing an attempt to replace "markets" with "hierarchies" in order to
maximize the joint profits of all parties to the firm and its nexus of
contracts.316  Instead, legislators' decisions to create administrative
structures reflect their judgments that such structures represent means by
which they can implement their aims (which, of course, will probably
include profit-maximizing or "rent-seeking") more efficaciously. Accord-
ingly, the explanation of how legislators structure their relationships with
agencies is essentially a political one.
Explanations of why Congress chooses to delegate responsibilities to
entities-whether institutions within Congress or agencies outside
Congress-are eclectic. Debate rages in the literature over how legislators
make their choices concerning whether and to what extent to delegate. 7
Early in the positive political theory literature, Morris Fiorina proposed that
legislators respond to variegated pressures from inside and outside the
process by delegating policymaking responsibilities to agencies in order to
shift the blame for "bad" policies to another institution.31 8 At the same
time, the fact of the enactment of the regulatory program, however
contentless it is in substance, enables legislators to claim credit from these
pressure groups for doing something. 9 In a later article, he added that
the element of legislative uncertainty as an explanation for the choice
315. See Moe, supra note 137. See generally supra text accompanying notes 174-82.
316. See discussion supra part III.C.
317. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & David Besanko, Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory
Mandate, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 126 (1992); Spiller, supra note 124; David P. Baron, Regulation and
Legislative Choice, 19 BELL J. ECON. 467 (1988); Fiorina, supra note 132; Aranson et al., supra note
131.
318. See Fiorina, supra note 132, at 186-88.
319. Id.
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between administrative agencies and courts as regulatory instruments.
320
He proposed that the choice is a choice between two lotteries, one taking
a chance on agency enforcement and the other on court enforcement.321
What determines whether legislators will take one chance rather than the
other is their calculations concerning the risk that one method of enforce-
ment will threaten to unravel the statutory bargain. This will reflect a
judgment about both the relative qualities of these two institutions and
about how much they care whether the policy passes or not.3z
More recently, positive political theorists have refocused attention on the
delegation question, emphasizing the extent to which the ex ante decision
to delegate is tied to decisions about how optimally to control the
institutions which act under this delegation. The question whether to
delegate is intimately bound up with the question how to delegate, that is,
how to construct measured controls on the exercise of regulatory pow-
er.3" Particularly pivotal to the debate over what sort of rational strate-
gies legislators design to control regulatory decisionmaking within agencies
has been the work of Mathew McCubbins, in collaboration with various co-
authors.324  McCubbins considers, from the perspective of principal-agent
320. Morris P. Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of
Legislative Power, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33 (1986).
321. Id. See also Mashaw, supra note 133, at 90.
322. Specifically, it depends upon how close their policy preferences are to the median. Outliers
will strongly favor or strongly oppose administrative regulation to the extent that such regulation
threatens to unravel the statutory bargain. Legislators bunched closer at the middle will be more
agnostic concerning the choice between agencies and courts. Fiorina, supra note 320, at 44-45.
"Legislators far from the median who foresee a pattern of agency enforcement to their liking will favor
administrative regulation more than their opposites who regard that pattern as unfavorable." Id. at 45.
323. McCubbins and Page reduce the delegation question to the level of a tautology: "[Tihe
legislative choice to delegate authority to an administrative agency in preference to judicial enforcement
of a legislative enactment follows when the act of delegating disguises the costs of the regulation to a
larger extent than it disguises the benefits." Mathew D. McCubbins & Talbot Page, A Theory of
Congressional Delegation, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY (M. McCubbins & T. Sullivan eds.,
1987).
324. See, e.g., GARY COX & MATHEw D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY
GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (1993); KIEWiET & McCuBBNS, supra note 217; Arthur Lupia & Mathew
D. McCubbins, Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed (1993) (on file
with author). Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 306; Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75
VA. L. REV. 431 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., Structure and Process]; Mathew D. McCubbins
et al., Administrative Procedures as Instrument of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987)
[hereinafter McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures]; McCubbins & Page, supra note 323;
McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 86.
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theory,3" the dilemma posed to legislative coalitions by the practice of
delegating broad regulatory power to agencies. Legislators are concerned
with managing uncertainty.3 26 Uncertainty is an inevitable property of a
regulatory process that includes shifting coalitions, different levels of
constituent and interest group demands, and changing states of the world.
Legislators are also concerted to minimize conflict, in particular, the
various incentives and opportunities of agents to hide their actions and
information as well as the standard moral hazard problems that plague
principal-agent relationships.327
Faced with these twin problems of uncertainty and conflict, legislators
will pay attention to arranging regulatory structures and managing
legislative-administrative conflict in order to ensure that their agents carry
out the aims of the legislators who are the architects of the original
program. The most important locus of regulatory policymaking in the
modem administrative state is the regulatory agency.328 From the
legislature's standpoint, the central question is how to design structures and
procedures to control administrative agencies. In a series of articles,
Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast describe how
administrative procedures established by statute and, in particular, by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) function to enable legislative
coalitions to control agencies.329 McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast begin
by describing why ex post monitoring and control devices are necessary,
yet imperfect and expensive, for making agencies more accountable to the
preferences of the enacting legislative coalition.33 ° What legislators can
do, instead or in addition, is structure the procedures the agency must
follow in enacting rules and enforcing policies.33' For example, the
requirement contained in the APA that a proposed agency regulation must
be announced in the Federal Register ("notice"), with an opportunity for
325. See STEVENS, supra note 156, at 281-87. See also sources cited supra notes 214-19 and
accompanying text (describing principal-agent theory).
326. See McCubbins & Page, supra note 323, at 415-17.
327. KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 217, at 25-26. See also STEVENS, supra note 156, at 284-
87.
328. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 5, at 418-23.
329. See sources cited supra note 329.
330. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 324. They emphasize, in particular,
the economic and political costs of ex post monitoring. See also KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, su1pra note
217, at 31-33.
331. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, supra note 324, at 440-44; McCubbins ct al.,
Administrative Procedures, supra note 324, at 253-55.
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public participation ("comment"),332 will function to provide information
to legislators in advance of the issuance of regulations, that can be used to
sound out interest groups and to mobilize coalitions to influence adminis-
trative action.333 Procedures that publicize agency action ameliorate the
information advantage that the agency has as the institution practically in
control of the nuts-and-bolts of the regulatory process. Procedures that
facilitate the ability of legislative coalitions to react to agency decisions and
procedures that increase the hurdles the agency must surmount to establish
policy work to reinforce the structure of the regulatory bargain originally
established.334 Moreover, such procedures enable legislators to respond
in the context of agency policymaking to changes in the legislators' own
changing preferences and interests.335
The positive political models concerning the ways in which legislators
control agencies have considerably enriched our understanding of the
dimensions of legislators' strategic decisions in a world in which the most
conspicuous source of regulatory policy is made by administrative agencies
pursuant to a broad delegation of power.336 Positive political theories of
regulation equip us to consider, from the perspective of normative theory,
what sort of institutional and doctrinal remedies are appropriate to respond
to the overlapping dilemmas faced by legislators and agencies in an
environment in which both institutions are inclined to act strategically and
neither institution feels the necessity to maintain a system of efficient, cost-
effective, and fair, economic and social legislation.
The linchpin of this positive description of administrative control through
332. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
333. See McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 324; McCubbins et al., Structure
and Process, supra note 324.
334. Jon Macey has argued that rational legislators can serve their purposes by careful attention to
the jurisdictional design of the agency. See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political
Control ofAdministrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992) [hereinafter Macey, Organizational
Design]. Congress can design the regulatory structure in order to "hardwire" the agency to the original
coalition of interest groups whose support was critical in getting the original statute passed. As the
preferences of interest groups change, and as new coalitions of interest groups form, the structure of
agency preferences will change along with the preferences of the enacting coalition. See also Jonathan
R Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative
Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671 (1992) [hereinafter Macey, Separated Powers].
335. In this sense, administrative procedures can act to blunt the force of "coalitional drift." See
sources cited in supra note 294 and accompanying text.
336. For an extended critique of the MeNollgast "structure and process" hypothesis, see Glen 0.
Robinson, Commentary on 'Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies':
Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REv. 483 (1989).
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procedures is the role of information.33 7 Agencies have more, and better,
information than Congress and the President about the content and
consequences (political and otherwise) of their regulatory policies.
Legislative decisions concerning administrative structure, then, will be
grounded in an effort to correct this information imbalance. 338  Earlier
political economy models were sufficiently pessimistic about the prospect
of legislators remedying this imbalance given the structure and incentives
of the regulatory process and the ubiquitous principal-agent problems that
arose in connection with multiple institutions. However, McCubbins and
his colleagues have been more optimistic about the ability of legislators to
design structures and processes to ameliorate these vexing information
problems.
This optimism is striking in light of the character of the information
problems that are described in the positive literature on regulation and
politics. The problem is not only that the bureaucracy has access to
information that legislators lack; the potentially more serious problem
concerns the quality of the information in the hands of the agency.
3 39
Simply put, the agency has incentives to hold back truthful information
from other politicians (including, most particularly, their "principals") and
to furnish politicians with "cheap talk."34  Doing so strengthens the
hands of bureaucrats and weakens the abilities of legislative coalitions to
maintain adequate control over agencies. Why would legislators invest
time and energy in trying to control agency decisionmaking given the
insurmountable information advantages of these agencies?
The answer that McCubbins and company give is that these strategic
information problems are not insurmountable.34' Legislators must pay
careful attention to procedures and structures that enable them to monitor
the opportunistic behavior of agencies and, in particular, the tendencies of
agencies to hide their actions-to lie-from legislators in order to
strengthen the agency's position in the regulatory process. The "adminis-
trative procedures" hypothesis advanced by McCubbins, Noll and Weingast
is part of the answer. Politicians can ameliorate the ability of agencies to
337. Cf KREHBIEL, supra note 272, app. A at 269-70; BANKS, supra note 308.
338. See Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 306. Cf Arthur Lupia, Busy Voters, Agenda Control and
the Power of Information, 86 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 390 (1992).
339. See Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 306. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 310.
340. See Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 306 (describing concept of "cheap talk").
341. See id. Cf. KiEwiEr & MCCUBBINS, supra note 217 (discussing information problems in
connection with congressional institutions).
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furnish information selectively and strategically by creating a process that
requires the agency to provide all information on equal terms to all
"interested persons."" Moreover, by enfranchising certain groups and
thereby placing burdens on agencies' abilities to act without consequence,
Congress can increase the costs to agencies of taking certain actions. When
an agency takes action that is costly-say it issues a regulation that is
subject to burdensome paperwork requirements under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 343-this provides a signal to legislators
concerning the agency's real preferences. The legislative coalition can then
respond with whatever set of ex post monitoring devices it has at its
disposal. The key point is that the legislature can learn from the choices
made by agencies, once it knows what sort of costs the agency must bear
in acting and therefore what it is giving up by deciding to move the policy
from the status quo.'"
The difficulty with extrapolating from these models of how rational
legislators would design bureaucratic accountability and regulatory control
is that they explain only one comer of the real regulatory world. The
procedures and structures that Congress and the President have adopted in
statutes like the APA, NEPA, and the Freedom of Information Act,345
impose a web of requirements on agencies in making and enforcing policy.
However, these requirements are seldom clear and never self-interpreting.
The efficacy of these procedures rests on a large body of
law-administrative law-which is concerned with controlling the exercise
of administrative power.3 46 The trouble is, from the standpoint of rational
legislators, much of administrative law is judge-made law, the product of
decisions made by courts to expand or contract the scope of procedural and
substantive requirements on agency decisionmaking.3 47 Administrative
law scholars have frequently insisted that courts have constructed their
approaches to review political decisions or to help the legislature in its task
of reigning in bureaucratic miscreants.34t  Jerry Mashaw contrasts
342. The phrase is the one used in the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988).
343. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988).
344. See Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 306 (discussing concept of "learning").
345. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
346. See generally CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988).
347. See discussion infra part V.B.
348. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr. The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory
of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239 (1989).
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normative models of administrative law with positive models, and criticizes
the tendencies of positive theorists of legislative delegation to simply
subsume procedural and substantive requirements imposed on courts into
the general rubric of positive political action.349 However, I need not go
as far as Mashaw does to make the cautionary note that administrative law
represents an admixture of judge-made and legislative law.3"' Judge-
made administrative law is manufactured and applied in the shadow of
political decisions; it is, in that regard, not inherently exogenous, above the
political fray. At the same time, legislative-made administrative law is
subject to interpretations by courts. The political structure of administrative
law, as described in more detail in Part IV, ensures that legislators must
consider how much they can rely on fidelity by courts to their control
aspirations when they decide how to design their techniques of bureaucratic
accountability.
This question may be considered at the level of positive political theory.
What is required is a positive political theory of legislative control and
delegation that builds into the models of control and decisionmaking under
uncertainty the role of administrative law, defined as a set of rules that are
the product of legislative and judicial choices which are naturally and
frequently in tension with one another. This basic point is fundamentally
one of the respective roles of each political institution in the regulatory
environment.35'
C. Presidency
The President plays a critical role in the construction and implementation
of regulatory policy."2 The President is a pivotal player in the process
by which legislation is enacted, both formally, through the power to veto
legislation, and informally, through a variety of devices used to influence
and shape regulatory policies.353 Yet, despite this central role, positive
theorists have been slow to incorporate elements of presidential
349. Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories
of Legal Development, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267 (1990).
350. See discussion infra part V.B.
351. See infra part V.B.
352. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 94, at 257-76.
353. For useful descriptions of the President's role in modem regulation, see JOHN P. BURKE, THe
INSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENCY (1992); THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE
OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991); WILSON, supra note 94, at 257-76.
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decisionmaking into their models of politics.354 This probably says more
about the current state of positive political theory than it does about the
inherent nature of the theory; that is, studies of presidential decisionmaking
are likely to be forthcoming as positive political theorists develop the
pieces of their comprehensive theories of regulatory politics.355 For now,
however, the Presidency remains a rather inscrutable piece. The previous
section offered an extended analytical survey of a large body of literature
on the institutional dimensions of legislative decisionmaking. The absence
of a similarly rich body of work with respect to the President makes the
description of positive political theory in this section necessarily more
speculative. With that caveat, I will speculate about two distinct aspects
of the President's place in positive political theories of regulation: (1) The
President's discretion to pursue regulatory aims; and (2) the forms of
presidential decisionmaking.
We start by assuming that the President has, like legislators, regulatory
ambitions and goals. You will recall that the regulatory ambitions of the
legislators are considered by positive political theory as heterogenous.
Legislator preferences may derive from an electoral constraint,356 or grow
out of their ideological commitment to sound regulatory administration.
The distributive models of legislative performance in an institutionalized
Congress stress, however, the interests of legislators in reaping benefits
from making and enforcing deals. Hence, although the underlying
motivations may be selfish or selfless, legislators are supposed to act
purposively and strategically in the pursuit of these goals. Similarly,
rational choice theories of politics suppose that, like legislators, the
354. "The hallmark of modem American government is presidential leadership. Yet positive
theorists have never known quite what to do with presidents.... [M]ost of the time.., they just get
left out-a datum so well known among positive theorists that they informally refer to presidents as 'the
P-word."' Moe & Wilson, supra note 88.
355. See, eg., id.; Moe, supra note 87; Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in
CAN THE GOVERNMENT GovERN? supra note 270, at 279-82 [hereinafter Moe, Bureaucratic Structure];
Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN PoLITICs 235 (John
G. Chubb & Paul G. Peterson eds., 1985) [hereinafter Moe, Politicized Presidency].
356. The President's utility has always been difficult to model. Because of the Constitution's limit
on consecutive terms, he faces an electoral constraint once, that is, when (and if) he runs for reelection;
hence, presidential behavior during the entire second term is difficult to model using the standard public
choice assumption of reelection-maximizing behavior. Moreover, even this one-time electoral constraint
is opaque. With a heterogenous national constituency, it is quite unlikely that the President will believe
himself hemmed in by particular interest group demands. Faced with a complex web of competing
demands and interests, he is likely to pursue policies that facilitate his presidential agenda, keeping, to
be sure, an eye on preserving his political capital with legislators and opinion leaders. However, it is
still difficult to reduce this agenda to the standard terminology of rational choice.
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President has regulatory goals and is prepared to pursue these goals through
rational, strategic action and that the forms of presidential decisionmaking
will reflect this purposive action.
The differences between purposive action by the President and such
action by legislators, however, may be significant. Terry Moe emphasizes
the dissimilarities between the incentives of legislators in superintending
regulatory administration and the incentives of the President. Legislators
are mostly concerned with intervening episodically in regulatory decisions,
usually on behalf of constituents and in pursuit of discrete, particular
benefits. In contrast, Presidents are concerned with governance.357 "All
presidents, regardless of party, are expected to govern effectively and are
held responsible for taking action on virtually the full range of problems
facing society."" Effective governance requires that the President take
charge of the bureaucracy; unlike legislators, "[t]hey are the only
participants who are directly concerned with how the bureaucracy as a
whole should be organized."3 9  To Moe, this fundamental difference
creates a dilemma for the other participants in the regulatory process.
Agencies, legislators, and interest groups face political uncertainty as the
President makes regulatory decisions without an eye toward mollifying
constituencies and appeasing outside interests but, instead, with the goal of
constructing a comprehensive regulatory strategy through administrative
control.360
One imagines, in this framework, the President looking down from a
throne on the machinations of legislators, interest groups, and agencies and
deciding whether and to what extent to pretermit this political process. In
the picture of the President offered by Moe, the President is both powerful
and strategic. Moreover, presidential strategies are directed toward
effectuating sound governance and, therefore, are likely to be more
benevolent than what legislators and agencies will offer. But there is
another side to this coin. What Moe elides in his description of the
President's role in regulatory decisionmaking is the scope of presidential
discretion or, to put it the other way, the power of Congress to control
presidential decisionmaking. In the constitutional and statutory structure
357. Moe, Bureaucratic Structure, supra note 355, at 278-79. See also Moe, Politicized Presidency,
supra note 355.
358. Moe, Bureaucratic Structure, supra note 355, at 279.
359. Id. at 280.
360. See Moe & Wilson, supra note 88, at 10-12; Moe, Bureaucratic Structure, supra note 355,
at 281-82.
[VOL. 72:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss1/2
REGULATORY REFORM
of regulatory policy, the President rarely gets to do what he wants. The
President may lack the same sort of exogenous and endogenous constraints
imposed on legislators and agencies. Nevertheless, there are other
constraints on the President. To appreciate the role of the President within
a framework of positive political theory, we must consider, as a critical
dimension of presidential decisionmaking, the scope of the President's
policymaking discretion.
On the whole, the President's regulatory discretion is considerable but
not unlimited. Moreover, precisely because the President has both the
prerogatives to expand the scope of regulatory influence as well as the
means and incentives to do so, pressures will be brought to bear from other
places in the regulatory process. The result will be, in theory at least, some
sort of equilibrium in which the President acts within the political and legal
limits constructed by loci of competing institutional power and by legal
doctrine. Consider the example of President Bush's efforts to consolidate
the strategies of regulatory review created in the past few administrations
and extended by his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, in the early 1980s.
361
The basic goal of this regulatory review experiment was to construct a
regime of executive control, in the name of improving the cost-effective-
ness of regulation,36 over regulatory agencies in their role as promulga-
tors of regulations. In the early years of his administration Bush estab-
lished a Council on Competitiveness (Council).363 Its stated purpose was
to ensure that proposed regulations would not undermine the competitive
position of American business firms by imposing regulations whose
benefits did not outweigh their costs. Among the controversies generated
by the Council was the argument that the executive branch could, through
the Council, steer regulatory agencies away from the instructions given to
them by legislators, both through the statutes enacted by Congress and
through the episodic, ex post influence of interested legislators.3"
The President's power to establish this Council and to charge it with
these review responsibilities fell within a lacuna of presidential regulatory
361. See generally MCGARITY, supra note 87; GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL Fix, RELIEF OR
REFO m? REAGAN'S REGULATORY DILEMMA (1984).
362. Many have pointed out, though, that the underlying reasons for this regulatory review may
have been considerably more sinister. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency
Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1059 (1986).
363. See, e.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., Federal Regulation Growing Despite Quayle Panel's Role,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1991, at Al.
364. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, House Votes to Eliminate Money for Regulatory Council Headed
by Quayle, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1992, at A16.
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power. The President is obliged, under the Constitution, to see that the
laws are faithfully executed;3 65 at the same time, the President has the
discretion-indeed, the responsibility-to implement the laws and supervise
the regulatory process. The controversy over the Council was just another
illustration of the difficulties associated with reconciling these two
responsibilities. The important positive political point is that Congress
responded aggressively to the President's use of this regulatory review
strategy. Ultimately, it did not much matter that the President was acting
legally in establishing this structure of regulatory control; the dispute was
not finally resolved by appeal to law. Instead, the resolution was political:
Congress threatened to cut off its direct appropriations to the Council in an
attempt to stop its efforts; the executive branch responded by leaving the
Council to operate on part of the appropriation directed by Congress for use
by the Office of the Vice-President.366 In regulatory disputes of this type,
which are by no means uncommon, the President wins and loses. The
outcome does not usually turn on the question of what powers the President
has, whether the President is entitled, as commander of the executive
branch, to direct his subordinates and to control regulatory policy.367
Rather, the outcome reflects political choices.
The regulatory review story is an example of an episodic response to
presidential innovation. Political choices that implicate the scope of
presidential influence occur at the level of regulatory structure as well. For
example, the scope of the President's influence over institutions of the
executive branch turns not only on the question of what powers the
President has under the Constitution and under statute; it also turns on what
sort of opportunities are presented to the President for the expression of this
power. If we start with the principle that the President is the master of the
presidential domain, which includes all parts of the executive branch, then
Congress can substantially pretermit the exercise of this mastery by
structuring parts of the regulatory process outside of the executive branch.
Establishing a so-called "independent" agency reshuffles presidential
influence without disturbing the essential structure of the President's
365. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
366. See 138 CONG. REC. S13,214-15 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1992) (statement of Sen. Glenn).
367. See generally Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 233; Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hall
to the ChiefAdministrator: The Framers and the President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991
(1993). For a recent, critical analysis of the President's role in regulatory policymaking, see Lawrence
Lessis & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); Yvette
M. Barksdale, The Presidency and Administrative Value Selection, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 273 (1993).
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"powers. '  The struggle over the creation of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) in the early 1970s illustrates the dimensions of
political choice. The President's first proposal for a consumer safety
agency lodged this agency in the executive branch, in the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare.369 Consumer groups prevailed in their
battle to bring the agency out from under the President's direct control.
The result was the establishment of a formally independent agency, the
CPSC.370 None of the President's regulatory powers was disrupted by
this arrangement; rather, the creation of an independent agency merely
made it more costly for the President to employ these powers to control the
CPSC. In this way, Congress limited presidential discretion in a very
practical way-by constructing a regulatory arrangement that is less
susceptible to control by its principal competitor for regulatory influence:
the President.
There are two critical ways in which this structural strategy is, from the
perspective of Congress, quite imperfect. One is that the President's
powers are not some immutable object.3 ' The Constitution's description
of presidential power is capacious; moreover, the legal doctrine of
separation of powers, as we observed earlier in connection with legislative
decisionmaking, is a weak constraint on the President's behavior.372
Creating structures that are more impervious to presidential influence and
control definitely increases the costs of presidential action. However, it
rarely disempowers the President altogether. The experience of presidential
activities in the regulatory process over the past half century indicates that
Presidents demonstrate great creativity in developing new techniques of
regulatory control in the face of legislatively imposed restrictions and
conditions.373
The second way in which legislative efforts to cabin the scope of
presidential influence are risky concerns the effect on Congress of certain
368. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 41. A recent symposium
contains a number of excellent discussions of the dimensions of Presidential power in the administrative
state. See Symposium, Administrative Law and "The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative
Agencies", 36 AM. U. L. REv. 277 (1987). See also Lessis & Sunstein, supra note 367.
369. See Moe, Bureaucratic Structure, supra note 355, at 289-92.
370. See Schwartz, supra note 56.
371. See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITCS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM
JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993).
372. See supra text accompanying notes 226-29.
373. See, e.g., SKOWRONEK, supra note 371; HARRIS & MiLKis, supra note 186, at 97-140; EADs
& Fix, supra note 361; RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983).
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structural decisions. Structural choices frequently have consequences for
all political institutions. Let us revisit the example of the CPSC. The
legislative history of the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 suggests
that legislators were not uniformly enthusiastic about creating an indepen-
dent agency.374 One reason was that independence does not mean merely
independence from the President but, a degree of independence from
political controls from whatever direction. When Congress pushes for the
creation of an independent agency, it runs the risk of establishing an
institution that is more insulated from both presidential and legislative
control. Like other aspects of regulatory policy, the choice involves a
tradeoff between certain patterns of control. Many regulatory choices
involve this risk of backfiring, of limiting a competitor's power in an effort
to preserve the upper hand, only to discover that decisions to restrict certain
forms of political power cannot be kept easily within their intended
bounds.375
This discussion focuses on the nature of the President's discretion in
regulatory policymaking. But what of the actual techniques of regulatory
control? How does the President in fact participate in the regulatory
process? Broadly speaking, the President participates at two different
places in the regulatory process. First, the President is an active participant
in the process by which the regulatory program is set in place, that is, in
the process of statute-making. Second, the President participates in the
374. See, e.g., Moe, Bureaucratic Structure, supra note 355, at 289-92.
375. Martin Shapiro has pointed out an example of this in connection with the controversy over the
legislative veto that was ultimately settled in Chadha. See Shapiro, supra note 310. The President
made the choice in that instance to align himself with those interest groups challenging the
constitutionality of the legislative veto device. In positive political theory terms, we might imagine that
the President was driven by his desire to restrict the domain of congressional influence over regulatory
policy and believed that the invalidation of the legislative veto would do that, by essentially lopping
off one important source of congressional influence and leaving the rest of the structure of regulatory
control intact. What the President risked in making this choice, however, was that the rationale of a
Court decision striking down legislative power over agencies would extend to all efforts at controlling
agencies, including presidential efforts. Indeed, it was not entirely clear how the Court could limit the
scope of a decision striking down one aspect of political control, on separation of powers grounds,
without casting doubt on the vitality of other aspects.
This story suggests that, although the President dodged a bullet in Chadha-the Court ultimately
rested its decision on a highly formalistic reading of constitutional structure and elided the larger
questions of separation of powers raised in the case-the President possibly made a mistake in joining
forces to challenge the legislative veto. Cf Cass t. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal,
101 HARV. L. REv. 421 (1987).
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regulatory process once set in motion by the statute.376 Positive political
theory can shed light on both dimensions of presidential participation.
The President's role in the creation of the regulatory statute is more
complicated than standard positive political theory models indicate. For
example, John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan's model of political influence
over administrative agency decisions supposes that the President's role is
limited to the ability to sign or veto the policy presented by Congress.377
Ferejobn and Shipan describe a simple, one-dimensional game in which the
President threatens to move the status quo by making a policy decision.
Other game-theoretic models building on the Ferejohn-Shipan game have
a similarly narrow conception of the President's policy role.378 A more
complete treatment of the President's role would include the various
manners in which the President contributes to the shape of the regulatory
program. This includes proposing regulatory initiatives, testifying on behalf
or against certain proposals, offering to legislators various carrots and
sticks.379  One of the difficulties with incorporating these eclectic
strategies into positive political theories of legislation is methodological:
It is quite difficult to model these formal and informal mechanisms of
presidential participation. Thus, simplicity is one factor driving positive
models that reduce the President's role in the creation of regulatory
programs to the sign/veto choice.
However, there is another important aspect of presidential participation
in regulatory policymaking that is presumably subject to formal
modelling-that is, the President's role in bargaining over legislative
proposals. In a multidimensional model of regulatory policymaking, we
can suppose that the President can trade across a range of issues. The
President has a vote for trade and can deal with legislators on the same
terms and conditions as other legislators in the process of making policy
through statutory "deals." Cross-issue trading enables us to see the ways
in which the sign/veto dichotomy presents an incomplete picture of the
dimensions of presidential power. Once we admit the possibility of
376. See ROBERT J. SPITZER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: ExECuTIVE HEGEMONY 'AT tHE
CROSSROADS OF AmERICAN GOvERNMENT (1993); JON R. BOND & RICHARD FLEISHER, THE PRESIDENT
IN THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA (1990).
377. John A. Ferejohn & Charles R. Shipan, Congressional Influence on Administrative Agencies:
A Case Study of Telecommunications Policy, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 393 (Lawrence C. Dodd &
Bruce J. Oppenheimer eds., 4th ed. 1989).
378. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Eskridge, Article I, supra note 220; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging
on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991).
379. See sources cited supra note 376.
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presidential logrolling, we have a much more complicated picture of the
scope of presidential participation in lawmaking. We also can ask a
number of questions concerning the President's structural choices. The
executive branch can presumably be considered in industrial organization
terms. Certainly, the considerations that drive presidential structure are
different from those that drive legislative organization. For one thing, the
President moves as one actor and need not construct the same network of
procedural rules and institutional structures for the facilitation and
maintenance of intra-institutional bargains. Yet, the President does face a
ubiquitous principal-agent problem; a rational chief executive will be
sensitive to the need to control executive branch subordinates through
attention to structural design.38 Moreover, the President does engage in
bargaining and will presumably structure an institution to facilitate
opportunities for bargaining with legislators. There is a sense in which the
President bargains within the legislative institution; as a practical matter,
the President's vote can be considered that of the 536th legislator.3"' At
the same time, the President is fundamentally separate from the legislature;
he therefore bargains as a distinct institution, with separate tactics and
stratagies.382 This dual sense of President-Congress bargaining raises
complicated issues for positive political theory.383 Suffice it to say for
380. The dilemmas faced by Presidents in controlling their subordinates in the executive branch
bureaucracy has been explored by a number of political scientists. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 353,
at 24-53; SKOWRONEK, supra note 371, at 17-32; RICHARD ROSE, THE POSTMODERN PRESIDENT:
GEORGE BUSH MEETS THE WORLD 162-85 (2d ed. 1991); WILSON, supra note 94, at 257-76.
381. The President can bargain with members of Congress but may be limited in his ability to
deliver. He can agree to exchange his vote for a legislator's vote on a bill, but the simple arithmetic
of the legislature (535 members) and the Presidency (one "member") suggests why it would be very
difficult for the President to make such a bargain. It will rarely be possible to identify the marginal
legislator whose vote will mean the difference between defeat or success for the President. On the other
hand, the President's vote is nearly always the marginal vote. His vote will therefore be tremendously
more valuable, in nearly every legislative situation, than the vote of one legislator. Even if we are
talking about a party leader or committee head, the value of what any one legislator has to trade will
usually fail to approximate the value of the President's vote.
382. But not, strictly speaking, his own resources. Again, we should be reminded of the
dependence of the President on Congress' appropriations decisions. See supra text accompanying note
366 (discussing Congress' threathened cut-off of funds to Competitiveness Council). Positive political
theory emphasizes the legislature's ability to compete with the President for administrative control by
controlling the agency, but what is often underemphasized is the extent to which Congress can control
the President directly.
383i To take just one of these issues: What is the significance of the fact that the President has
more to trade with legislators than merely his vote? The issue is, as we might put it, one of the relevant
currency of exchange. The President can trade those policymaking services that do not require the
passage of legislation but, instead, lie within the discretion of the President. For instance, the President
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now that this dimension of presidential participation can be incorporated
into positive political theories of lawmaking in order to generate a much
richer picture than thus far exists of the nature of regulatory
decisionmaking in a complex political environment.
The other main dimension of presidential participation in regulation is
presidential influence over the implementation of regulatory programs by
administrative agencies and administrators. The President's role in this
regard is more commonly explored in the positive literature. The basic
message is that the President has tremendous advantage over Congress in
controlling agencies.384 Reasons for this involve both the inherent
strengths of the President and the endemic weaknesses of the legislature.
Among the former are the absence of significant electoral constraints on
presidential action. The President, as mentioned above, is more free than
Congress to be concerned with governance and the "big picture." '385
Among the latter are the tendencies of legislators to focus on particularistic,
narrow interests and, in addition, the collective actions that plague
decisionmaking in the multi-member legislature.386
An important element of the President's strategy of regulatory control is
may issue an executive order in return for a vote on a bill. While this evens out somewhat the currency
of trade, the President has to be careful in cutting such deals. These deals usually involve zero-sum
transfers, that is, the giving of some sort of benefit to one legislator and thereby removing the benefit
from the supply of goods available. Perhaps the most promising type of currency is the services that
the President can provide through his role as chief administrator. He can, for instance, help untangle
bureaucratic red tape for a member, or agree to throw some favorable publicity his way. Trading
services for votes is a means by which the President can limit his disadvantageous position with respect
to legislative logrolling.
384. See, e.g., Moe & Wilson, supra note 88, at 18-27; Ferejohn & Eskridge, Making the Deal
Stick, supra note 220.
385. See Moe, Bureaucratic Structure, supra note 355.
386. See Moe & Wilson, supra note 88, at 23-26. Moe and Wilson note that these collective action
problems trouble legislator interests to the extent that legislators "take action in their own best interests
as individuals-which may conflict with the best interests of the institution as a whole." Id. at 23.
However, the conflict may be more apparent than real. The thrust of positive political theory is that
politicians will act to reconcile these two interests; that is, they benefit from institutions which provide
them with benefits within their institution; they also benefit from choices made within an institution
which is powerful relative to other institutions in government. They will be reticent to 'sacrifice
institutional interests for more narrow interests.
The imperative of protecting the power of Congress as a whole also suggests why the problem of
legislators' focusing on particularistic, narrow interests may be overstated. In order to properly "'serve"
the individuals and groups who request legislative action, the legislature must secure the power of their
institution vis-a-vis competitors. Interest groups will hardly be mollified by the legislators' excuse that
they did their best, but the President defeated their initiatives. Hence, the capacity of each legislator
to pursue narrow aims is related to the capacity of the institution to resist presidential encroachments
(defensive strategies) and to pursue legislative interests.
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the creation of a favorable (from the President's standpoint) climate for
regulatory policy through careful attention to structural design.
387
Administrative agencies are often the product of presidential initiative, even
when the policies implemented by these agencies are set by Congress.
President Nixon's creation of the EPA, which preceded the passage of the
watershed environmental statutes of the 1970s and 80s, ensured that the
President's impact would be felt on the construction of future environmen-
tal policy.388 Moreover, the creation of watchdog agencies such as the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the late Council on
Competitiveness ensure structural mechanisms for constant presidential
influence in the policymaking process.8
Different structures serve different functions. Creating a particular form
of administrative agency provides for different sorts of presidential
influence.39 For example, the structure of the EPA, an executive branch
agency headed by a single administrator answerable to the President, was
more amenable to presidential control than a commission-form agency
constructed by Congress with sources of political independence.39'
Regulatory supervision through an executive branch department like OMB
facilitates presidential prerogatives in a way that would not be possible
under the rubric of a "management" agency outside the aegis of the
executive branch.392 The point is that the President's structural choices
are made with an eye toward maintaining influence over regulatory policy
and, at the same time, safeguarding prerogatives from encroachments by
equally self-interested legislators.
The question of how successful the President is in superintending
regulatory decisionmaking is ultimately an empirical one. Positive theory
sheds light on the issue by suggesting that the President has both the means
and the incentives to structure an institution in the service of regulatory
aims. The ideal normative picture painted by some positive political
theorists is one in which presidential strategizing is checked and balanced
by congressional actions and vice versa. The positive picture that emerges
from what little positive scholarship currently exists on the Presidency does
387. See, e.g., McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, supra note 324; Macey, Organizational
Design, supra note 334.
388. See HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 186.
389. See, e.g., EADS & Fix, supra note 361.
390. See Francis E. Rourke, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE
POLITICAL SYSTEM (Michael Nelson ed., 1984). See also sources cited supra notes 353, 376.
391. See HARRIS & Mims, supra note 186, at 225.
392. See MCGARrY, supra note 87.
[VOL. 72:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss1/2
REGULATORY REFORM
not fit this ideal; instead, the Congress-President relationship is described
as out of balance, with the President exercising considerable discretion in
regulatory decisionmaking. Electoral imperatives, constitutional structure,
and collective action problems all ensure that the President possesses
considerable advantages in the regulatory process which resist congressional
checks.393 To make matters worse, argue Eskridge and Ferejohn, the
Supreme Court has facilitated, through its constitutional and statutory
interpretation decisions, the expansion of presidential power.394
I conclude this section on the Presidency with the rather ambivalent
observation that the jury is still out; positive political theory has yet to train
seriously its models on the Presidency and the President's role in regulatory
policymaking. The future of positive political theory surely involves a
greater attention to these questions.
D. Judiciary
Political economists have never known entirely where to put courts in
their theories. The judiciary has therefore remained largely an enigma.
Positive political theories of judicial behavior are troublingly axiomatic.
Moreover, the axioms are often in conflict. One group of positive theorists
tends to view courts as merely another political institution driven by the
same concerns and interests that motivate other politicians. In the
regulatory game, the court is seen as just another player, moving at its
designated time and having, along with other political actors, the same
interest in implementing its own preferences into law.395 Others view
courts as a source of exogenous constraints on decisionmaking by the
legislative and executive branches.396 Strategic politicians act in the
shadow of restrictions created and enforced by the judiciary, with the
judiciary representing the only independent and non-political institution in
the political process. These inconsistent conceptions of judicial decision-
making represent a central difficulty in contemporary positive political
393. See Moe & Wilson, supra note 88.
394. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick, supra note 220; Ferejohn & Eskridge, Article
I, supra note 220. Cf Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 452 (1989).
395. See, e.g., Edward P. Schwartz et al., A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent, 57 LAW &
CONTEIP. PROBS. (forthcoming June 1994); Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory
of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 263 (1990), The seminal contribution is Brian Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence
of Congressional Policy Making: Grove City College v. Bell (Hoover Working Paper, 1988).
396. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 144; Landes & Posner, supra note 105.
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theories of regulation. While both views describe something important
about the nature and qualities of judicial decisionmaking, neither of these
conceptions captures the essential elements of the judicial role. Courts are
political and strategic, but not only that; courts are the source of some
constraints on political decisions. However, courts are not the only source
of constraints and, moreover, are themselves constrained by cross-cutting
rules, doctrines, and practices.397 Positive political theory has yet to
provide a coherent theory ofjudicial behavior and decisionmaking; without
it, a comprehensive positive theory of politics is impossible. The effort to
construct a coherent theory of judicial decisionmaking represents one of the
important tasks of contemporary positive political theory.
We start with a perennial question in rational choice theory: Why do
judges behave the way they do? Even when reduced to a level of the basic
heuristic assumption at the heart of rational choice theory, the question is
confounding.398  Fortunately, it is largely irrelevant. The question of
what sort of utilities judges maximize is far less important than, and not
necessarily connected to, the question of how judges participate in the
regulatory process within the institution of the courts. In the context of this
larger, and more institutionally focused question, judicial motives represent
an intangible and peripheral set of data.
The focus in positive political theory is on how and why the institution
is constructed and on how it operates within an environment made up of
397. See infra text accompanying notes 418-19.
398. To begin with the more obvious part of the confusion, it is quite difficult to analogize judges
to legislators and other politicians at the level of incentives and motives. The structure of judicial
incentives is different from other political actors in ways that make comparisons problematic. Federal
judges face no electoral constraint; nor can they realistically be expected to covet promotion. Being
appointed to the Supreme Court is surely no more likely than being struck by lightning--even for those
select elite judges whose names pop up like clockwork whenever there is a Supreme Court vacancy.
In addition, great wealth through judging is hardly something to which a judge can aspire. An obvious
free rider problem exists in the federal judiciary: A judge's salary cannot be individually increased
without a special statutory appropriation, which will never happen. See Macey, supra note 145, at 497-
98. Moreover, the Constitution expressly forbids the diminution ofjudicial salaries during the term of
office. A judge must seek riches elsewhere. The hypothetical profit maximizing judge is, for that
reason, probably somewhere other than in black robes.
The observation that judges have incentives different from other politicians goes only so far.
Describing the unique incentive structures of the judiciary suggests only that judges are not constrained
in the same way as are legislators. If, however, we still believe that judges are concerned with
maximizing their individual utilities, then we can assume that judges will take advantage of any
discretion with which they are left. It may be that judges are concerned simply with implementing their
personal preferences-ideological, idiosyncratic, whatever-through their decisions. If so, they can act
accordingly, without regard for what electoral or pecuniary incentives exist. Ve are thus back where
we started: Why do judges behave they way they do?
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other institutions, each with its own agenda and own set of constraints,
internal and external. Positive political theories can absorb different
perspectives on legislative, executive, and judicial behavior. The
assumptions of rationality and (in some cases) foresight in positive political
theory are not trivial; yet, there is a studied agnosticism in the positive
political theory account concerning the underlying motivations of judges,
legislators, and executives acting within institutions and within a political
environment.399 Instead, there are two central questions that must be
understood and answered in the course of developing a positive theory of
politics, neither of which presupposes a resolution of this "judicial motives"
conundrum: The first question is what exactly is the zone of discretion
within which judges have the ability to exercise their own judgment free
of reversal by other political institutions? The second question is what
factors affect how judges exercise their discretion within this zone? That
is, what motivates a judge to choose one strategy or another in a situation
in which she has both the discretion to decide and the resources that enable
her to implement her desired aims?
Positive theory's core maxim of judicial discretion is that a court °0
will decide with reference to the likelihood that its decision will be
reversed by another political institution, whether it is another court on
appeal or Congress through the enactment of legislation. In spatial terms,
a court will pick a policy within a space representing the zone of discretion
within which other political institutions will permit the court to decide
without reversal.40 ' Suppose we think of the relationship among the three
lawmaking institutions-the House, the Senate, and the President0 2 -in
399. For a criticism of this agnosticism, see Michael E. Levine, Comment on Macey, 8 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 119 (1992).
400. In this discussion, I use the term "court" and "judge" interchangeably. Of course, courts are
often made up of more than one judge; in such instances, intriguing questions arise concerning the
relationship among judges in multi-member institutions. Leading law and economics scholars have shed
interesting light on this question over the years. See, e.g., Lewis A. Komhauser & Lawrence G. Sager,
Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court,
95 HARV. L. REv. 802 (1982).
401. See, e.g., Gely & Spiller, supra note 395, at 268-73.
402. One reason it is useful to think in terms of three institutions rather than the conventional two
"political branches" is because each institution has a veto over the decision of the other. In a sense,
the disfunction between the House and the Senate is even greater than between either legislative house
and the President. After all, the President's veto can be overridden by the House and the Senate.
Hence, both institutions can cooperate and form a coalition to overturn a presidential decision. By
contrast, if one house refuses to act, nothing can happen, regardless of the size of the legislative
majority. See Levmore, supra note 220.
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terms of a two-dimensional policy space.
[Figure 1]
S
C
P
HAH
H P
Each point represents the institution's ideal point. 3 The preferences
over policies decline in distance from the ideal points. The surface of the
triangle represents the Pareto optimal set of policy choices, that is, those
choices that will make a majority better off without making the other
harmed. The curves intersecting points x and x* represent the indifference
curves of the three institutions.4" The court's ideal point is represented
by C. If it were to implement C through its decision, then the remaining
institutions would concur on a reversal to bring the policy back to an
equilibrium because, after all, x is better than C. But, if the court were to
decide x*, closer to its ideal point than x, but still within the Pareto optimal
set of HSP, then its decision would stand. Consequently, a court that sets
out to bring its decision as close as possible to its ideal has some discretion
(the area within HSP) but not complete discretion.
To understand the sort of political constraints that bind judges it is
important to understand the temporal dimensions of political
decisionmaking or, as Ken Shepsle usefully puts it, the potential of
403. We are assuming, as is standard, that the ideal point of the institution reflects the ideal of the
median member. But we could relax the assumption and still use the model. If we suppose, along with
structure-induced equilibrium theory, that the committees operate as "veto gates" keeping certain
legislation from floor consideration, we might regard the H and S in the model as representing the
median memo of the gatekeeping committee.
404. The indifference curve connects all points equidistant from the institution's most preferred
point.
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coalitional drift.4 05  Courts are constrained by the threat of reactions by
Congress and the President. However, it is not the enacting coalition that
poses the threat but, rather, the coalition that is in place at the time the
court makes its decision. Legislative preferences and coalitions may
change over time.4 6 At the very least, there is uncertainty in the minds
of all political institutions, including the courts, concerning whether and to
what extent the preferences of the House, Senate, and the President reflect
the will of the parties to the original bargain. In the two-dimensional
model described above, the HSP refers to the sitting coalition, not
necessarily the enacting coalition. The effect of this changing structure of
political preferences on judicial discretion is described by John Ferejohn:
[I]nsofar as courts in particular have allegiance to statutes-that is, to the
duly encoded preferences of the enacting Congress-they should be careful
to devise interpretive methods that protect statutes from contemporary
political responses, and in particular do not provoke congressional responses
that are very far from the statutory desires of the enacting coalition. Such
courts would engage in what might be called "strategic jurisprudence," in that
they would have to take account of the preferences of the sitting Congress in
interpreting statutes. Only by doing so would such courts be able to act as
"sophisticated honest agents" of the enacting Congress.4"7
Accepting this theoretical description as far as it goes, all that it suggests
is that judicial discretion is bounded and that, if we set out to predict
judicial patterns, we can describe a zone of discretion within which courts
can operate without disturbance. This basic thesis about the dimensions of
judicial discretion rests on two assumptions. The first is that the court has
adequate information concerning the likelihood that its decision will be
overturned. In the standard positive political theory models, the assumption
is 1 or 0; that is, a judicial decision will be overturned or it will not.403
More realistic, and substantially more complicated, models would consider
overruling as a probabilistic estimate.40 9 Courts would need information
both about the extent to which the preferences of lawmakers have moved
405. See Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, supra note 294.
406. See id. See also Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 294.
407. See Ferejohn, supra note 101, at 24-25. See also John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast,
Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992) [hereinafter Ferejohn
& Weingast, Strategic Statutory Interpretation]; Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 294.
408. In technical terms, these are full information models. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note
377; Marks, supra note 395.
409. For an important exception to this standard assumption, see Schwartz et al., supra note 395
(using signalling model).
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from where they were in the original coalition; in other words, the court
must determine how far, if at all, the coalition has in fact drifted.
However, in addition, courts would consider the probability that this current
coalition will invest their energies into overruling the court decision.
Current positive political theory models seem to assume that legislators will
overturn any decision that is outside the Pareto optimal set of preferences.
But surely there are transaction costs associated with overruling. Whether
they will invest the resources necessary to overturn the decision will
depend upon, among other factors, the importance of the issue to a
legislative majority and the opportunity costs of attempting to overrule the
decision."' While more complexity may be added to the picture, the
basic point is the same-courts can pick a point within the space created
by the political preferences of institutions which have the power to overturn
the courts' decisions if they stray outside the policy space.4"
Another critical assumption is that courts care about whether they are
overturned. Of course, all things being equal, we can agree that a judge
would rather win than lose. But the real question is whether, at the margin,
the court's decision will be influenced by the likelihood that the decision
will survive scrutiny. The assumption is quite strong; it supposes that
courts will shape their judgments around predicted political consequences;
that they will, in a particular case, decline to decide as they want to, or
think they ought to, because to do so would risk a reaction by Congress
and the President. To be plausible, the assumption must rest on a positive
theory of judicial decisionmaking or, at the very least, a theory of why
courts act with regard to political decisions made by others.4 2 There are
two distinct pathways which such positive political theory can travel. The
first expresses an economic efficiency rationale for judicial sensitivity to
the political dimensions of its decisions; the second expresses a more
strategic, political opportunism rationale.
The efficiency argument rests on the same sort of internally focused
arguments that underlie the new economics of organization and its
410. This is not, I would insist, merely an empirical point, but a theoretical one that goes to the
efficacy of the "zone of discretion" model. Once we build into the model the feature of transaction
costs, then there may well be a different calculation for political actors regarding whether they will
overturn or let stand a judicial decision.
411. See Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson Tiller, Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of
Supreme Court Decisions (1993) (on file with author).
412. See Levine, supra note 399. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding
Law Through the Lens of Public Choice, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 286 (1992).
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application to the study of political institutions.413 To understand why
judges tie their decisions to the preferences of legislators and the President
we begin with the basic structure of judicial decisionmaking. We start by
assuming that a court has a greater or lesser amount of discretion over both
the cases that it decides and the issues framed within the case that it
resolves. At one extreme, of course, is the Supreme Court of the United
States, a judicial institution that has control over its docket. The Court,
acting through coalitions of justices, can pick and choose from among the
hundreds of cases that are brought before it for decision.44  The Court
faces costs every time it decides a case-indeed, every time it tackles any
one of the number of issues presented in a case. An important task of the
Court is to economize the costs of deciding. These costs include the
opportunity costs of spending resources on one issue and case at the
expense of the many others that could be considered. In light of these
costs, it would seem prudent for the Court to take account of the risks that
its decision will be overturned by Congress. Why, after all, would it waste
its time on a decision that would not survive long after its decision when
it could spend its resources on a decision that matters to it as much and
will prove more durable? So, one reason to expect a court with some
control over its docket to pay attention to the prospect of overruling
concerns the costs (including the opportunity costs) of deciding cases.415
The second rationale rests on a distinct, and more externally focused,
perspective on judicial decisionmaking. Whereas the economic efficiency
argument described above reflects an outgrowth of the sort of industrial
organization perspective on political institutions that is useful but limited
in its approach to considering the range of issues in regulation and public
law, this rationale coincides with the positive political theories of legislative
and executive behavior. The notion is that the court is concerned with
implementing its own preferences through decided cases.416 Underlying
motives and incentives are irrelevant; the judge may be concerned with
prestige, money, social justice, or something else. He will act, however,
to implement his policy preference and will, in that regard, take account of
413. See supra part III.C (discussing new economics of organization); supra part IV.B.1 (applying
industrial organization theory to Congress).
414. For a positive political model of the Supreme Court's certiorari process, see Edward P.
Schwartz, Information, Agendas, and the Rule of Four Nonmajoritarian Certiorari Rules for the
Supreme Court (1992) (on file with author).
415. Cf. Spiller & Tiller, supra note 411, at 16-21.
416. See sources cited supra note 387.
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the risk that his preference will be replaced by the preferences of other
politicians acting within their institutions. The judge understands that he
may not be able to accomplish what he ideally would want; to pick his
ideal point would result in a reaction that may leave him worse off than if
he did nothing.4 17 Instead, if he acts at all, he will pick that point that is
as close to his ideal point as he can get without being overturned by
Congress and the President.
However, the notion that the judge will roam freely within the bound-
aries of this policy space is questionable. The point about the strategic
concerns of the opportunistic judge simply indicates that the judge will try
to avoid being overruled. One constraint on judicial discretion, then, will
be the threat of political reaction. The judge may also feel constrained by
other factors, such as her belief that the intent of the framers of the statute
must be implemented,4" ' or her belief in precedent.41 9 In spatial terms,
the preferences of the Congress that enacted the statute may be represented
by another set of boundaries which are not necessarily congruent with the
preferences of legislators currently. These boundaries do not represent the
risk of being overturned now, but merely the zone of discretion that the
enacting legislature intended to leave to courts in the first instance.
Suppose that we have settled on the boundaries that limit the scope of
judicial discretion. What does positive political theory say about what
decision a judge will reach within this zone? The most common approach
to answering this question in the positive political theory literature regards
judges as concerned with implementing their own preferences through their
decisions.420  Once the court has determined the boundaries of its
discretion, it will proceed to pick the outcome that matches most closely
its policy preferences. Those preferences may be ideologically driven; or
they may be bound up with the judge's pecuniary interests; or, more
417. This is because an overruling can move the policy to someplace other than the status quo. See,
e.g., Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Certiorari: Hierarchy, Strategy and Decision Costs
at the Courts (1992) (on file with author). Positive political theorists have been slow to take into
account the spectral quality ofjudicial choice. Models usually consider judicial choice as either/or (i.e.,
affirm v. reverse). See, e.g., Pablo T. Spiller & Mathew L. Spitzer, Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrine,
I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 8 (1992). For a useful discussion-and defense-of this assumption, see
Schwartz et al., supra note 395, at 233.
418. See discussion infra part V.A.3a.
419. This "belief" may be strategically-driven. See Schwartz et al., supra note 395. See also
Lewis A. Komhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989);
Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 Ctli.-KENT L.
REv. 93 (1989).
420. See supra text accompanying notes 398-99, 416 (discussing judicial motives).
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amorphously, with her interests in increasing her "prestige." In any event,
positive political theories in this vein are hardly innovative in their
description of the behavioral motivations of judges; they track standard
rational choice descriptions of judges as utility maximizers in the same way
and essentially for the same reasons as any other actor in the political
process. 4
21
Needless to say, these hypotheses rest on a controversial conception of
the judicial role in the structure of American government. But even
supposing that this idea of a judge as a political actor captures something
important about the nature of judging,4" the idea does not provide a
sufficient basis for drawing positive conclusions about judicial
decisionmaking. For one thing, the notion of preferences is ambigu-
ous.423 Does the judge have preferences merely about policy outcomes?
Or does he also have preferences about decisional rationales, the content of
legal rules, and precedent? The notion of outcomes is too ambiguous to
yield the sort of hypothesis that is capable of being examined theoretically.
Even among those positive political theorists that take the idea of the judge
as a political, strategic actor as a given, disagreement exists over what
judges prefer, what goals they pursue, and the means of implementing these
goals.
More recently, positive theorists have incorporated richer, more
complicated, conceptions of judicial behavior into their models of how
courts participate in the political process. In one interesting, recent model,
Emerson Tiller and Pablo Spiller describe how courts can pursue strategies
to implement their own policy preferences through judicial decisions and,
simultaneously, implement their preferences concerning particular doctrines
and procedures.4 4 A judge may, for instance, desire less regulation;
certain policy outcomes will follow from this desire. At the same time, this
judge may prefer to interpret a statute in accordance with its precise
language because the judge is committed to a narrow, "textualist" approach
421. See the discussion in POSNER, supra note 106.
422. The notion of the judge (particularly the Supreme Court justice) as a political actor antedates,
of course, positive political theory. See, e.g., GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE
ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1946-1963 (1965); SHAPIRO, supra note 1.
See also JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
(1993).
423. See, e.g., Spiller & Tiller, supra note 411; Schwartz et al., supra note 395; Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L.
REv. 647 (1992); Gely & Spiller, supra note 395.
424. See Spiller & Tiller, supra note 411.
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to interpretation.4' These two sets of preferences may complement one
another; or they may reflect preferences that are incommensurate because
they are about two distinct types of issues. In any case, to understand
judicial strategies we must, so this model goes, understand these two
dimensions of judicial strategy.
Among the implications of this important insight is the one mined by
Tiller and Spiller, namely, that strategic judges may be willing to have their
decisions overruled by Congress, if the desideratum of the overruling is that
one dimension of their preferences (say, their preference for textualist
interpretation) is preserved.426 Another implication that might be consid-
ered in light of thinking about judicial preferences and strategies in a more
complex way is whether and to what extent courts will sacrifice a
substantial amount of the utility they get from implementing their policy
preferences in order to achieve other, more long-lasting goals. Moreover,
how does the multi-dimensionality of judicial decisionmaking alter the
political strategies of legislators and the President, both in terms of their
decisions whether to overrule and in terms of their decisions how to
influence judicial decisionmaking ex ante?427
In addition to the complexities added to the positive account of the
judiciary by a richer conception of preferences, another critical feature of
judging that is beginning to be incorporated into positive political theory
is the institutional-decisionmaking structure of the judiciary. This structure
of judicial decisionmaking, which makes the assumption that the judge is
a strategizer, is only the beginning of the story. The preferences of a judge
can be implemented only through his decisions; these decisions require an
appropriate institutional structure. In multi-member institutions, including
the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, the judge must receive the
support of his colleagues; even in a single-member institution, a judge's
power is institutionally dependent.428 In recent years, positive political
425. On "textualism," see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
(1990).
426. Albeit under the conditions spelled out by Spiller & Tiller. See Spiller & Tiller, supra note
411.
427. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and Political.Advantage, 12 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 217 (1992) (discussing political strategies for controlling process of statutory interpretation).
428. For example, the judge has only limited control over the issues that come before him.
Technically, the problem is one of "path-dependence." See Lewis A. Komhauser, Collegial Courts I,
12 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 169 (1992). Cf Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules,
80 GEO. L.J. 583 (1992) (describing how biases in the cases that come before courts can skew
decisionmaking process).
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theorists, most notably, Lewis Komhauser, have contributed rich theories
of decisionmaking in collegial courts.429
The lesson drawn from these efforts to craft more complicated theoretical
models of judicial decisionmaking is that courts must be examined as
unique political institutions; they participate, along with other institutions,
in the construction, implementation, and interpretation of law and legal
doctrine. However, their responsibilities in carrying out these functions are
importantly distinct from other institutions. These distinctions are the
product of constitutional arrangements; they are also the product of shared
understandings, historical situations, and jurisprudential philosophies,
characteristics which are each difficult to reduce to rational choice
theoretical frameworks. However, these characteristics nonetheless channel
judicial discretion in important ways which are thus far underappreciated
by positive political theory.
One prominent positive political theorist has begun to sketch out a
framework for considering the nature and scope of judicial
decisionmaking.43° Like earlier positive political theory efforts, the
linchpin of this effort is the concept of judicial discretion. The notion is
that the shape of judicial decisions will be a function of the "interpretive
regime" in which judicial decisionmaking takes place.43' John Ferejohn
writes:
The notion of an interpretive regime is intended to suggest that the methods
ofjudicial interpretation in use at a particular point in time tend to have some
degree of coherence or structure. This coherence might arise from the
hierarchical nature of the appellate court system, or perhaps from some
tendency to systematization in legal community. Whatever the source, an
interpretive regime permits the coordination of legal expectations both within
the legal community of judges, lawyers and commentators, and beyond it to
agencies, legislators and ordinary citizens.432
This regime is no mere artifact of history; it is neither accidental nor
evolutionary. It is, instead, the product of rational, political choices made
429. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modelling Collegial Courts II: Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 441 (1992); Komhauser, supra note 428; Komhauser & Sager, Unpacking the Court, supra
note 400; Pablo T. Spiller, Rationality, Decision Rules, and Collegial Courts, 12 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 186 (1992); Schwartz et al., supra note 395; Easterbrook, supra note 400.
430. See Ferejohn, supra note 101. Related themes are developed in William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
John A. Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of Law (1993) (on file with author).
431. There are some similarities between Ferejohn's theory of "interpretive regimes" and the
analysis of constitutional interpretation and history in BRUCE T. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FoUNDATIONS (1991). See Ferejohn, supra note 101, at 20 n.21.
432. Ferejohn, supra note 101, at 27.
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within an institutional and historical context. The results of these choices
form the institutional regime in which judicial decisionmaking takes place.
The concept of an interpretive regime as a constraint on judicial
decisionmaking and as a means of channeling discretion in a certain
direction is enticing, yet inchoate. What determines whether a set of
common judicial techniques of decision rise to the level of an interpretive
regime, a shared community of decisionmaking strategies? What factors
ensure that an interpretive regime remains stable?
The definition of a regime turns not only on the interpretive practices we
observe (e.g., narrow versus strict statutory construction; broad federal
power versus states' rights), but also on the extent to which judges share
a commitment to a homogenous set of decisionmaking strategies.
Commitment within the judiciary to a "plain meaning" rule of interpreta-
tion, for example, would indicate the creation of an interpretive regime;
similarly, commitment to an expansive reading of the national
government's regulatory powers would represent the makings of an
interpretive regime built around a particular approach to federalism issues.
For the purposes of ascribing to a particular judicial epoch the moniker
"interpretive regime," it does not matter what causes the regime; suffice it
to say that judges within an interpretive regime share a common set of
decision principles and interpretive conventions.433
The precise point at which an eclectic set of interpretive practices come
together to form an interpretive regime is unclear. For example, William
Eskridge, Jr., recently described the revival of an approach to statutory
interpretation-what he labels "the new textualism"-among a growing
number of federal judges and justices.434 The new textualism has
substantially affected judicial decisionmaking and, as a consequence, the
structure of the regulatory state. But does this new textualism constitute
the development of a distinct interpretive regime? Perhaps the emergence
of an intense commitment to a particular method of interpretation among
a number of judges reflects the ambition of those judges to expand the
scope of their own power and influence in an environment in which the
regime of interpretation is strongly contested and in which judicial agendas
are closely divided. In any event, what constitutes the emergence or the
collapse of an interpretive regime is not apparent.
A more serious concern is one that brings us back to the roots of positive
433. See id.
434. Eskridge, supra note 144.
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political theory. What ensures the proper level of commitment to a certain
interpretive regime? John Ferejohn's tentative answer is stability-that is,
the interests of judges in maintaining a stable set of interpretive conven-
tions. Stability is the product of the rational choices of judges to create and
obey these conventions. The basic reason is judicial economy. Common
decisionmaking conventions represent "internal constraints on judicial
action."435  These constraints "arise from the incapacity of courts,
responding to disputes in real time, to commit themselves to future courses
of action. Judges might prefer to decide cases by developing interpretive
regimes, making them publicly known, and then deciding cases through the
application of these rules." '436 By doing so, judges can make their
decisions more predictable to other politicians and ordinary citizens. It
remains unclear exactly why courts crave predictability and certainty in the
way described by Ferejohn. Perhaps the reason is that predictability
enables judges to economize on deciding cases. Reducing decision costs
through reliance on off-the-rack interpretive conventions is, in this view, an
important objective of rational judges.437 So, too, is there value associat-
ed with reducing the risk of erroneous decisions-that is, error costs-and,
accordingly, judges will construct interpretive regimes within which they
can rely on tried-and-true rules of decision.43 However, this economic
rationale for interpretive regimes is rather imprecise. Certain rules of
interpretation do not reduce, to a substantial extent, the costs of deciding.
Nor do we observe, as the economic rationale clearly predicts, choices for
more efficient interpretive regimes. In a sense, we are returned to the
judicial motives conundrum that we had left aside: Why would judges
construct and maintain interpretive regimes in order to reduce or generate
predictable outcomes?
Whether or not there emerges an adequate positive theory to explain the
design and maintenance of interpretive regimes, there is still something
enormously useful in thinking about public law in the ways suggested by
this "regimes" framework. Several conceptual ideas that seem to float
around rather loosely in positive political theory are brought together. The
first is the nature of judicial discretion, that is, the notion that courts are
435. Ferejohn, supra note 101, at 30.
436. Id.
437. See Spiller & Tiller, supra note 411; cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI.
L. REv. 533 (1983).
438. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 231.
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constrained in the ways that they implement their will through judicial
decisions. The underlying constraints are political; judicial decisions
outside the zone of discretion may be overruled. But the constraints in
practice, the day-to-day boundaries on judicial decisionmaking, are
constructed by interpretive rules and norms. Legal scholars are much more
likely to ascribe constraints on judicial decisions to the rule of law and
principles such as stare decisis and textualist statutory construction than we
are to pivotal members of the 103rd Congress. But this need not reflect a
dichotomy between apolitical conception of judicial discretion and a legal
conception. Instead, the notion that judicial decisions will reflect the
interpretive regimes in which the judges decide reconciles both conceptions.
Thinking about judicial decisionmaking within a interpretive regimes
framework also helps shape the inquiry into judicial organization and
structure. Courts make rational institutional decisions as do other actors in
the political process. These choices reflect their calculations in two ways.
The first concerns hierarchical decisions about how to control the members
of the organization in which the judge operates. (Of course, some judges
are more equal than others with regard to their ability to make organiza-
tional choices on behalf of the institution.)43 9  The second concerns
decisions about how to insulate its decisions from political controls, that is,
from disruptions by competitor political institutions. A framework, such
as that provided by the notion of interpretive regimes, that focuses attention
on the content of judicial rules and the nature of interpretive strategies can
be integrated into theories of judicial organization to integrate positive
theories of the judiciary in a way that has not yet been done. The
integration would involve bringing together perspectives on the "external"
aspects of judicial decisionmaking, including political controls and
commitments to jurisprudential principles, with the "internal" aspects of
judicial decisionmaking, including the structure of judicial incentives and
the costs of reaching agreement in multi-member institutions. The effort
at such an integration brings us full circle to the critique in Part II of
previous rational choice theories of politics and the description in the first
section of this Part of the ambition of positive political theory. What is
needed is studied attention to the role of institutions in constructing the
conditions for, and the strategies of, political decisionmaking, including
decisionmaking by courts and judges. What is also needed is an apprecia-
439. For example, an important locus of authority within the courts is the Federal Judicial
Conference, a body whose membership includes members of the federal judiciary at all levels.
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tion, grounded in positive theory, for the role of law and legal rules in
shaping political action."'
E. Putting the Pieces Together: The Dynamics of Regulatory
Competition
The regulatory process reflects a confluence of ingredients. The
discussion in the previous sections of this Part suggests that these
ingredients-legislative, administrative, presidential, and judicial ac-
tion-are both distinct and similar. Positive political theory has contributed
to our understanding of the regulatory process both in its construction of
positive theories of political institutions and in its consideration of how
these institutions work in an institutional environment.
440. Another important task is to explain, from a more reflectively normative perspective, what sort
of role we would want courts to play in a regulatory system dominated by the sort of rational, strategic
action described above. This normative task intersects with the concerns of both positive political
theorists and legal scholars. What positive political theory aims principally to provide is a positive
framework within which we can tackle these normative questions. At its most ambitious, however,
positive political theory is an analytical engine behind a particular normative perspective on public law.
There is a different way of considering the relationship between positive political theory and the
judiciary than that sketched out in this section. That is to see judges as members of an audience to
which prescriptive suggestions that take into account positive political theories of legislation and
regulation are directed. The final part of this Article explores some of the ways in which normative
legal scholarship may integrate and apply the insights of positive political theory. See infra part V.
For now, it is merely worth noticing that positive political theorists are beginning to tackle a number
of normative questions raised by the theory and, in doing so, their prescriptions tend to be directed
toward judges. Of course, this reflects the tendency of normative legal scholarship generally to view
courts as the consumers of our scholarly output. See generally Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and
Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REv. 835 (1988). But it also reflects something about
positive political theory distinctly-namely, its theoretically-grounded skepticism concerning the
capacities of the legislative and executive branches to reform themselves, given the ubiquitous
incentives and opportunities for rational, strategic action. Cf. Elhauge, supra note 148 (discussing
relationship between interest group theories and proposals for stronger judicial review); Charles Silver,
Public Choice and Judicial Review, 18 L. & Soc. INQ. 165 (1993) (same).
Among the efforts to construct prescriptive suggestions that are grounded in positive political theory,
two stand out. One is the effort by William Eskridge, Jr., and John Ferejohn to defend an approach to
construing the Constitution and statutes in order to cabin excessive presidential influence over the
process of regulatory decisionmaking. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick, supra note
220; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Article I, supra note 220. The second is the effort of the collective
"McNollgast" to develop rules of statutory construction for use by courts in order to safeguard the
bargain struck by coalitions in the legislature and therefore protect the enacting Congress from its
diabolic successor-the "sitting" Congress. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive
Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming June 1994)
[hereinafter McNollgast, Legislative Intent]; McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative
Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEo. L.J. 705 (1992) [hereinafter McNollgast, Positive
Canons].
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In examining the dynamics of regulatory decisionmaking, positive
political theories often describe the process sequentially.44  The first step
is the enactment of the regulatory statute. Statutory decisions reflect the
rational choices of legislators and the President. Each lawmaker shares an
interest in constructing a favorable (from her own separate perspective)
regulatory climate; decisions about which regulatory policy to support will
reflect these interests. Decisions by lawmakers concerning the contours of
the regulatory statute will be affected by two broad categories of concerns,
the first of which includes the institutional constraints on the decisions of
lawmakers. The second includes the role of uncertainty in making
regulatory decisions.
The basic elements of these concerns have already been spelled out in
different contexts above. To recap, institutional constraints include the
variety of structures and procedures that limit the ability of individual
lawmakers and collections of lawmakers from implementing their
preferences through the regulatory statute. Of course, many of these
institutions are, by hypothesis, the product of rational choice. Yet, these
rational choices are made to channel statutory decisions and, in some cases,
to circumscribe the actions of strategic legislators in the future. We
considered in section III(B)(2), for instance, how the standing committee
can function to tie the hands of opportunistic legislators who would, in the
absence of the gatekeeping function of the committee, renege on responsi-
bilities to other legislators in bargaining situations.442 Institutional
constraints include the force of legal rules." 3  A rule of statutory
construction that eschews reliance on legislative history and, instead,
interprets the statute in accordance with its literal words will limit the
opportunities for legislators who are part of a majority coalition to put their
spin on the legislative bargain of which they are a part.4" Furthermore,
a rule that limits the scope of Congress's power to restrict the authority of
courts to review administrative agency decisions represents another
institutional constraint on legislators' ability to structure the legislative
bargain on their own terms and conditions." 5 Institutional constraints are
441. This is especially true, of course, with respect to the use of game theory in developing
regulatory decisionmaking models. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 377; Marks, supra note
395.
442. See supra text accompanying notes 282-86.
443. For an interesting philosophical treatment of the role and function of legal rules, see
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991).
444. See Shepsle, supra note 61.
445. Both of these issues are taken up more systematically in the next two sections.
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ubiquitous; they arise in connection with virtually all important lawmaking
decisions. The shape and scope of each regulatory statute, therefore, will
reflect both the interests and abilities of lawmakers to pursue rational
strategies through statutory design as well as the constraints on such
strategizing that emerge from the collection of institutional rules, structures,
and procedures that regulate the lawmaking process.
Lawmakers are also hemmed in by their uncertainty about the effect of
policy decisions. Rational choice models suppose that decisionmakers have
enough information to make effectively rational decisions." 6 Lawmakers
may be limited, though, in their capacity to make knowledgeable choices,
not because of any failures in cognition, but because of their inability to
anticipate and respond to the unintended consequences of their ex ante
regulatory choices and, separately, their inability to predict the future.
Unintended consequences include broadly those circumstances and features
of regulatory implementation that are hardly susceptible to control through
statutory detail. For example, the effects of a regulatory strategy on aspects
of the economy may be difficult to foresee, even by rational legislators with
a great amount of available information." The predicament faced by
political decisionmakers who would regulate synoptically, but settle for
regulating incrementally has been described lucidly in the literature on
regulation." Positive political theory suggests a different framework for
lawmakers' rational choices, but the predicament is still palpable.
Moreover, the inability to forecast the future is an important source of
political uncertainty. This uncertainty continually jeopardizes the hard-won
accomplishments of those who collect themselves to enact a regulatory
statute; this uncertainty therefore casts a shadow on the statutory decisions
made by lawmakers ex ante. In light of this uncertainty, "the task of
designing political organization is not simply a technical problem of finding
an efficient governance structure linking current power-holders to their
creations. The more fundamental task for political actors is to find and
institute a governance structure that can protect their public organizations
from control by opponents.""
Once the regulatory program is set in place by statute, the regulatory
446. But see KREHBIEL, supra note 272.
447. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 19-20 (1990) (describing
difference between single-stage and multi-stage policies).
448. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 12; Colin Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative
Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 393 (1981).
449. Moe, supra note 137, at 125.
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process---or, in the jargon of positive political theory, the regulatory
"game"-will reflect the rational, strategic decisions of legislators and the
President to influence regulatory decisionmaking through the various
techniques at their respective disposals. In addition to the fact that such
decisions are made after the statute is enacted, there are two potentially
major differences that may exist between the structure of regulatory
competition ex post and ex ante. The interests of the program's creators
may diverge from the interests of politicians who are in a position to
influence regulatory policy in the future."' As discussed earlier, two
important consequences flow from the fact that the creators of the
regulatory program in the legislative and executive branches are not
necessarily the same as the supervisors of that program as it is carried out
over time. Changes in preferences and in personnel may significantly
affect the direction of the regulatory process. Perhaps it would be ideal if
these changes could be manifested in a systematic reconsideration of the
regulatory program in the legislature. Not only is this not guaranteed to
happen, but positive political theories of legislative and presidential
decisionmaking suggest that it is unlikely to happen, given the institutional
constraints on legislative change. These constraints are themselves largely
the product of legislators' rational choices ex ante to make it quite difficult
to unravel a statutory bargain.451 As a consequence, there is a constant
risk that the structure of the regulatory bargain will be jeopardized by
strategic decisions made by subsequent legislators and Presidents to
influence administrative agencies and courts in order to bring these
institutions into alignment with the current structure of political preferenc-
es.
The other major difference with respect to ex post, as opposed to ex
ante, regulatory competition involves the impact of the conduct of the two
institutions on the regulatory landscape: the agencies and the courts.4 5
Each institution poses distinct problems for lawmakers. With agencies, the
principal problems are two-fold. First, there are persistent principal-agent
problems associated with the efforts by the legislative coalition to cabin
agency opportunism.4 3 This opportunism may take the form of agencies
acting to pursue their own self-interest;4 4 or it may involve agency
450. See Shepsle, Bureaucratic Dift, supra note 294; Moe, supra note 137.
451. See discussion supra part IV.B.2.
452. See discussion supra parts IV.B.3, IV.D.
453. See McCubbins et al., supra note 324; STEVENs, supra note 156, at 281-83.
454. See, e.g., NiSKANEN, supra note 77.
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obedience to the will of other legislators or the President; 455 or the
problems may stem from the inability of the legislative coalition to fashion
a regulatory statute that instructs the agency with any precision concerning
their aspirations and aims.456 Most regulatory programs will involve all
three of these problems in varying amounts. The legislators can take steps
to control the causes and effects of these principal-agent problems. What
is intriguing, though, is how these steps play out in the dynamics of the
regulatory process. As we saw earlier, legislative and presidential efforts
to reign in agencies yield their own set of problems. Tradeoffs and second-
best choices are an omnipresent feature of politicians' decisions with
respect to administrative agencies which are constructed and managed
through regulatory statutes and through the ex post decisions of lawmakers.
No less vexing problems are raised by politicians' efforts to control
judges. To the extent that judicial decisionmaking represents a significant
element of the regulatory process, it is worth the energies and efforts of
politicians to consider how best to deal with the judiciary's role in
regulatory policymaking.45 7 Lawmakers have substantial tools at their
disposal to manage the courts."5 ' On the other hand, courts have their
own sources of power and have proved rather resourceful in maintaining
some independence from politicians' encroachments. Fundamentally,
politicians appreciate the extent to which nearly every significant regulatory
decision will eventually reach the courts, in some form or another.
Accordingly, politicians will fold into their regulatory decisions, rational
choices concerning how best to manage judicial conduct or, failing that,
how best to cope with the persistent role of the judiciary in regulatory
policymaking. Dealing with courts, institutions that are at the same time
self-reliant and dependent, free to choose but constrained in their actions,
represents a continuous dilemma for legislators and Presidents.
The portrait of regulatory competition among rational politicians has
many different elements. The previous description of positive theories of
political institutions suggests that the principal elements are the institutions
that participate in the regulatory process. From another view, these
elements represent the different sequences in the regulatory "game,"
beginning with the enactment of the regulatory program and continuing
through the implementation process. In this view, all institutions are part
455. See discussion supra part IV.C.
456. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
457. See discussion supra part IV.D.
458. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 427.
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of the policymaking milieu; understanding the dynamics of the regulatory
process, then, means understanding how these institutions interact with one
another at each stage in the process. Each represents different takes on the
same essential portrait, a portrait of regulation and the regulatory process
as political, partisan, manipulable, and disheveled.
The task of this Part was to examine in detail the underpinnings and
insights of positive political theory. The regulatory process is treated, in
this account, as a dynamic process in which institutions compete with one
another for control and influence. To the extent that these institutions are
designed with an eye toward facilitating the opportunities of their members,
institutional structure and decisionmaking rules will reflect both the
individual interest of the institution's members and the collective interest
of the institution in maintaining its power in an environment made up of
other institutions with similar interests and agenda.
In Part V, I turn to some applications of this theory to critical issues in
the contemporary debates over regulatory reform. The regulatory
predicament described in Part II of this Article is multidimensional. 419
The current regulatory process has been criticized from a variety of
perspectives and with a variety of different remedies.4 6  Changing the
structure of legal rules that affect the regulatory process is only part of the
remedy-for some, perhaps only the tip of the iceberg. Yet, in considering
the application of positive political theory to questions concerning the law
governing regulatory administration, we can learn something important
about the prospects of regulatory reform and the extent to which rational
choice theory, as reflected in the efforts of political economists and legal
scholars working on positive political theory, can profitably inform debates
among legal scholars on the causes of, and possible cures for, regulatory
predicaments. The two issues considered in the remainder of this
Article-statutory interpretation and administrative law-reflect aspects of
public law that cross the entire range of regulatory issues.
V. POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY AND PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATORY
REFORM
The impact of rational choice theories of legislation on normative
theories of public law has been significant, but incomplete.46" ' In this
459. See supra part II.A.
460. See discussion supra parts II, II.
461. See generally Elhauge, supra note 148. As his title suggests, Einer Elhauge considers only
part of rational choice theory-the interest group theory of legislation and decision (or collective choice)
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Part, we revisit this question of rational choice/normative theory intersec-
tion, but in a very different light. The tenor of prescriptions grounded in
an appreciation of rational choice theory has been sanguine, and at times
utopian, in believing that courts can perfect the political process by
interpreting statutes and constitutions and reviewing administrative agency
decisions in order to cabin noxious interest group influence.462  The
instinct to construct normative theories that respond to the more pernicious
elements of strategic lawmaking is understandable; at the same time, such
proposals create their own problems and have, as a general matter, an
uncertain impact on the functioning of the political process as a whole.463
However insightful these proposals have been from the standpoint of
redressing the problems of interest group influence, different issues are
raised by the efforts to consider prescriptions from the perspective of
positive political theory. While scholars who have undertaken these
normative efforts appeal to the same broad principle-that the regulatory
process must be saved from the lethal effects of rational, strategic
behavior-the object of the enterprise is necessarily different. Whereas a
crucial part of the prescriptive agenda of scholars in traditional public
choice is to cleanse political processes from poison brought from out-
side-for instance, leave legislators free to pursue "public-regarding"
legislation by making it more difficult to enact "private-regarding"
laws4 -- positive political theory insists that many of the dilemmas are
theory.
462. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 13; Macey, Separated Powers, supra note 334; Gary
Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905 (1990); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and
the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 123 (1989); Eskridge, supra note 144; Macey,
supra note 144; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1985); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHi. L. REv. 703
(1984); Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49
U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (1982).
463. See Elhauge, supra note 148, at 48-87.
464. See Macey, supra note 144. While Jon Macey's Article is deservedly celebrated for its
thorough consideration of one important potential connection with rational choice theories of legislation
and theories of statutory interpretation, it makes an important undefended assumption: that raising the
costs to interest groups of demanding private-regarding legislation by forcing the legislature to express
an explicit private-regarding purpose for its law will decrease the demand for such legislation and thus
reduce the supply of it. We should expect, then, that the ratio of private-regarding to public-regarding
legislation will change. But what Macey never really explains is why the legislature would proceed to
enact a greater quantity of public-regarding legislation. As Frank Easterbrook has recently pointed out,
public choice theory "needs a theory of scarcity." Easterbrook, supra note 412, at 286. The most
conspicuous scarce good for a legislator is time. Id. at 285. Legislators bear opportunity costs when
they legislate; they could just as well do something else. Why, when faced with a reduced demand by
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found outside the system. The key problems are institutional problems and
the legal solutions need be institutional solutions.
In providing a more institutionally rich focus on the political dynamics
of regulation and regulatory policymaking, positive political theory provides
a different sort of perspective on questions of regulatory reform. If, for the
moment, we strip away the jargon of political economy that undergirds
positive political theory, we see that the question at issue is perennial in
public law scholarship-how should courts confront the intersecting
elements of political control and influence when considering how to
interpret statutes and review administrative agency decisions?46 Though
infused with formal models and theories of political decisionmaking, the
basic question remains the same: How can and should courts address the
politics of regulation?
A. Statutory Interpretation
Long considered a rather mundane aspect of public law, recent years
have brought renewed attention by legal scholars to positive and normative
questions concerning the role of statutory interpretation in government.466
The first major wave of scholarship concentrated on developing normative
theories of statutory interpretation and critiquing current judicial approaches
to interpreting statutes. 467  The second wave emphasized important
positive elements of statutory interpretation and, in particular, the way in
which statutory interpretation intersected with the decisions of non-judicial
interest groups for his services, would a legislator transfer his energies into supplying public-regarding
legislation which provides him with, by hypothesis, less economic rents?
465. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory
of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of
Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 427 (1989).
466. See generally Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat, 77 MINN. L. REv, 241
(1992); Richard A. Posner, Legislation and its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431 (1989).
467. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, PROBLEMS IN JURISPRUDENCE 262-309 (1990); SUNSTEIN,
supra note 6; Daniel R. Farber, Legislative Deals and Statutory Bequests, 75 MINN. L. REV. 667 (1991);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 321 (1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward
a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic
Interpretation]; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 97 MICH. L. REv. 20
(1988); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified
IntentionalistApproach, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1988).
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institutions.46 This scholarship helped to explain how different ap-
proaches to statutory interpretation and the results of different interpreta-
tions affected policymaking and the structure of government.469 The
effect of these mutually-reinforcing approaches to studying interpretation
was to focus sharp attention on a long-neglected aspect of public law.
Positive political theory has contributed to this revival of attention; legal
scholars interested in studying statutory interpretation continue to profit
from these contributions.
Until very recently, the legal literature on statutory interpretation had not
really confronted the distinct issues raised by regulatory statutes and their
interpretation. In a Harvard Law Review Article and a book, Cass Sunstein
offered the first major, systematic treatment of statutory interpretation in the
modem regulatory state.47 Among the ways in which Sunstein's grand
analysis of statutory interpretation and regulation moved public law
scholarship forward was his deemphasis of the tedious focus on Interpreta-
tion Theory as a methodological source of guidance.47' Sunstein inter-
posed himself into the debates among theorists such as Ronald Dworkin
and Stanley Fish, both of whom rested their ambitious and brilliant
exegeses into the nature of legal interpretation on Interpretation Theory,
hermeneutics, and jurisprudence.472 The message was not atheoretical;
instead, the principles-and, for Sunstein, there were most assuredly
principles that properly drove interpretation-were drawn from the history,
purposes, and structure of the regulatory state.47 This "re-vision" brings
statutory interpretation theory to where it should be: the place where we
consider interpretive principles and approaches to interpretation from the
468. See, e.g., R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES (1994); Ferejohn & Weingast, Strategic
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 407; Eskridge, supra note 144; Ferejohn & Shipan, Congressional
Influence, supra note 377.
469. Useful empirical analyses of statutory interpretation include Robert F. Rasmussen, A Study of
the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535
(1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331 (1991); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An
Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. Rrv. 1073 (1992); Eskridge, supra note 144.
470. Sunstein, supra note 467; SUNSTEIN, supra note 6.
471. See Sunstein, supra note 467, at 411 (describing tendencies in modem interpretation theory,
in which "debates about statutory interpretation ... often dissolve into fruitless and unilluminating
disputes about the constraints supplied by language 'itself' (as if such a thing could be imagined)").
472. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 337-38 (1986); STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT
CONiES NATURALLY (1989).
473. For a criticism of Sunstein's interpretive principles, see Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHt. L. REv. 1203
(1990).
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perspective of sound regulatory policy and where our ambition is to
promote, in Sunstein's words, "constitutional purposes and to improve the
operation of deliberative government in the post-New Deal period." '474
1. The Stakes of Statutory Interpretation
Statutory interpretation is a principal means by which the structure of a
regulatory program and the obligations of each participant in the regulatory
process are shaped. 475  As we saw earlier, the construction of the statute
involves the strategic actions of lawmakers, who are driven by their rational
interest in pursuing their regulatory aims but are, at the same time, cabined
by various institutional constraints and by uncertainty. 476  Interpretation
creates meaning; as such, it affects the agendas, and hence the power, of
the political actors in the regulatory process. It may, for instance,
implement the original statutory bargain according to its express terms, in
which case the concerns of the majority coalition that their bargain would
become unraveled are mollified.477 In addition, it may update the statute
to bring it into alignment with contemporary mores or with the political
preferences of current lawmakers. 47' However courts and agencies
approach the task of interpretation, the stakes of interpretation are quite
high.
4 79
Public law scholars insist that modem regulatory statutes reflect broad
delegations of power to administrative agencies and are far from the sort
of clear directives that traditional legal theory supposed was part of the
474. See Sunstein, supra note 467, at 463.
475. See, e.g., MELNICK, supra note 468.
476. See supra part IV.B.2.
477. See MeNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 440.
478. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 467; Eskridge, Dynamic Interpretation, supra note 467.
479. Consider, as an example of how statutory interpretation affects the structure of regulatory
policymaking, the case of OSHA and the regulation of toxic substances. OSHA's regulatory machine
was set in motion with a new purpose following the Supreme Court's decisions in Industrial Union
Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607 (1980) and American Textile
Manufacturer Inst. v. Donovan, (The Cotton Dust Case), 452 U.S. 490 (1981). In both cases, business
groups had challenged OSHA's decision to impose stringent regulations on two toxic substances. In
the Benzene case, OSHA interpreted its statutory charge under the Act to require it to set an exposure
limit that achieved the maximum level and to require the agency to find a risk "significant" before it
turned its regulatory attention to it. 448 U.S. at 615. Such a construction, argued Justice Stevens, was
necessary to avoid the sort of sweeping delegation of lawmaking power to the agency that was regarded
several decades earlier as unconstitutionally broad. Id. at 617. In the Cotton Dust case decision,
however, the Court declined to construe the Act to require OSHA to determine whether the proposed
regulation's costs exceeded its benefits as a precondition for the issuance of the rule. 452 U.S. at 500.
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essential quality of statutes under the rule of law.48° Modem regulatory
statutes tend to be, in Edward Rubin's phrase, rather intransitive; they
represent broad directions to administrative agencies to make law.481 The
statutory deals, then, are frequently little more than agreements to refrain
from making policy and instead to assign to agencies the responsibility to
construct policies seriatim.482 Positive political theories of delegation and
control, described in section III(B)(3) above, suggest that rational reasons
exist for this strategy.483 The buck is not really passed; lawmakers assign
roles and responsibilities to agencies, but, at the same time, take care to
assure that their wishes will be carried out as discrete policy issues arise
over time.484 Moreover, lawmakers pursue their regulatory ambitions ex
post, through various tactics of supervision, influence, and control. The
statute represents the template with which agencies understand and fulfill
their responsibilities; however, the real regulatory action is in connection
with the exercise by legislators and the President of strategic power linked
to policymaking after the statute is in place.485
Neither of these phenomena-the increasing reliance on intransitive
480. See Rubin, supra note 5. See also Thomas Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1985). For a classic statement of the traditional (what Rubin calls "pre-
modem") view, see F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973).
481. Rubin, supra note 5, at 380-82. Cf. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative
Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983).
482. For some qualifications to this assertion, as well as some explanations of its causes, see, e.g.,
Strauss, supra note 465.
483. See supra part IV.B.3.
484. See text accompanying supra notes 323-27.
485. In addition, many regulatory statutes are quite detailed in describing the boundaries of agency
decisionmaking. The recently amended Clean Air Act, for example, spans dozens of pages in "Statutes
at Large." When compared with their modem cousins, the new social regulation statutes of the 1960s,
such as the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1970 look
ecumenical. Indeed, if there is any trend to statutory structure in the contemporary administrative state
it is toward more, rather than less, detail and complexity. See Strauss, supra note 465, at 434.
This prolixity is a reflection of a number of factors, not the least of which is the legislators' sense
that statutory precision is often the most efficacious method of tethering agency action to legislative
preferences, especially in light of the threat of presidential encroachment on the regulatory interests of
the legislature. Naturally, there is a tradeoff between certainty on the one hand, and flexibility on the
other. As I described in an earlier section, there are rational reasons for legislators to leave statutes
vague and to delegate to other institutions, including courts, the prerogatives to take a first crack at
policymaking. What the tension between proximity and vagueness reveals is that legislators face
difficult tradeoffs; different coalitions of legislators resolve these tradeoffs in different ways. What the
trend toward more specificity perhaps suggests is that legislators increasingly appreciate the extent to
which expost control is expensive and unreliable and ex ante control is frequently preferable as a means
of ensuring that their "agents" will continue to do their bidding over time. See Spulber & Besanko,
supra note 317.
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lawmaking and on ex post regulatory influence-should diminish the
significance of statutory interpretation in the modem regulatory state.
Statutory interpretation is not merely, or even especially, about constructing
the details of regulatory policy but, rather, about establishing the scope and
limits of institutional power. The notion that lawmakers frequently resort
to broad delegations of regulatory policy to agencies reflects, in the positive
political theory framework, a tactic, a series of rational choices. However,
statutory interpretation still functions to establish both the limits on these
choices generally and the precise limits of the scope of the delegation,
however broad in style and form, to the implementation mechanism.
Consider a classically intransitive statute: the Federal Communications Act
of 1934.486 The assignment of authority to the Federal Communications
Commission to, among other things, regulate "in the public interest" is
broad.487 It is not contentless, however, even in statutory design. The
interpretive choices involve various approaches to imputing meaning to the
phrase public interest or, conversely, of refraining to impute such a
meaning. To refrain, though, is to make a choice. It chooses to assign
responsibility to the implementation mechanism-the agency-to construct
a body of law under the rubric of the Communications Act. Whether the
agency must do so by resort to the legislative history and purposes of the
statute, or whether the courts understand the agency's responsibility as
creating a body of federal common law,"'8 involves an interpretive
choice.48 9 Interpretation gives meaning and makes policy, even if that
486. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988).
487. See generally GLEN 0. ROBINSON ET AL., THE ADMNISTRATIVE PROCESS 324-45 (4th ed.
1993).
488. See Merrill, supra note 480.
489. A good example ofhow the tension between understanding statutory ambiguity as a delegation
to the agency to make laws and understanding it as, rather, an instruction to interpret the statute and
its history in light of this ambiguity is the Supreme Court's struggle to construct a rule concerning the
proper deference to give to an agency's statutory interpretations. In one early case, Skidmore v. Swift,
323 U.S. 134 (1944), the Supreme Court understood its role, where there was no instruction regarding
either how the agency was to exercise its interpretive role or how much deference the courts should pay
to the agency's interpretations, as creating its own approach. In its critical paragraph, Justice Jackson
wrote that "the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." 323 U.S. at 139. In Addison
v. Holly Hill Fruit Prod., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944), decided the same term as Skidmore, the Court
regarded the statute-the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938-as delegating the ultimate policy choice
to the agency. Justice Frankfurter wrote: "In view ... of the variety of agricultural conditions and
industries throughout the country, the bounds of these areas could not be defined by Congress itself.
Neither was it deemed wise to leave such economic determination to the contingencies and inevitable
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meaning and policy represent little more than a declaration that all relevant
policy choices are made by the agency assigned to implement the statute.
The stakes of statutory interpretation, then, do not turn on the degree to
which a statute is more or less specific.
Nearly every regulatory story in the modem administrative state involves,
as a vital part, a chapter on how the regulatory statute was construed and
how such constructions affected the shape and scope of the program. It is
clear that statutory interpretation will affect the structure of the regulatory
program. What is more interesting is how interpretations affect regulatory
decisions and the regulatory process. Statutory interpretation is a dynamic
process. It begins with the architecture of the statute, that is, the product
of choices made by coalitions of legislators in the course of creating the
statutory bargain. The framework of interpretation is set by statute and also
by the courts' approach to the interpretive enterprise. Legislators and the
courts may work in tandem to establish the conditions and rules governing
statutory interpretation; yet, the positive political theory of legislation
suggests that they will frequently work at cross-purposes. Hence, while
statutory interpretation will always form an important part of the regulatory
process, the way in which interpretations and interpretive rules function
within this process is, if not always up for grabs, at least contingent on a
number of interlocking factors which factors are as much part of politics
as any other aspect of regulatory policymaking.
diversities of litigation. And so Congress left the boundary-making to the experienced and informed
judgment of the Administrator. Thereby Congress gave the Administrator appropriate discretion to
assess all the factors relevant to the subject matter, that is, the fixing of the minimum wages and
minimum hours." 322 U.S. at 610.
A distinct approach was sketched out by the Court in Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977), a
case concerning a regulation determining what constituted "unemployment" for purposes of benefits
eligibility under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed Fathers Statute. In this case,
the fact that the Secretary's interpretation was embodied in a regulation, a regulation promulgated
pursuant to the agency's delegated powers, was dispositive. In contrast to earlier cases in which the
Court had given administrative interpretations "important but not controlling significance," see, e.g.,
Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946), this regulatory program posed a situation
in which Congress has "expressly delegated to the Secretary the power to proscribe standards for
determining what constitutes 'unemployment' for purposes of AFDC-UF eligibility. In a situation of
this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility of
interpreting the statutory term." 432 U.S. at 432. By the time of Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court had apparently backed away from the
rulemaking/adjudication distinction as the talisman for its deference doctrine. See generally Robert A.
Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1
(1990). See also infra part V.A.4.
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2. Statutory Interpretation and Political Strategy
In light of the significant role of statutory interpretation in the regulatory
process, it is not surprising that legislators and the President invest
substantial energies in creating (and often fine-tuning) regulatory statutes.
Nor is it surprising that legislators and the President invest energies in
trying to influence the process by which the statute is interpreted by
agencies and courts.9 Statutory interpretation is an aspect of regulatory
policymaking that is well worth fighting over.
Legislators fight over what is at stake in the interpretations of statutes
primarily through the creation of legislative history. Statutory interpretation
takes, to a greater or lesser degree, account of information compiled during
the course of legislative deliberations over a statute.49' Courts regard this
information as evidence of what Congress meant by ambiguous statutory
language;" courts are guided by this information-this legislative
history-as they make their statutory interpretations.493  Knowing this,
rational legislators will manufacture legislative information with an eye
toward shaping judicial interpretations. Each judge and commentator has
his favorite example of a legislative statement, report, or colloquy in which
one or more legislators set out to stack the deck in favor of a certain
statutory outcome by communicating a message to future interpreters.494
Strategic action by legislators is inevitable in a regulatory process in which
other politicians seek to control policy outcomes and, accordingly, seek to
influence statutory interpretations. Manipulation of legislative histories,
essentially a form of strategic communication, is part of both the offensive
and defensive arsenal of rational legislators.495
In a sense, we can understand the creation of legislative history as an
490. See generally supra note 427 and accompanying text.
491. For a useful examination, relying on various examples, of how courts take into account
legislative histories in construing statutes, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 696-828 (1988).
492. See any one of the hundreds of cases in which courts rely on legislative history.
493. Of course, this discussion elides questions concerning the questions taken up in part IV.D,
namely, what is the positive political theory of courts and judicial behavior that underlies our beliefs
that courts will rely on legislative history? All that is suggested in this part is that we observe that
courts usually do use legislative history in interpreting statutes. It remains as an ambition for positive
political theory to explain why they do.
494. For a number of interesting examples, as well as an illuminating discussion of legislative intent
in a public choice framework, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1988).
495. On strategic communication, see the discussion in supra part IV.B.3.
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institution. Legislators design statutory histories in order to carry out
policy aims. Insofar as each legislator fears the strategic actions of the
others in the shaping of legislative history, they will all structure their
efforts to facilitate their ability to influence future interpretations. Like
tangible institutions such as the committee or party, legislators can take
advantage of the institution of legislative history by paying careful attention
to its process and potential.496
The President also strategizes.497  The President is seldom agnostic
concerning the regulatory program which has been signed into law.
Interpretation also affects the President's regulatory agendas. Accordingly,
the President will take advantage of strategies and tactics to influence the
process of statutory interpretation. One tactic is the use of presidential
statements to shape the meaning of the statute and, more specifically, to
influence the interpretation of that statute in cases brought before the
courts.4 98 Another tactic is the strategic use of the presidential power to
appoint federal judges. 499 During the Reagan and Bush years, both
Presidents put judges on the bench who eschewed, to a greater degree than
their predecessors, reliance on legislative history in interpreting stat-
utes."' Others have described the connection between this textualist
approach to interpreting statutes and the expansion of presidential power
and influence."' 1 While there may have been other reasons for these
judicial appointments, positive political theory suggests that the President
makes strategic judgments concerning the prospect that the judges
appointed will facilitate the President's regulatory agendas. To the extent
that these judges check the efforts of legislators to influence interpretation
and, perhaps also aid the President's efforts, they are fulfilling the
President's purposes and strategies.
Regarding the interaction between statutory interpretation and political
strategy, consider an example from the recent annals of regulatory politics
and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). One of the priorities
of the FCC under the Reagan administration was to relax the restrictions
imposed on broadcasters through the fairness doctrine. The constitutional-
ity of the fairness doctrine was considered by the Supreme Court in Red
496. See generally supra text accompanying notes 254-70.
497. See Rodriguez, supra note 427, at 224-26.
498. Id. at 226-28.
499. See Eskridge, supra note 144, at 290-93.
500. Id.
501. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Reagan Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399.
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Lion Broadcasting v. FCC502 and was resolved in favor of the govern-
ment."03  The fairness doctrine was never expressly required by stat-
ute;"ca the FCC had proceeded for years under a rule requiring that
broadcasters afford "reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues of public importance."'
In the early years of the Reagan administration, the FCC issued a lengthy
study in which the bottom line was that the fairness doctrine had outlived
its usefulness."' Poised ready to rescind the fairness doctrine, influential
legislators came into the picture. In particular, Senator Ernest Hollings and
Representative Timothy Wirth, as members of a powerful committee with
FCC oversight responsibility called the Commissioners on the carpet. He
insisted that the 1934 statute did not permit, but required the fairness
doctrine.507  To reverse the administrative policy, then, would violate the
statute.50' Among the ways in which Senator Hollings made his inten-
tions clear was his grilling of FCC nominees. A typical colloquy in a
confirmation hearing would involve Senator Hollings attempting to glean
reassurance from the putative commissioner that the commissioner would
not participate in the unraveling of the fairness doctrine." 9
502. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
503. The rationale was the same as that adduced by the commission, namely, the importance, "In
view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government's role in allocating those frequencies, and
the legitimate claims of those unable without government assistance to gain access to those frequencies
for expression of their views ...." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400.
504. Another related requirement, the equal-time rule, was an express provision of the
Communications Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1988).
505. 395 U.S. at 371.
506. See In the Matter of Inquiry into section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licenses, 102 F.C.C.2d 143 (1985).
See generally Thomas Krattenmaker & Lucas Powe, The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional
Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151.
507. See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1984) (statement of Rep. Timothy Wirth); Reauthorization and
Oversight of the FCC: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (statement of Sen. Ernest
Hollings). See generally Matthew Spitzer, The Constitutionality ofLicensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 990, 1000-01 (1989).
508. See sources cited supra note 507.
509. In an important oversight hearing, Senator Hollings declared:
I have often said that there is no education in the second kick of a mule. During the last
Congress, the Chairman of the FCC proved that old adage correct. He, however, appears to
be showing that three kicks might do the trick....
I am particularly concerned about the various proceedings concerning the fairness doctrine,
including the proposals to repeal or alter the personal attack and political editorializing rules.
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Although I am just speculating here, it seems rather clear that Senator
Hollings and his supporters lacked the votes in Congress to establish the
fairness doctrine statute;"'0 certainly, they could not have overcome a
certain presidential veto."' However, they were not disempowered.
Instead, legislative advocates of the fairness doctrine strategized by trying
to influence the manner in which the agency would interpret the statute,
given the ambiguity in the FCA concerning the fairness doctrine. The
legislative gambit ultimately failed; not because of any special intervention
by the President nor because Senator Hollings and his supporters' interests
had flagged. Rather, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled that the fairness doctrine was not, in fact, required
by the statute." As we will consider in more detail below, this judicial
ruling gave the FCC the shield it needed to free it from the strategizing of
the legislature.
The point of the story is to suggest a number of lessons about statutory
interpretation and political strategy. First, neither the legislature nor the
President is limited in its ability to try to influence the process of statutory
interpretation ex post. There are no institutional constraints on their
influence devices within either institution. Second, the agency cares what
current legislators have to say. One listened in vain for an FCC nominee
announcing "Well, Senator Hollings, I am afraid that you have interpreted
the 1934 statute quite incorrectly. You can rest assured that I will interpret
the statute the correct way once I am confirmed." Nor was the agency in
a secure position to challenge the administration's interpretations, if one
was preferred. Third, political strategizing will perhaps eventually run up
against an institutional constraint in the form of a judicial decision. In the
FCC example, a court sided with the administration; another example might
well reveal that current legislators' preferences are accorded
weight-perhaps at the expense of both the administration's views and the
views of the original coalition that enacted the statute. Finally, this judicial
determination will change the circumstances in a way that can, depending
Since the beginning of Chairman Fowler's tenure, I have put him on notice not to weaken in
any way the various political broadcasting laws or rules. So that there is no misunder-
standing, the Chairman should consider such notice to be again issued.
Reauthorization and Oversight Hearings, supra note 507, at 2-3.
510. lam grateful to Matthew Spitzer for conversations about the Hollings/fairness doctrine episode.
511. I am assuming that President Bush would have vetoed a fairness doctrine amendment to the
Federal Communications Act.
512. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See Spitzer, supra note 507,
at 1007-13.
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upon the court's approach and its result, facilitate, hinder, or have no effect
upon, the structure of legislative-presidential strategy.
3. The Functions of Interpretive Rules
Rational politicians, as the FCC story illustrates, will construct strategies
to enact their preferences into regulatory policy. The extent to which
courts can limit these strategic actions through their interpretations of
statutes is unclear. Statutory interpretation is just one part of the regulatory
process; as such, it is subject to political actions and reactions as well as
any other form of regulatory participation. Judicial attempts to cabin
political influence may ultimately become unstable; lawmakers may act ex
ante and ex post to limit the damage that courts can do to their agendas
through interpretations. Still, statutory interpretation that is sensitive to the
institutional structure of lawmaking, including the incentives and opportuni-
ties of lawmakers to act strategically, can ameliorate some of the more
troubling aspects of political control.
Such sensitivity can be manifested by attention to interpretive rules.
These rules include the so-called "canons" of statutory construction.513
They also include, somewhat less glamorously, the methodologies that are
brought to bear in reading and interpreting statutes, such as how the
interpreter incorporates, if at all, the legislative history of the statute into
his interpretations.
a. Legislative Intent, Statutory Purposes, and the Interpretive
Dilemma
What is meant by the statutory bargain? The structure of any regulatory
statute will reflect the political choices made by lawmakers acting within
coalitions and in the shadow of institutional constraints and uncertainty.
That the result will often be statutes with multiple purposes, which seem
to push regulatory policy in different directions, is a consequence of the
complicated and fractured nature of the system. A statute is not like a
novel or a play.5 4 It does not have to have a theme; it needs no
beginning, middle, and end. It is a web of interlocking deals among
legislative coalitions. By definition, the statutory deal has hung together
513. For several different perspectives on these canons, see contributions in Symposium, A
Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533 (1992). See also
SUNSTEN, supra note 6.
514. See Sunstein, supra note 467. For a rather different perspective; see Heidi M. Hurd,
Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE LJ. 945 (1990).
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adequately to command the support of a majority of legislators at the end
of the process. However, the legacy of that dealmaking, ratified by a
legislative majority, is frequently a negotiated settlement more akin to an
incomplete contract1 5 than to a coherent and comprehensive regulatory
enterprise.
Prolix statutes such as the Clean Air and Water Acts aptly illustrate this
quality of compromise and dealmaking. But this incomplete contract
quality is found even in those statutes that are held up as models of
legislative craft and of public-regarding policymaking in action. Take, for
instance, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.516 The 1964 Civil Rights Act
represents a compromise struck among various legislators and legislative
coalitions. 7 In an environment in which legislators, like the constituents
they represented, were deeply divided over civil rights, the passage of a
significant piece of civil rights legislation represented a remarkable
achievement. It was not an achievement that emerged full-blown, as an
unfolding of a grand and inevitable social vision, as, in the words of Victor
Hugo that were quoted in connection with the Act, "an idea whose time has
come."51  Rather, the achievement reflected the strategic efforts of
legislators who were willing and able to cut deals and make compromises
across a range of issues encompassed in legislative proposals.51 9 Espe-
cially critical was the role of moderate legislators who, coming to the
legislative debate without strong commitments for or against civil rights,
were in a position to steer the course of debate and shape the contours of
515. See infra notes 523-24 and accompanying text.
516. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
517. This discussion of civil rights legislation draws heavily on Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R.
Weingast, Interpreting the Second Reconstruction: Perspectives on Law and Politics in the Civil Rights
Era (1993) (on file with author).
518. Commentators have tended to view civil rights legislation as special, as a regulatory policy
distinct from other policies enacted by Congress. The "exceptionalist" approach to civil rights
legislation has both a positive and a normative component. The positive point is that the legislature
considered its role in debating and passing civil rights legislation in a fashion different than in other
contexts. So, they understood they were enacting a special, distinct statute, that would deserve a special
construction and implementation. Normatively, the exceptionalist approach to civil rights policy stresses
the extent to which courts and agencies should treat civil rights differently, perhaps a sort of quasi-
constitutional legislation. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Introduction: Civil Rights Politics as Interest-Group
Politics, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1991).
519. The unsung hero in our account is Senator Everett Dirksen. See Rodriguez & Weingast, supra
note 517. See also ROBERT D. LOEvy, To END ALL SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE
OF THE CIvIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 225-54 (1990); NEIL MACNEIL, EVERETT DiRKsEN: PORTRAIT OF
A PUBLIC IVIAN (1970).
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the final bill.52° Absent a legislative majority for either a pure version of
a civil rights bill or a complete rejection of such a bill, the moderates
proved pivotal in structuring the final version of the civil rights bill.5 21
The final structure of the statutory bargain reflects the political choices
made in the course of fashioning a coalition in support of a bill. Recently,
scholars have noticed the connection between this vision of legislation and
the formation of contracts. 22 Further, the analogy is drawn between
regulatory statutes, which are frequently open-ended and rife with gaps, and
incomplete contracts.5z  The analogy is appealing; yet, there are
differences in the nature and elements of legislation enacted by public
authorities and incomplete contracts negotiated by private parties who rely
on public authorities to implement their will.524  What is needed instead
is an approach to interpreting statutory bargains that is attentive to the
issues that arise in connection with any incomplete bargain, but is also
sensitive to the particular political qualities of statutory and regulatory
policymaking.
b. Enforcing the Statutory Bargain
The principle that courts should interpret statutes in order to facilitate the
will of the framers of the statute has a pedigree as old as the federal
Constitution.as This is no accident; the premise of legal positivism that
520. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 517. For accounts of the origins of civil rights legislation
see, e.g., LoEvY, supra note 519; HUGH B. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972 (1988); CHARLES WHELAN & BARBARA wHELAN, THIE
LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).
521. For a description of the "moderates" in the context of civil rights legislation, see Rodriguez
& Weingast, supra note 517. Basically, the definition relies on a prediction, calculated through a
standard regression analysis, of who would be likely to fall in the middle of the views of the ardent
supporters of a strong civil rights bill and the ardent opponents of such a bill. For a discussion of this
method, see id.
522. See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 440; Farber, supra note 467.
523. See McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 440, at 708-10; Shepsle, supra note 61; Strauss,
supra note 465; Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 517. Cf. Kreps, supra note 168.
524. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 168. To take just one difference: The incomplete contracting
literature stresses the need for courts to fill gaps by interpreting the contract to maximize the joint
profits of the parties. See, e.g., Charles J. Geotz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,
67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981). It is not at all clear, however, that we would instruct a court interpreting
an incomplete statute similarly.
525. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (R. Fairfield ed., 1981) ("It can be
of no weight to say that the courts may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of
the legislature."); THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 256 (Alexander Hamilton) (R. Fairfield 2d ed., 1981)
("The rules of legal interpretation are rules of common-sense, adopted by the courts in the construction
of the laws. The true test, therefore, of a just application of them is its conformity to the source from
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underlies this principle is rooted in the framers' understanding of the rule
of the law, the nature of interpretation, and the proper limits on judicial
discretion. 26 Modem statutory interpretation scholars seem to often sneer
at this principle, claiming that it cannot ground proper interpretation, it is
unworkable in practice, and it ossifies public policy by securing the status
quo even when circumstances and public values have changed consider-
ably.527 Nonetheless, there is more agreement on this principle than
immediately meets the eye. Interpretation scholars seldom disagree that a
contemporary statute that speaks plainly and directly to the facts raised
should be interpreted to give force to a bargain struck by the framers. 2
The difficult issues, naturally, occur at the margin, where questions arise
concerning the inscrutability of the framers' will and the question whether
this will should be interpreted in light of other important public values or
social aims. The bargain principle, though, represents a profound practical
constraint on interpretive ingenuity and attempts to, in William Eskridge's
words, "spin legislative supremacy." '529
It is also a sound constraint. Consider the dilemma posed by political
strategies constructed by current lawmakers to rechart the course of
regulatory policy. The regulatory relationship is tripodal: legislators acting
within the matrix of the legislature and its institutions, the President acting
as master of the executive branch, and the administrative agency. The
agency is surely the most vulnerable institution, subject to influences and
pressures from all sides, unable to wield any substantial independent
authority, and concerned to maintain whatever practical regulatory authority
it has by steering clear of political controversy. Of course, the situation
may not be this bleak. The agency need not be pitied; it may be little more
than, after all, a mouthpiece for the political preferences of its creators. On
the other hand, it may represent an independent source of opportunistic
behavior and self-interested strategizing.530 Effective regulatory policy
may, then, be thwarted as much or more by the strategizing and opportun-
ism of the agency than by the political choices of legislators and the
which they are derived.").
526. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
527. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 467; Michael S. Moore, A NaturalLaw Theory oflnterpretation,
58 S. CAL. L. REv. 279 (1985); Hurd, supra note 514.
528. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767
(1991); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989).
529. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. L.J. 319 (1989).
530. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
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President.
It does not matter from whence the threat comes, however, if we
consider the potential of instrumental statutory interpretation to ameliorate
the effects of political strategy. Approaching interpretation as a project of
recovering the substance of the original regulatory bargain can limit the
scope of strategizing, whether primarily carried out by legislators and the
President, or the agencies, or all three. Recall that the dilemma arises
because politicians threaten to break from the understanding of the bargain
reached by coalitions formed at the time the statute was enacted. With no
political reasons for fealty to the original bargain, politicians are uncon-
strained in their attempts to direct regulatory outcomes. Thus, the
constraints must come, if at all from outside the process. Agencies are
unlikely sources of these constraints; they operate, after all, within the
sturm und drang of politics. Nor is the President likely to save the original
bargain from politics. Judicial interpretations that are sensitive to the
structure of the original bargain can cabin ex post political influence by
decreasing the benefits of such attempts at influence. If we suppose that
the agencies are looking for political cover from legislative or executive
coercions or both, then an interpretation of the statute that gives force and
effect to the structure of the original bargain will strengthen the hand of the
agency facing strategic lawmakers. For instance, the commissioner
nominees would be better situated in hearings before Hollings' subcommit-
tee with an interpretation of the Communications Act of 1934 that
addressed and resolved the fairness doctrine issue.53' One interpretation
would protect commissioners from Senator Hollings and like-minded
legislators; another interpretation would protect commissioners from
President Reagan. In either case, the court could, through its interpreta-
tions, limit the scope of ex post political influence.532
What interests are being served by such fidelity to the original bargain?
Beyond the constitutional interests at stake in enforcing the will of the
statute's framers, commitment to the original bargain increases the costs to
lawmakers of practicing political influence. To be sure, strategic politicians
can take steps: They can attempt to influence the interpretive process ex
ante by, say, scrutinizing nominees to the bench; they can influence the
531. See supra text accompanying notes 502-12.
532. Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Law-Making System, 138
U. PA. L. REv. 1111 (1990); Strauss, supra note 465, at 436-37.
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process ex post by overturning statutory interpretations.533 Each of these
actions is expensive, however, and rather public. They involve rational
judgments concerning the worth of cabining the judiciary's statutory
interpretations. Styled as a principal-agent problem, political principals
must expend precious resources to control recalcitrant agents. The costs
may not be worth it; strategic legislators may back off. Moreover, courts
are, as described above, particularly powerful agents. 34 They can protect
themselves more effectively than administrative agencies.535 An interpre-
tive approach that ties the hands of current lawmakers enables the court to
run interference for administrative agencies; they can take the heat from
politicians who find their control efforts crippled by interpretations that
track the original bargain.
The other interests that are facilitated by this interpretive approach are
the interests of the legislators who were part of the original coalition. The
case for according weight to the wishes of these legislators rests on an
instrumental, process-based view of the lawmaking process. Legislators
have many alternative uses of their time and energies. Lawmaking through
bargaining and coalition-formation are not the only functions of the
legislature. Legislators face a range of distinct pressures and influences.
Although quite busy, they enjoy great discretion over how they spend their
time: They can devote their energies to "casework," '536 essentially
untangling bureaucratic red tape on behalf of their constituents; they can
trade with one another on pure pork barrel legislation in order to generate
a continuous stream of benefits to each other;537 they can form fruitless
coalitions in order to curry favor with some elements of the electorate ("I
did my best in voting for your bill") while not alienating others too much
533. The most comprehensive empirical analysis of statutory overrulings is Eskridge, supra note
469.
534. See supra part IV.D.
535. To the extent I am making an empirical point about the relative independence of courts versus
agencies, there is quite obviously much more that needs to be said beyond the flat assertion in the text.
A couple of thoughts will suffice for the purposes of this argument. First, the Constitution establishes
the institution of the Supreme Court and protects, at least at a minimum level, the Court from legislative
evisceration. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The independence of the "inferior courts" is, naturally, a
considerably more controversial issue. Second, Article III judges are guaranteed lifetime tenure "during
good Behaviof' and protection against diminution of salary. Id. Agencies have no such protection.
Any additional remarks about the greater relative independence of courts from legislative control would
raise larger questions which I here will elide.
536. See FIORINA, supra note 116.
537. See id. See also JOHN A. FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS: RIVERS AND HARBORS
LEGISLATION 1947-1968 (1974).
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("after all, the bill did not pass so you should be relieved"); or, finally, they
can do nearly nothing, occupying their time with matters other than
participating in lawmaking. Given these alternatives, it is no small matter
to construct institutions and legal regimes to facilitate the processes by
which legislators reach agreement, especially when such agreements
produce truly majestic legislative accomplishments, such as the civil rights
legislation of the past quarter century.
To be sure, the appropriate methods are controversial. Theodore Lowi
and others have suggested that lawmaking should involve the construction
of more specific legislation in order to safeguard the rule of law.5 38 From
the perspective of political theory, exhorting legislators to draft more
pointed statutes may serve the important function of constraining the
opportunities for ex ante political control. The argument here, though, need
not rest on an overall vision of how we want statutes to look, on what we
regard as a statutory demonstration by Congress of "comprehensive
rationality" in lawmaking.539 Instead, it rests on the idea that legislation
is accomplished through a process of bargaining and coalition-formation.
Good ideas fall by the wayside without a process for bringing together two
separate majorities in the two houses of Congress and the support of the
President. Politics, as the saying goes, is the art of the possible; compro-
mise, not consensus, is the order of the day in the modem lawmaking
system. One might look at pieces of legislation like the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 and imagine
that they sprung forth, as though from the head of Zeus, and all the
legislature did was to quickly stamp its imprimatur on these "ideas whose
time has come." But that, positive political theory suggests, is unrealistic.
Methods of statutory interpretation that give weight to the expressed
judgments of legislators, who have formed into the coalitions which have
successfully passed legislation, encourage the formation of such compacts.
They create incentives for legislators to work together on construing public
policy. Certainly, the reasons behind the decision of rational, strategic
legislators to enact such policy may be less than appealing. But what we
want is not a collection of "angels," to recall Madison's message in
Federalist No. 51,540 but a collection of lawmakers who are willing, for
538. See Lowi, supra note 5, at 92-126.
539. See Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and
Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1991).
540. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 160 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield 2d ed., 1981) ("If men
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
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whatever reasons, to overcome the practical difficulties associated with
making deals, reaching agreements, and making policy.
Public law scholars Cass Sunstein and Jon Macey chafe at the character-
ization of legislation as mere dealmaking. Jon Macey embraces the strong
form of the interest group theory of legislation as a description of
legislation in the modem regulatory state.54' His solution, though, is to
reinforce the "public-regarding" qualities of the legislative process through,
for example, process-perfecting theories of statutory interpretation. 42 The
ambition is to make it harder for legislators to make such deals; the result
would, he suggests, be a more purified, public-regarding process. Cass
Sunstein is even more critical of the characterization of legislation as a
process of dealmaking and bargaining.543 "[T]he 'deals' approach tends
to break down," says Sunstein, "if conceptions of politics rooted in interest-
group pluralism cannot be defended on normative grounds." 544 Yet, the
positive political theory of legislation suggests that legislation is not
merely, or even especially, the product of interest group influence-in
Sunstein's words, "naked interest-group transfers. 545  Legislation is an
admixture of different aims, ambitions, geneses; just as legislators have
heterogenous preferences and motives, legislation will reflect this
heterogeneity. 46 But statutory outcomes still remain deals in the sense
that legislators hammer out compromises, make trades, act strategically, and
engage in the practice of what the late William Riker aptly labelled "the art
of political manipulation. 547  The normative argument that Sunstein
rightly calls for is that facilitating the processes of legislative dealmaking
enables the legislature to produce legislation, to grapple with difficult
policy issues, and to generate prescriptions.
The tenor of public choice analyses of the legislative process is, as
Macey and Sunstein both recognize, pessimistic. They emphasize the
wealth-transferring and private-regarding aspects of the process. If we
think of dealmaking not like some publicly established system of organized
internal controls on government would be necessary.").
541. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 144.
542. See id. See also Macey, supra note 145 (proposing that Constitution's separation of powers
limits noxious interest-group influence).
543. See Sunstein, supra note 467, at 446-51.
544. Id. at 449. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM.
L. REv. 1689 (1984).
545. See Sunstein, supra note 467, at 449.
546. See ARNOLD, supra note 447, at 8-16, 60-87.
547. RIKER, supra note 195.
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crime, but, instead, like a system of contract formation and (through agency
and judicial interpretations) enforcement, then some of the taint associated
with viewing legislative deals through the lens of interest group theory may
be ameliorated.
With the normative argument (tentatively) in place, we can consider the
function of interpretive rules. The incentives to spend energies on coalition
formation and statute-making will be a function of the extent to which the
products of such activities are respected and enforced. Fidelity to the
original bargain will encourage legislators to take seriously that bargain as
a preferred method of lawmaking. It will also restrain their tendencies to
respond to the risks of future uncertainties by declining to confront and
resolve vexing statutory questions. To the extent that respect is accorded
to the bargain as such, rather than to only a particular type of legislative
form, say, a narrow, precise delegation, then instrumental interpretation
along these lines will not encourage or discourage lawmakers from making
their own rational choices concerning how to structure the statutory
bargain; it will, however, encourage them to make their rational choices
within the frameworks of statutes rather than through other means.
Regulatory policy should be made primarily through legislation, that is,
through attention by legislators and the President to statutory design. This
does not suggest necessarily a preference for transitive, over intransitive,
legislation. 48 We are concerned here with encouraging the legislature to
make basic structural decisions concerning the form and shape of regulatory
policymaking. We are not arguing that the details of such policies should
be made in the statute, rather than through administrative regulation.
Establishing the structure of regulatory policy through statutes and through
statutory interpretation that is sensitive to the concerns of the original
parties to the deal disables strategic actors-particularly future legislators
and Presidents-from pursuing regulatory aims freely and without regard
to the choices made by elected representatives in the legislative arena. Of
course, positive political theory teaches us not to be pollyannish about the
system of lawmaking within the legislative and executive branches.549
Perhaps there will be little of the sort of public-regarding deliberation that
one sees often supposed by public law scholars in making recommendations
about regulation and administration."' Admittedly, proposing that courts
act in a politically sophisticated fashion does not facilitate such deliberation
548. See Rubin, supra note 5; Strauss, supra note 465.
549. See supra part IV.C-D.
550. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 462.
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(but nor, it should be emphasized, does it hinder it). Yet, even assuming
that the legislative and executive processes are plagued by strategic
behavior and political advantage-taking, the choice is invariably a
comparative one: What sort of regulatory process is replaced by reestablish-
ing the primacy of statute-making and regulatory design through legisla-
tion?"' What is replaced is a profoundly political process that lacks
many of the checks and balances provided by the lawmaking system
described in Article I. Ex post influence lacks many of the critical
institutional constraints that exist with respect to ex ante lawmaking.
Judicial interpretations that strengthen the original bargain establish yet
another important institutional constraint. The choice of enforcing the
structure of the original bargain is not a choice of law over politics; instead,
it is a choice for a certain type of politics. It is a type of politics that is
arranged to foster coalition formation, rather than individual strategic
initiatives, and to reward attention to institutional detail and legislative
design rather than generating pressures for ongoing monitoring and
supervision by future legislators, Presidents, and interest groups.
Thus far, we have spoken of enforcing the statutory bargain through
interpretations as though the mechanisms of such a strategy are apparent.
They are decidedly not so, however, as a large body of statutory interpreta-
tion scholarship that is critical of intentionalist theories of interpretation
attest. The most recent effort to construct a mechanism for implementing
the objectives sketched out here has to been to develop so-called positive
canons of statutory construction.
c. Positive Canons
Interpreting the statutory bargain need not entail the mere application of
conspicuous statements of legislative intent scattered through the pages of
legislative reports. Nor need it entail relying on a purely textualist method
of construction which takes literally the meaning (what is often labelled the
"plain meaning") that ordinary users of language would give to the
statutory text that is interpreted. Both of these conventional approaches
have their respective problems. 52  Instead, what is offered is a set of
interpretive rules that are designed to assist the project of determining the
contours of the statutory bargain.
These "positive canons" include rules that help untangle which
551. See infra part V.A.4 (discussing comparative institutional competence).
552. See, e.g., Eskridge, Dynamic Interpretation, supra note 467.
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legislators, in the course of the legislative process concerning a particular
statute, played the critical roles in fashioning the final bargain. The idea
is not that some legislators are entitled to speak for the legislature on the
whole. Rather, the point is that the construction of a statute entails the
formation of different coalitions of legislators, some of whom can be
bought rather cheaply, either because they will support the final bill no
matter what the form or because they do not care about the issue one way
or another.553 The legislative history of the statute will reveal in part the
nature of these coalitions and will shed light on how a majority group was
cobbled together to support the bill that was finally enacted.54  In the
course of understanding which roles respective legislators played in the
coalitional politics surrounding a legislative enactment, certain legislative
actions and statements should be given different weights. Consider an
example from the civil rights statute described above. During the course
of the legislative debates over H. R. 7152, the version of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 that was passed by the House and sent to the Senate for
consideration, Senators Joseph Clark, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, and
Clifford Case, a Republican from New Jersey, attached a lengthy memoran-
dum containing a detailed analysis of various provisions of the proposed
bill.555 Although the bill to which their memo referred was replaced by the
so-called Mansfield-Dirksen substitute, 56 a substitute which was passed
by the Senate and the House and signed into law, the famous Clark-Case
memorandum was relied upon frequently by courts in cases interpreting
Title VII of the Act.557 The positive political theory of the legislative
enactment process that considers the ways in which legislators form
coalitions, suggest compromises, and give their own interpretations of these
compromises during the course of the legislation's consideration, remains
quite skeptical about the use of this memo as evidence of what the coalition
that fashioned and implemented the substitute bill that was enacted into law
meant by their proposal.
The Clark-Case memorandum has been described by positive political
theorists as a form of "cheap talk," that is, a form of strategic communica-
tion to an audience which includes implementing agencies and courts in
553. See McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 440.
554. See Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 517.
555. 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964).
556. See LOEVY, supra note 519, at 225-55.
557. See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977).
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order to steer regulatory policy in their preferred direction."' 8 The bulk
of the positive canons described in the positive political theory literature on
statutory interpretation are designed to blunt the effects of this cheap talk
and to take seriously in interpreting statutes only those statements and
actions which reflect the investment of resources and commitments that
give them veracity.
The use of positive canons to give effect to certain legislative decisions
does not rest on a distinction between the legislature acting in a public-
regarding, rather than rent-seeking, capacity. Most lawmaking behavior is
presumed to be strategic. Interpretive rules that separate information that
is nothing more than cheap talk from information that is probative with
regard to the actual understandings of legislators in the course of shaping
coalitions and making final legislative agreements aim to constrict the
scope of lawmaking strategies which threaten to undermine the structure of
the legislative bargain. Positive canons thus function to preserve the
agreement reached by legislators within coalitions and institutions that
reflect strategic choices against threats from opportunistic legislators (inside
and outside the coalitions).
4. Statutory Interpretation and Institutional Choice
The description of the process of statutory interpretation in the proceed-
ing sections covers only part of the role and relevance of statutory
interpretation in regulatory policymaking. Decisions about statutory
interpretation involve choices not only about method, but also about
institutions. As long as administrative agencies have been around as
instruments of regulatory implementation, the question of what role
agencies play in interpreting statutes has been pressing.559 Congress, the
President and, ultimately, the courts, make judgments concerning the proper
distribution of interpretive responsibility among the institutions in
government. This distributive judgment has taken on particular importance
in the last decade following the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron v.
Natural Resource Defense Council.5" In Chevron, as is tediously well
known by now, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step process for
558. See Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 517. See generally McNollgast, Legislative Intent,
supra note 440 (discussing concept of "cheap talk").
559. For early examples of how courts deal with this issue (no, the problem did not arise tabula
rasa with Chevron in 1984), see, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947); NLRB
v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. III (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
560. 476 U.S. 837 (1984).
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determining whether an agency's statutory interpretation will be accepted
by the reviewing court as correct. First, the court must consider whether
the statute clearly resolves the issue; if it does, the court's work is at an
end. If the statute does not resolve the issue, the agency's interpretation
will be accepted so long as it reflects a "permissible construction of the
statute. '561 The notion that Chevron reflects a fair judgment concerning
the intent of Congress and the President regarding the proper assignment
of interpretive authority has been rightly criticized as misleading. 62 At
the very least, we would be hard pressed to attribute to lawmakers a
comprehensive rule of interpretation for all statutes and all agencies; surely,
the lawmakers' response to the question, "does Chevron reflect the proper
approach to discerning the scope of the agency's interpretive discretion?"
will be some version of "it depends." No overarching conclusion
concerning Congress and the President's wishes across an entire range of
statutes and agencies seems sustainable. 63
561. 467 U.S. at 476.
562. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 394.
563. Cass Sunstein argues, however, that the Chevron decision is inconsistent with section 706 of
the Administrative Procedure Act. If he is right, then Congress did make a comprehensive choice in
1946 to limit the reviewing courts' ability to defer to agency judgments. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 2071, 2080-81 & 2081 n.46 (1990). However,
his argument is not supportable on the facts he describes. To begin with, the language of section 706
is question-begging; it states: "To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions."
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). The reviewing Court does fulfill the responsibility, under Chevron, to interpret
the statute. That, after all, is the essence of step one. what should be the proper attitude of the
reviewing court toward the agency's interpretation cannot be answered by the direction to "decide" and
"interpret." As to the legislative history, nowhere in the history of the APA is there an instruction to
the courts to interpret statutes de novo. Sunstein takes from the wealth of statutory materials the
strongest statements in support of aggressive judicial review. Yet, not even in these statements are there
indications that the courts were meant to eschew deference to agencies. The only place the statement
de novo appears is in the Attorney General's manual, a document that has traditionally been regarded
as an important piece of historical evidence concerning the meaning of the statute. In the manual, the
Attorney General's committee presents de novo as an alternative which the court is free to reject in
favor the agency's interpretation, especially "when the legislation deals with complex matters calling
for expert knowledge and judgment." FINAL REPORT OF THE AT'TORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc.
No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1941).
Sunstein follows this mention of the Attorney General's manual with a rather curious statement:
"Moreover, the Committee may well have been biased against independent judicial review because it
was allied with the institutional interests of the executive branch, and because it consisted in large part
of the New Deal enthusiasts skeptical about judicial checks on administration." Sunstein, supra, at 2081
n.46. Perhaps. But, then, so would Congress be allied; if the APA's judicial review provisions have
a theme that grows out of the politics of the era and the political choices made by Congress and the
President at the time, it would seem to be a skepticism about strong judicial review borne of the
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But what about resting Chevron on a judgment, grounded in positive
political theory, that judicial deference is prudent along the lines described
in the case? The positive political case is strong given a set of conditions;
without these conditions, Chevron is not only not prudent, but threatens to
disrupt the regulatory process by strengthening the hand of strategic
politicians, sometimes legislators and other times the President, at the
expense of sensible regulatory policy.
Both conditions involve considering how agencies and courts fulfill their
respective responsibilities under each of Chevron's two prongs. First let us
consider the agencies. Agencies interpret statutes continuously; although
constantly overlooked, a critical component of regulatory decisionmaking
is agencies' own interpretations of the statutes they are charged with
implementing. This has not, in the first instance, anything to do with
authority or proper role; it is simply a fact of administrative life that
agencies consider the scope of their statutory responsibilities by reading and
applying the language and history of their organic statutes. Peter Strauss
has lucidly described both the persistence and the unique nature of agency
statutory interpretations. As to whether this unique nature tends to push the
agency in the direction to fealty to the original statutory bargain or toward
obedience to the episodic political influences of current lawmakers, Strauss
notes both tendencies. There is obviously a real tension here. Administra-
tive expertise, a concept we might think to scoff at in light of the positive
political stories discussed earlier, has a role to play. Agencies are the
institutional memories of the bargains struck by legislators in the original
regulatory statutes. While their incentive structure is messy in light of the
experience with conservative federal judges substituting their judgments for the judgments of
administrative agencies. Why, in this political light, Congress and the President would express an intent
to require courts to interpret regulatory statutes (passed, after all, by the New Deal Congress) de novo
is counter-intuitive.
This exegesis into Sunstein's APA argument is an excuse to raise a larger point: The structure of
administrative law, and in particular the APA, reflects the political choices made by rational, partisan
decisionmakers acting in the shadow of a particular political environment. That environment was made
up of quite liberal legislators and a liberal Democratic President (FDR) along with conservative federal
judges (appointees of the string of Republican presidents proceeding Roosevelt). Many of the choices
made in the APA were reflections of those political choices. See Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present,
and Future, 72 VA. L. REv. 447 (1986). However, the historiography on the origins of modem
administrative law and the APA either elide the political dimensions of this story altogether or else
interpret the episode in an opposite way, namely, as an instance of Congress and the President
recognizing the imperative of bringing administrative agencies under the supervision of federal courts
through fortified judicial review. See, e.g., MORTON J. HoRwIrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW: 1870-1960 ch. 8 (1977); Walter Gellhom, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings,
72 VA. L. REv. 219 (1986).
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cross-cutting political pressures they confront, their comparative advantage
over other institutions is their understanding of the legislative history (both
the real and the manufactured history) of the statute. Strauss contrasts this
expertise with the generalist judge:
Responsible in some sense for all law, a court has infrequent occasion to
consider the meaning of any particular part of the law, and no responsibility
for continuing, proactive attention to its development. If it comes to the
legislative history at all, it comes to that history cold, without a developed
institutional sense of the state of play. It does not participate in, indeed very
likely is utterly unaware of, what occurs in drafting, hearings, debates, or a
continuing course of oversight hearings, presidential guidance, and frustrated
efforts at securing legislative change ... . For the agency, of course, the
reverse is generally true; its closeness to the legislative process, continued
involvement, and responsibility are ... precisely the reasons the courts have
long given its readings of statutory meaning special weight.5' 4
If we think of interpretation in terms of the positive canons described
earlier, the advantages of these interpretive qualities are all the more
significant. The court brings off-the-rack interpretive rules to bear in
construing statutes which have distinct political histories. Such interpretive
rules function like Occam's razor, synthesizing the body of statutory law
into a structure of bargaining and deal-making that courts can understand
from one statutory case to another. Agencies can invest in expertise;
indeed, they must be especially immersed in the political history of the
statute that frames their regulatory responsibilities. The agency's
interpretive expertise, then, is a notable element of its role in regulatory
decisionmaking; to the extent that courts can craft doctrines allocating
interpretive responsibilities across institutions, this expertise element is
important.
The process of agency interpretation is also unique because agencies are
peculiarly placed between two competing loci of power-Congress and the
President. This is the other side of the tension alluded to earlier. The
political machinations triggered by the agency's location in the political
process counsels caution in deploying a legal rule that changes the
allocation of power between two institutions-in the case of Chevron,
564. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the Primary Official With Responsibility to Read
Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 321, 346-47
(1990). See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in
Administrative Law, 64 Tx. L. REv. 469 (1985); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year:
Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987).
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between agencies and courts. In the legal literature on separation of
powers, we often return to the image of the Congress and the Presidency
in perfect balance, with each institution checking the other and agencies
mediating between these two Leviathans. 65 The reality is, needless to
say, much more complicated.5 66  Recently, critics of Chevron have
insisted that the result of an austere agency deference rule is to nurture
greater presidential control and influence at the expense of both Congress
and of sound regulatory policy generally.567 But surely this critique
underestimates the vitality of legislative efforts to counteract presidential
strategies. From the perspective of positive political theory, the problem
is not that administrative agency deference enables the President to
dominate the regulatory process without any check or balance; rather, it is
that we may recoil from the political fallout generated by this change in the
legal landscape. Congress' reaction to a deference rule that increases
presidential power in the short term may take the form of pulling and
tugging agencies toward the agendas of legislators;568 or it may take the
form of constraining presidential power through statutory and non-statutory
controls. 69 In order to gauge whether we are willing to bear, at the
system level, the costs associated with this pattern of presidential ac-
tion/congressional reaction we need to know about the tactics and strategies
each institution is prepared to bring to the fight. If the desideratum of a
Chevron-like rule of judicial deference is intensified competition among
legislators and the President, we may want to construct legal constraints on
this competition or abandon the rule altogether.
Now what of the courts? The sources of judicial constraints and
discretion were considered in subpart IV(D). 70 The extent to which we
should commit to a Chevron deference rule or commend to courts a
different, and more de novo-type, approach, turns on our view concerning
whether courts will in fact exercise their interpretive responsibilities. If we
can depend upon a court to interpret statutes in accordance with the
565. See Macey, supra note 145.
566. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 5; Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 573 (1984).
567. Two especially perceptive critiques of Chevron from this perspective are Sunstein, supra note
563; Farina, supra note 394.
568. See supra notes 502-12 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC/fairness doctrine example).
569. See supra notes 363-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Competitiveness Council
example).
570. See supra part IV.D.
1994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
principles described earlier,57' paying attention to the structure of the
original statutory bargain, and relying upon positive canons to illuminate
the nature and structure of the bargain, then the advantages of a more
independent, nondeferential approach are greater. In this light, the choice
is between a conscientious, politically sensitive, but still largely indepen-
dent, court and an expert, but politically dependent, agency. There is no
uniform criteria we can use to make the choice between the two. Political
independence gives us one answer. Expertise gives another. But we are
at least armed with information that enables us to consider wisely the
positive political implications of making allocative decisions concerning
courts and agencies.
572
Allocating interpretive responsibility is merely one such choice. The law
frequently makes such allocative decisions. Courts must decide continually
how to apportion responsibilities for making different types of regulatory
decisions. Many of these decisions intersect statutory and administrative
law in ways that are interesting to consider from the perspective of positive
political theory. This subpart considered statutory law in the course of
interpreting statutes. The next subpart considers administrative law.
B. Administrative Law
1. The Stakes of Administrative Law
The debate over the proper normative strategy for controlling, through
legal rules, the conduct of regulatory policymaking recreates the perennial
debate over the role of administrative law in regulatory government. Much
of the recent literature has reflected a growing concern with the use of
vigorous legal controls on administrative action.573 Such controls risk
571. See supra text accompanying notes 552-58.
572. To restate this point at a somewhat higher level of abstraction, in order to know how to make
this institutional choice, we need to have a more richly developed theory of proper public administration
and the rule of law. The tensions and tradeoffs between expertise and political independence are, of
course, a perennial theme in the literature on public administration in American history. See, e.g.,
DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (2d ed. 1984). My point here is merely that one cannot decisively settle the
issue of institutional choice--what we might call the Chevron conundrum-without a more complete
theory that accounts for, and at some level resolves, these tensions and tradeoffs.
573. See, e.g., MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 11; SHAPIRO, supra note 12; Thomas 0. McGarity,
Thoughts on "DeossiJfying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Unruly Judicial Review ofRulemaking, 5 NAT. RES. & ENV. 23 (1990); Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting
Overton Park" Political and Judicial Controls Over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992).
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"ossifying" the regulatory process, distorting regulatory decisions, leaving
us with too much or too little regulation, and in various ways transmogri-
fying regulatory policymaking into a legalistic, and overly cautious,
system.574 Unlike earlier versions of this debate in which the core of the
disagreement concerned whether or not courts should look hard at agency
decisions or whether courts should impose stricter procedural burdens on
agencies in enacting policy,575 the more modem iteration of this debate
zeros in on the mechanisms and styles of judicial control. 57 6  In this
sense, the structure of the modem debate is both more specific and more
abstract than much of what has come before. 77
It is more specific because arguments exist for and against particular
legal strategies for controlling regulatory action. The tacit (and accurate)
assumption seems to be that much of contemporary administrative law is
made in small bits, that is, through various doctrines concerning how and
when one secures forms of administrative law review. Jerry Mashaw, for
instance, has recently mapped out the case for significantly curtailing the
use of preenforcement review of administrative regulations as the
cornerstone of a strategy for cabining the effects of strategic action by
politicians.5 Moreover, debate rages over the proper rules of standing
for parties challenging administrative regulations. 79 The effect of the
two recent Lujan decisions is to establish greater barriers to judicial relief
for administrative agency decisions.58 Such restrictions have generated
574. See McGarity, supra note 573. See also Colin Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in
Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 393, 428-34 (1981).
575. See, e.g., Carl Auerbach, Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Relationship Between
Administrative Procedures and Judicial Review, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 15 (1977); Martin Shapiro,
Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487 (1983); Stewart, supra note 128; Cass
R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 17 (1983).
576. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1990); Mashaw, supra note 79.
577. For the criticism that administrative law scholars have relied too heavily on courts and judicial
review in considering issues of regulation and public administration, see IR Shep Melnick,
Administrative law and Bureaucratic Rationality, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 245 (1992).
578. Id. Mashaw's Article relies on some of the same analytical technologies as positive political
theory. Indeed, the thrust of this recent Article is that judicial review doctrine (pre-enforcement review,
at least) should be constructed in order to check the strategic elements of politics. Elsewhere, Mashaw
has been more critical of reliance on rational choice theory as a positive and normative basis for public
law reform. See Mashaw, supra note 349; Mashaw, supra note 462.
579. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1141 (1993); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DuKE L.J. 1170 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing
After "Lujan"? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992).
580. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497
U.S. 871 (1990). See generally Sunstein, supra note 579.
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critical heat, with administrative law scholars debating the wisdom of these
and other "availability" restrictions on judicial relief in regulatory matters.
Meanwhile the debate over Chevron and the question of administrative
interpretations and judicial deference chugs along unabated."8' As these
debates illustrate, disagreements over administrative law are frequently had
at the margin, with energies invested in describing how reconstructing one
part of the contemporary administrative law edifice would have salutary
effects.
To some extent, the debates recreate the patterns of administrative law
scholarship generally, with many arguing for more generous access to
federal courts and more searching judicial scrutiny and others suggesting
a parsimonious role for the federal courts in the regulatory process. At
another level, however, the doctrine-specific debates, taken collectively,
illustrate a critical point of the discussion in this Part; namely, that
decisions concerning how best to regulate politics and the role of politics
in the regulatory process are often decisions at the margin. They entail
picking institutional and doctrinal devices that are suited to accomplishing
the objective of reforming regulation without recreating the political
interferences that distort and disrupt the regulatory process. 82
There is a larger set of issues, however, than those raised by disagree-
ments over the content of particular administrative law rules and doctrines.
These issues concern the approach courts take to scrutinize the content and
processes of agency decisionmaking. Administrative law encapsulates
many of these large issues under the capacious category "scope of
review."'583 Yet, the issues resist even this large category. What is at
581. Three recent contributions to the massive literature on Chevron are especially noteworthy.
Thomas Merrill, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994); Peter Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron
Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984; Linda Cohen &
Matthew Spitzer, The Chevron Puzzle, 57 L. & CONrEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming, June 1994). The latter
article is the most comprehensive effort thus far to bring positive political theory to bear in illuminating
the Chevron issue.
582. This doctrinal heterogeneity in contemporary administrative law is a point often
underappreciated in political scientists' commentaries on the state of administrative law scholarship.
Latent in the criticisms of political scientists that legal scholars are too obsessed with judicial review
and the courts in writing about regulation, see Melnick, supra note 577, is the mistaken belief that
judicial review is nonolithic. Some aspects of judicial scrutiny of administrative decisionmaking are
connected to critical issues of politics and decisionmaking within political institutions; judicial scrutiny
is not always mere courts "second-guessing" agency decisionmaldng through various forms of hard-look
review. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 128. Just as legal scholars frequently ignore important issues
of politics in writing about regulation, political scientists frequently fail to appreciate the multifaceted
legal dimensions of administrative law.
583. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). See generally JAFFE, supra note 9.
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stake, as well, is the question of what sort of attitudes and approaches
courts bring to bear in scrutinizing agency decisions. It is not merely the
choices between "hard" versus "soft" looks or "synoptic" versus "incremen-
tal" review that is germane. In addition, it is how courts approach their
task of appraising the dimensions of regulatory policymaking when they
confront it at the level of reviewing an agency decision.
2. The (Properly) Political Structure of Administrative Law
Politics persist in a legal environment in which courts exercise their
control through broad directives to agencies to act better, more reasonably,
and more cost-effectively. The purpose of these broad directives, as
suggested earlier, may be to recreate the political struggles that bore the
regulatory program initially. From this perspective, judicial intervention
would seem essential to limit the scope of destructive political competition.
But the counsel in this section is for caution and judicial modesty.
Administrative law as a set of doctrinal strategies for courts to use in
checking agency decisionmaking under situations in which the statute
represents no source of constraint can be an ill-tailored tool for blunting the
impact of politics and political strategy.
The problem is not merely, or especially, that agencies will ignore the
instructions of courts, or that agencies cannot gauge how courts are likely
to treat their particular regulatory decisions upon review. Rather, the
problem is that the action-forcing decisions of courts under the rubric of
administrative law/scope of review carve out a piece of the vast political
puzzle, leaving the rest of the puzzle intact; they intervene at one stage and
with respect to only one aspect of a multi-faceted regulatory process. The
result is that the political structure of the agency decision is left intact. The
reasons that gave rise to the agency decision with which the court quarrels,
persist without disturbance.
Consider, as an example of this, the Supreme Court's intervention into
the decision by the Secretary of Transportation during the Reagan
administration to rescind the passive restraint requirement issued by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).584 The
regulatory story has many different parts, but the thrust of it is rather easy
to comprehend. After campaigning on the platform of getting government
off the backs of industry, President Reagan was determined to reconstruct
the approach to safety regulation that had characterized previous adminis-
584. See the description in MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 11.
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trations585 In that connection, his transportation secretary quickly
rescinded the passive restraint requirement on the grounds that it was
expensive and that it was no longer clear that the rule would provide
significant safety benefits.586 In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the Supreme Court reversed
the agency's decision, finding the decision arbitrary and capricious. 87
The nub of the Court's complaint was that the agency had not furnished
sufficient reasons justifying its action. 8 Underlying the Court's analysis
is the idea that agency decisionmaking should not turn, as it seemed to in
this case, on political considerations, on the reactions of a new President
who expresses his regulatory agenda by forcing the agency to change its
policies.589 Even if we accept the premise, the means by which the Court
implements this vision of apolitical administration is naive. NHTSA
remains an agency subject to the political strictures of legislative and
presidential decisions within a particular political environment after the
State Farm decision.590 The Court declined, in State Farm, to read the
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 to require the passive restraints standard
or even to require that the agency follow a process of regulatory
decisionmaking that would insulate it somewhat from the political pressures
of its principals. Instead, the Court reviewed the product of this political
process and declared "Your reasons are not good enough."
What were the Court's alternatives? One was to leave the issue to the
political process. To be sure, the NHTSA was buffeted by political
considerations and, in particular, the interests of the Reagan administration.
Yet, there were constraints built into the executive branch process that
limited some of the strategizing that the Court apparently feared. Among
the institutional constraints were the choices that the administration had to
make among the various regulatory causes with which it was concerned.
585. Id.
586. Id. at 207-08.
587. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
588. Id. at 43. Left was the implication that the agency may well be able to provide an adequate
set of reasons to insulate its rescission decision from review. However, as Merrick Garland wrote soon
after the State Farm decision, it seems highly unlikely that a reviewing court would have upheld a
rescission under the circumstances described by the Supreme Court in the case. See Merrick B.
Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REv. 505 (1985).
589. But see Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, 463 U.S. at 53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("A change
in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an
executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations). See also
EDLEY, supra note 576, at 182-84.
590. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 11.
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The necessity of developing regulatory priorities in an environment in
which resources bind choice reflects one sort of institutional constraint that
would limit the ability of the President to gut the NHTSA's regulatory
agenda.591 Another institutional constraint involves the role of uncertain-
ty. Reenacting a regulation like the passive restraint rule is difficult and
expensive. To rescind a rule is to invest in a policy outcome in an
environment in which the administration's political calculus may
change.592  For this reason, inertia or caution may govern the
administration's approach to influencing regulatory outcomes. Beyond
intra-institutional constraints lie the constraints imposed by other political
institutions, notably Congress. Perhaps there were no legislative coalitions
that had enough of a stake in the passive restraints rule to generate
reactions to the administration's action.5 93 However, in other regulatory
situations, such coalitions may well form; and the President's regulatory
strategies may well be checked by legislators' reactions to presidential
initiatives. To be sure, the Court's decision to leave this issue to the
regulatory process would, naturally, have the effect of leaving the
President's passive restraint decision intact. It is not at all clear, however,
that the general concern that animated critics of President Reagan's
regulatory strategies-the concern that the rescission of the passive restraint
rule represented the opening salvo in a march toward deregulation-were
well-founded.594 We should resist thinking of the choice before the Court
in State Farm, however, as between no constraints on politics and the type
of constraint imposed by this style of judicial review. The choice, always,
is among which institutional constraints are appropriate. Another
alternative for the Court in State Farm, that is frequently available, was to
rest its decision on a reading of the statute, on a statutory interpretation,
rather than an administrative law rationale. The rationale would be that the
instruction in the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 to reduce fatalities and
591. Of course, the administration might still regard, as was probably the case here, an issue like
"passive restraints" to be sufficiently important to prioritize. The point is simply that we cannot
conclude from the rescission of this rule that the administration would be able to-even if it wanted
to--carry out a pogrom against auto safety regulation writ large.
592. Cf. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, supra note 294 (discussing role of uncertainty in connection
with legislature).
593. It was surely, after all, nofait accompli, since the agency rescinded the rule after a full notice
and comment rulemaking proceeding.
594. For an excellent analysis of the pitfalls facing presidential efforts to deregulate, see MARTHA
DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985). For an interesting, recent case
study, see Thomas McCraw's chapter on Alfred Kahn and the demise of the Civil Aeronautics Board
in THOMAS K. McCRAw, THE PROPHETS OF REGULATION 222-299 (1984).
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injuries on the nation's highways restricts the domain of agency discretion
to rescind a rule without convincing evidence that such a rescission would
result in equal or greater safety. The problem with this reading, though, is
that the history of the Act does not clearly indicate that the legislative
coalitions that settled on this statutory bargain contemplated that NHTSA
would implement the strictest possible safety regulations.595
The choice is between two doctrinal pegs, statutory interpretation and
administrative law. The first peg rests on a studied interpretation of the
statute and its history, which may lead the Court to cabin the discretion of
the agency (and, therefore, the President) in order to secure the bargain that
was struck among a majority of the legislature circa 1966 and President
Johnson. Such a strategy would accomplish the aims described in the
proceeding section. It is quite dependent, however, on the structure of the
original statutory bargain. How did Congress communicate its intent
through the original statute? Is there the sort of evidence and data that we
can use, through use of positive canons and politically sophisticated
interpretive approaches, to discern enough of the structure of regulatory
bargain to resolve issues like the NHTSA rescission of passive restraints?
Fundamentally, the use of statutory interpretation as a strategy of
constraining political strategy and regulatory control is dependent upon the
specific statute-its history, structure, and design.596
The other peg-administrative law-has the advantage of generality.
Once they have articulated the "reasonableness" requirement of State Farm,
all agencies are on notice that reviewing courts will subject regulatory
decisions to some harder level of scrutiny. Even if this scrutiny expresses
little more than a mood or an attitude, it still provides an important signal
to agencies in designing their regulations and regulatory strategies. The
Court's approach to review becomes an important part of the environment
in which the agency makes policy. Its comparative advantage, however, is
also its critical flaw. Administrative law constructs a web of general
requirements on decisions made by heterogenous agencies acting within
cross-cutting, yet particular, political environments. The political
environment in which NHTSA operates is not the same as the political
environment in which the EPA conducts its regulatory business. This is
not to say that general judicial scrutiny through administrative law is
uniformly unworkable or undesirable. It just says that review strategies of
595. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 11; Elizabeth Drew, The Politics of Auto Safety, 218
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 96 (1966).
596. See the discussion of statutory interpretation in supra part V.A.3.
[VOL. 72:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss1/2
REGULATORY REFORM
the sort illustrated by the State Farm decision are ill-suited to plumb the
depths of the political contours of a particular political relationship as it
arises in a distinct regulatory context.
Another example of the limits of administrative law as a strategy for
grappling with complex political situations comes from a classic adminis-
trative law case, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe.597 The case
involved a decision by the Secretary of Transportation to approve a permit
for building an expressway through Overton Park in Memphis, Tennes-
see.59" In reviewing the Secretary's decision, the Court emphasized the
history of the statute and its command to the federal government to refrain
from building roads through parks unless absolutely necessary.5 99 The
flaw in the Secretary's decision, argued the Court, stemmed from his failure
to consider seriously and systematically the relevant issues and facts that
may well have led him to deny the permit. "Some explanation" is
necessary "to determine if the Secretary acted within the scope of his
authority and if the Secretary's action was justifiable under the applicable
standard."0"' The argument that the Secretary signed the permit without
considering either his statutory obligations under the Department of
Transportation Act of 1966 and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968
missed important elements of the story. The critical elements of the story
were political.6"'
As Professor Strauss describes the complex facts underlying the case, the
controversy over the decision to build a highway through Overton Park was
caught up in a swirl of national and local politics.60 2 At the national
level, legislative coalitions and the President vigorously fought over the
structure and details of these two federal transportation statutes. Crucial to
597. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
598. Peter Strauss has recently offered an extremely useful account of the Overton Park Case. The
discussion in the text relies largely on his account. See Strauss, supra note 573.
599. The source of this alleged command was section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act
of 1966 and section 18 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968. Both sections state:
[T]he Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires the use of any
publicly owned land from a public park ... unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent
alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to
minimize harm to such park ... resulting from such use.
Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966)
(codified at 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1988)); Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, 518, 82
Stat. 815, 823-24 (1968) (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1988)).
600. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 418.
601. See Strauss, supra note 573.
602. See id. at part II.
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the debate over these Acts were disagreements over the factors the
Secretary of Transportation was to take into account in making building
decisions. The result was a legislative compromise in which the legislature
constructed a framework of regulatory authority in which the Secretary of
Transportation would exercise substantial discretion. 3 In one telling
passage of the House Conference Report quoted by Strauss, the floor
managers of the legislation in the House described their understanding of
section 4(f) of the Transportation Act: "This amendment of both relevant
sections of law is intended to make it unmistakably clear that neither
section constitutes a mandatory prohibition against the use of the enumerat-
ed lands, but rather, is a discretionary authority which must be used with
both wisdom and reason." 4
Politics at the local level also shaped the political environment in which
the Secretary acted.6 5 As controversy raged through Memphis for many
years over the issue of highway construction through Overton Park,0 6 the
implementing agency modulated the serious political noise coming through
various parts of the political processes that were implicated by these
decisions. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Transportation was constantly
considering, evaluating, and balancing information and influences from
within the structure of local politics. 607 The decision to grant the permit
came at the end of a long political process in which the regulatory
decisionmaker had been pulled and tugged in various directions. In this
light, the vantage point of the Supreme Court seemed rather remote.
The Overton Park decision, which spawned an enormous body of
caselaw establishing "hard look" review of agency decisions,6 t is striking
in its broad paean to aggressive review of decisions on the grounds that
such review is necessary to guard against arbitrary and capricious action.
As the facts of Overton Park, and perhaps many other "hard look"-era
cases, suggest, the real problem with the agency's decision is not
principally inept decisionmaking, decisions made lazily by agencies without
sensitivity to the difficult factual and legal issues raised by the case.
603. Id. at 1271-76.
604. H.R. CONF. REP.No. 1799, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1968), quoted in Strauss, supra note 573,
at 1287.
605. See Strauss, supra note 573, at 1290-1317.
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied
403 U.S. 923 (1971). For a comprehensive discussion, see generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM
T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 504-515 (1993).
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Rather, the concern seems to be that the agency's decision was wrong
because it adhered to principles and factors that had no support in the
statute or in principles of sound administrative policymaking.0 9
There may yet be another perfectly good reason for the sort of scrutiny
contemplated by the Court in Overton Park. Perhaps it was precisely the
existence and persistence of the political whirlwind in which the agency
operated that called for some restraint through administrative law. This
vision of courts rescuing agencies from politics through administrative law
is, of course, just another element of the view that courts should perfect
political and regulatory processes through more searching judicial
scrutiny."' Restyled as a process-perfecting decision, Overton Park is
problematic for two different reasons. First, it is not at all clear that the
politics that drove the Secretary's decision reflected a political process that
needed correcting. By normatively appealing standards of effective interest
representation and checks and balances,61' the process that gave rise to
the granting of the permit by Secretary Volpe seemed rather good. We
need not attribute this to the public-regarding behavior of the 90th Congress
or the Memphis City Council. Instead, the institutional constraints that
bind strategic political action seemed to work in this instance. Other
instances may, naturally, be much more problematic. Perhaps, ironically,
the hard look review set in motion by Overton Park has much more
applicability to a different set of facts and a different political context.
In these situations of flawed politics, correction through administrative
law review is deeply problematic. The problem, as illustrated by cases like
Overton Park and State Farm, is that the courts are unwilling to construct
the sort of comprehensive political histories of these regulatory statutes that
would enable them to consider systematically the character of the
regulatory decision and the efficacy of political controls. Such attention is
vital in understanding the full dimensions of the problem with which the
court is concerned.612 In State Farm, the Court did not consider whether
political controls can work to cabin the partisan political strategizing by the
President. Perhaps it extrapolated from what happened with Standard 208
that the process had broken down. But, significantly, what the Court
purported to do in State Farm was not merely to reverse the
609. See Shapiro, supra note 575.
610. See ELY, supra note 1; CHOPER, supra note 1; Klarman, supra note 4.
611. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 128.
612. See generally WILSON, supra note 94 (discussing multifaceted nature of regulatory
decisionmaking).
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administration's decision, but to make general administrative law, to create
an approach to regulating political influence across a range of cases and
political contexts. The examination of politics and political controls in
Overton Park is even more myopic. The Court seriously underestimated
the prospect that legal interventions through the device of searching
administrative law review could not only fail to perfect politics, but could
undermine the political-institutional balances that constrict strategic
excesses of the sort that threaten to disrupt regulatory policymaking-both
ex post, in the course of making regulations and resolving disputes, and ex
ante, in the course of making regulatory statutes. The legacy of hard look
review after twenty years suggests that such underestimations can lead to
inauspicious results.13
Holmes' aphorism is apt here: Hard cases make bad law. What makes
cases involving regulation so frequently hard is the fact that they arise in
a complicated political context that is difficult to disentangle in the peculiar
arena of litigation and appellate court review.6 14  It is not that judges
cannot understand or appreciate the elements of politics. Rather, it is that
the thrust-perhaps even the basic theme-of administrative law is that
courts must step in and speak law to politics; they must develop and apply
general principles of law, asking what is reasonable, arbitrary, or an abuse
of discretion, in situations involving particular, fact-dependent, politically
rich, and institutionally bounded patterns of regulatory decisionmaking.6t s
613. Although his concerns are somewhat different, Robert Kagan has recently described important
features of American public policy-what he labels "adversarial legalism"-and its negative effects on
policy outcomes. A basic theme in his analysis is that the increasing reliance on legalistic, adversarial
methods of dispute resolution has hobbled progress in various aspects of public policy. Robert A.
Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MOMT. 369 (1991).
The discussion of cases such as State Farm and Overton Park suggests that there may be a basis to fear
that a similar phenomenon is going on in the area of administrative law and regulation. That is, the
reliance on similar processes with respect to judicial review of agency action may well have had similar
sorts of negative effects on policy outcomes as has adversarial legalism in the policy areas that Kagan
describes. See, e.g., DONALD HOROwIT, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); R. SHEP MELNICK,
REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR Acr (1983); JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL
COMPULSIONS: How PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY (1989).
614. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978)
(discussing limited capacities of ordinary litigation to resolve polycentric disputes).
615.
The risks created by accepted judicial participation in the political process should lead judges
to pay serious attention to the realities of political controls over administrative action before
acting on the assumption that such controls will not prove effective. ... Even if the court
concludes that political controls cannot be relied upon to encourage balanced outcomes, it
would be preferable for it directly to address the institutional causes of imbalance-seeking
to restore the effectiveness of the political controls, rather than transforming the judicial
[VOL. 72:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss1/2
REGULATORY REFORM
Often the political dimensions of regulatory decisionmaking call upon the
courts to develop forms of political controls-to speak politics back to
politics.
The result is, naturally, still law. That is, courts enact legal constraints
on the actions of agencies and, thereby, on the strategic activities of
legislators and Presidents. But the underpinnings of the courts' approaches,
their own strategies, must rest on politically sophisticated judgments and
on an appreciation for the right legal device at the right time.
VI. CONCLUSION
In his book, The End of Physics, David Lindley describes the underpin-
nings of the belief-the myth-that all the basic questions of physics will
soon be answered through the development of an abstract and comprehen-
sive theory, exquisite in its mathematical simplicity and powerful in its
hegemony over an entire field of scientific inquiry. Lindley argues that the
belief is a myth.
Perhaps physicists will one day find a theory of such compelling beauty that
its truth cannot be denied; truth will be beauty and beauty will be
truth-because, in the absence of any means to make practical tests, what is
beautiful is declared ipso facto to be the truth.... The theory of everything
will be, in precise terms, a myth. A myth is an explanation that everyone
agrees on because it is convenient to agree on it, not because its truth can be
demonstrated. This theory of everything, this myth, will indeed spell the end
of physics. It will be the end not because physics has at last been able to
explain everything in the universe, but because physics has reached the end
of all the things it has the power to explain.'
16
What Lindley describes is the reification of a methodology-in the case
of physics, abstract mathematics-and the way in which such reification
crowds out complexity, messiness, empirical tests, and other considerations
that threaten the pristine integrity of the theory. Positive political theory
represents, in its scope and pretensions, the same sort of ambition for a
"theory of everything." It poses the same danger as do those proclaiming
an imminent end to physics, namely, the embrace of a simplifying myth in
the name of answering all the big questions even where such a pathway
leads away from incremental progress. It is the choice for the "big picture"
over the "real world." The danger of swallowing the corpus of positive
review process into a surrogate political process.
Strauss, supra note 573, at 1329.
616. DAVID LINDLEY, TaE END OF PHYsIcs 255 (1993).
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political theory whole is that, as with the quest for a perfect theory of
physics, we are likely to chase mathematical simplicity and analytical
symmetry at the expense of rigor and complexity.
And not without reason. There is a certain beauty to positive political
theory. It provides a comprehensive framework for thinking about issues
of regulation, politics, and public law. Its technologies and, particularly,
its formal models, are subject to hypothesis testing and careful scrutiny.
What we are likely to find with such testing and scrutiny is that the simple
models described in the positive political theory literature must be modified
to take account of the complex qualities of regulatory politics and
administration. Even so, positive political theory is useful in forming the
sort of empirical tests that should be completed and the types of analyses
that must be done.
Since the decline of the legal process, and with it the end of any serious
interpenetration of cutting-edge currents of political science into prescrip-
tive public law, we are hungry for a positive foundation to the normative
analysis that circulates and recirculates in public law discourse. Positive
political theory represents an important strand in the contemporary studies
of politics and regulation. It is rapidly becoming part of the mainstream
of political science. For that reason alone, it deserves careful scrutiny by
those who study law and government.
While positive political theory has yet to prove itself as a "theory of
everything," it is perhaps at the stage now of being a set of "theories about
a lot of things." As such, it marks an important step forward in under-
standing the nature and functions of regulation, governmental processes,
and political behavior. It provides a framework of analysis within which
we can learn a great deal in the course of developing prescriptive strategies
for regulatory reform and institutional change. The aim of this Article has
been to consider, from the perspective of positive political theory, some of
the dimensions of such reform and change.
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